891.00/5–1146: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received 4:32 p.m.]
678. Following presentation of credentials this morning I had considerable conversation with Shah and Qavam, latter being present throughout in his capacity as Foreign Minister. His presence was unfortunate as far as obtaining significant information was concerned, since it was evident that Shah and Qavam were hesitant to speak entirely frankly in each other’s presence.
As concerned Iranian case before Security Council, I said Iran had great sympathy in the United States in its efforts to maintain its independence, but added that some difficulty was caused Secretary of State by fact that there did not appear to be complete understanding at all times between the Iranian Government and its representative in New York. As illustration, I cited fact that Ambassador Ala stated to Council on April 3 that no negotiations were going on between the Iranian and Soviet Governments concerning either the presence of Soviet troops in Iran or Soviet oil concession, since negotiations on neither of these subjects would be legal. Following day agreements were announced in Tehran on both subjects, making it evident that negotiations had in fact been going on. I stressed importance of assistance Security Council could give nation like Iran but also importance of that nation presenting its case to Council in most positive and exact manner. Both Shah and Qavam expressed understanding of difficulties created. Shah then asked what Council could do in actual fact to assist Iran. He evidently had in mind that the Council had no security forces at its disposal. I said that in spite this fact, Council could accomplish great deal through public opinion, as evidenced by fact that Iran was today free of regular Soviet forces.
As regards elections, Shah said they would be held “soon”. He and Qavam agreed, however, that 2 or 3 months would probably be required between issuance of decree calling for elections and actual holding thereof. No mention was made of foreign supervision. Qavam indicated he had in mind his promise to submit Soviet petroleum agreement to Majlis by October 24.
I said, principally for Qavam’s benefit, that program of reform which he had announced shortly after assumption of office had made a favorable impression in the United States, and I hoped he would have opportunity to institute it soon. Shah interposed that country must be united and independent before other measures could be undertaken.
[Page 459]Qavam said that Pishevari and Azerbaijan delegation were still here, but offered no comment on progress of negotiations.
In general, Shah’s policy is more likely to produce bloodshed than Qavam’s but latter’s conciliatory attitude towards Azerbaijan may result in continued existence of the Azerbaijan Army. Qavam thinks that Tehran Government can gain control over this army gradually by penetration. Shah favors more direct and stronger methods. It is possible that if Qavam continues to find Azerbaijan delegation intransigent, he may move in the direction of Shah’s position. If he does so, and if fighting results, with indirect or direct support of Azerbaijan by USSR, I consider it likely Iranian Government will present to Security Council new complaint against USSR.