Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/5–2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

Tehran, May 25, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received May 26—4:30 p.m.]

752. Background furnished in Department’s 459, May 23, regarding US attitude on Iranian case in Security Council is most helpful. Qavam had expected report he made to Security Council to result in case being dropped from agenda, and line we took in meeting of May 22 caused some surprise but apparently no harm done.

I suggested some caution in future regarding press reports of civil disturbances. We will make every effort to keep Department promptly informed of any significant developments in this field.

As regards specific questions at end of telegram under reference:

1. I think it entirely safe to say there are no Soviet troops in Soviet uniforms in Iran with possible insignificant stray exceptions. On the other hand, there is too much evidence of presence of Soviet citizens in Azerbaijan, many with military training, to leave any doubt on this score. I have tried hard to obtain some estimate regarding numbers but few persons are willing to make any guess. Vice Consul Dooher, arrived today from Tabriz, estimates 2500 persons in city of Tabriz who could properly claim Soviet citizenship but he says this is mere guess and that many of them are of Turkish race and might also have claim to Iranian citizenship. He has heard one estimate of 150 genuine Russians from European Russia, but thinks this number too small if Soviet consular staff and officials are included. Tabriz is by far largest single center of Soviet activity. As regards interference, majority Soviet subjects are in Azerbaijan Army uniforms and are in charge Azerbaijan detachments at key points. Captain Gagarine says blond officer in Azerbaijan uniform who stopped him en route Tabriz could neither read nor speak anything except Russian. It would be unwarranted to assume from this incident that number of persons this type in Azerbaijan is necessarily large.

2. Specific instances of Soviet interference other than type indicated above are hard to establish, particularly in view difficulty to define what constitutes interference. Pishevari visits Soviet Consulate Tabriz frequently, especially in times of crisis, and Soviet Consul sees him often. It is evident that Pishevari leans on him heavily for advice, but I doubt very much that Soviet agents have found it necessary to use threats or even pressure. Pishevari group seeks Soviet assistance, often more than it obtains. As regards Soviet activities in Tehran, Security Council case seems to have had salutary effect on Soviet attitude, at least for the moment. Soviet Ambassador is bewildered by Qavam’s unpredictability and especially by Ala’s statements, and he suspects, despite Qavam’s denial, that Qavam may be instructing Ala to take line he has.

3. While Firuz is playing Soviet game he is doing so for own ulterior motives of retaining power and ultimate revenge on Shah. As regards Qavam, while strong and improper Soviet pressure was exerted on him while Soviet troops were still here, I could not honestly say that at present he receives or acts on Soviet advice more often than on my own. Qavam thinks he is playing clever game with Leftists and Soviets, to obtain firm control of government and elect a Majlis he can dominate. Qavam probably expects to turn against Leftist at what he considers proper time, perhaps 6 months hence.

4. At present moment Iranian Government and large part Iranian public would not welcome Security Council inquiry commission. However, Qavam appreciates strength which Security Council gives him and might possibly welcome inquiry or at least threat of inquiry later if negotiations with Azerbaijan go badly.

As regards general situation, Iranian Minister Posts and Telegraph Ghaffari reflected to me yesterday attitude voiced frequently by important Iranian officials, including Qavam, that British actions and interference in Iranian affairs today are as extensive and objectionable as Soviet. My request for factual evidence of present British activity usually produces merely references to past history, but recent press story (see Moscow 623 [1623], May 23⁵¹) that Ghaffari has confirmed British failure to evacuate Bushire, indicates attitude of large part Iranian officials and public.

It is not difficult to envisage that if next Iranian Cabinet is only slightly more to Left than present one, it might complain to Security Council against Britain. If suitable opportunity or provocation should arise even Qavam who knows that British do not like him might appeal against alleged British activity. Such an appeal would be carried through with more consistency than one against Soviets because of less fear of reprisals and equal if not more public support.

Actions of British in withdrawing troops by March 2 and overwhelming difference between British and Soviet attitudes towards Iranian case in Security Council seem, remarkably enough, not to have made any great impression on Iranians. In my view, Iranian appeal against British interference at present would be unwarranted, since British Ambassador appears to be carrying out loyally his instructions to keep hands off.

It is important to keep Iranian attitude towards British in mind to interpret Iranian Government’s attitude towards question of Soviet interference before Security Council. I would suggest caution on our part to avoid getting too far out on a limb on question of Soviet interference without more positive evidence to support Ala’s general accusations. Our sponsorship of complaints which are difficult to substantiate convincingly may rise to plague us in future cases before Security Council.

I am inclined to think on balance that it would be preferable for Security Council to terminate existing case on agenda. Iranian Government should not be encouraged to bring new case in future unless it has clear evidence which it is willing to place before Council and to stick to its guns. It may become appropriate for a member of Security Council to raise new case on his own initiative, but I do not think we should attempt to fight any case based on continuing Soviet interference unless we have more demonstrable proof than at present.

Open Soviet interference during last fall and winter has already achieved its purpose in the establishment of a functioning Azerbaijan govt and subsequent reports of concrete Soviet intervention are becoming increasingly scarce. It is entirely possible that Russians feel their work is so well done they can afford to leave rest to Azerbaijanis themselves except for the offer of advice from time to time. This latter is form of intervention almost impossible to prove.

Most likely case for Council intervention in connection Azerbaijan dispute would result from open Soviet assistance to Tabriz in case of civil war.

Allen

51. Not printed.