891.00/5–3146: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 31—1:35 p.m.]
777. It seems evident that Qavam is attempting to conciliate Tudeh Party in anticipation forthcoming elections and is making every effort to elect Majlis which he can control. Since Tudeh is only large, well organized and functioning political machine in Iran he wishes to use it for his own purposes if he can.
Thus in Embassy’s opinion Qavam’s action in removing Ala from position of Iranian representative before Security Council was not solely or even primarily result of Soviet pressure but was basically [Page 491] internal political move designed to placate Left elements in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. (Personal pique against Ala may also have had some influence in decision.)
Qavam is continuing to play risky political game. He appears to believe that once he has elected Majlis under his own control he can reverse trend to Left and steer Government more towards center.
He is undoubtedly aware of danger that situation might get beyond his control (many Rightists believe this has already happened) but is willing to risk it, apparently feeling that course to Left at moment is only means of settling Azerbaijan question peacefully and winning elections. His recent decree calling for distribution of state lands to peasants is important maneuver in this direction.
Additional dangers are that even if Qavam should succeed in electing Deputies he desires, he may not be able to control them. Moreover, political machine will be built up which will fall into subversive hands whenever Qavam leaves office.
On other hand, Qavanrs friendly attitude towards Tudeh has one potential advantage in that it might tend to remove Tudeh feeling that Party must depend on Soviet support to prevent being suppressed. Any encouragement that could be given Tudeh to become genuine Iranian Party without looking abroad for support would of course be helpful.