891.00/5–846: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received May 9—8:17 a.m.]
659. From Allen.24 During my initial call on Prime Minister this morning Qavam said that communication which Ala had addressed to Security Council in past few days was in accord with instructions he had sent Ala. In response to my specific question he stated his instructions to Ala had included statement that Iran was unable inform Council fully regarding evacuation Azerbaijan because of activities of Soviet Union in that province.
As regards present negotiations with Pishevari, he said that they had achieved no results. At his last meeting with Azerbaijan delegation, he had again informed Pishevari that he could not modify in any way the 7–point program which he had announced some time ago, as basis for agreement with Azerbaijan. Yesterday when he had called in Soviet Ambassador to impress upon him desirability of [Page 454] public statement by Soviet Govt that all Soviet troops had withdrawn from Iran, he had informed Soviet Ambassador that he could not alter his position with Azerbaijan delegation, would have to resign his position if no further progress could be made. Soviet Ambassador told Qavam he hoped he would not resign since if he were followed by another Prime Minister who had a conciliatory policy, no advantage would be gained by resignation of Qavam who had pioneered this policy and was carrying it out so diligently. If new Prime Minister should carry out policy of coercion, bloodshed would result, and Iran would become scene of “international warfare”. Qavam said that although Soviet Ambassador had said “international warfare” and not “civil war”, he (Qavam) did not take remark very seriously.
The Prime Minister then told me in the utmost confidence that his difficulties were not so much with Pishevari as with the Shah. He said that he felt confident he could make arrangements with Pishevari and that they had actually come fairly close to an agreement, on the basis of the appointment by Tehran (1) of a governor general in Tabriz, and (2) of an officer from the Iranian Army to take command of the Azerbaijan forces, the latter to be selected by the Tehran Government from among five officers of the Iranian Army to be dominated [nominated?] by Pishevari. There still remained some difference over the question of finances, Pishevari insisting upon appointing the Director General of Finances of Azerbaijan, but Qavam thought this point could be arranged. Qavam said that the Shah objected to the proposed arrangement, and insisted upon sending three brigades of the Iranian Army (5,000 or 6,000 men) into Aberbaijan immediately, one to be station at Tabriz, one at Rezaieh, and one at Ardabil. Qavam was convinced that this action would result in fiasco, since dissatisfied elements in army and elements friendly towards Azerbaijan regime would probably go over to other side. In view of size of Azerbaijan forces (alleged to be 30,000), Qavam was afraid central forces would be defeated. He was convinced that best method of handling situation was to win Azerbaijan back under Tehran control by pacific penetration. The Shah, on other hand, insists upon forceful occupation of the area.
Qavam said that his primary difficulty with the Shah resulted from the Shah’s insistence upon exercising, in practice, his nominal position as Commander-in-Chief of Army. Qavam hoped very much that I would give the Shah good advice on the occasion of my forthcoming visit to him.
In response to my specific inquiry as to whether negotiations between Tehran and Tabriz, now being on, could be considered an [Page 455] internal Iranian matter, Qavam stated that this was not the case. He said that while the Russians gave the open appearance of aiding the two parties in getting together, he knew that Russians would aid Azerbaijan if matter developed into armed conflict.
In reply to another question regarding the numbers of armed civilian Russians left behind in the northern provinces, Qavam said that it was impossible for him to determine their number, but that he felt confident there were many such persons in Azerbaijan but not in the other four provinces. He said that they were well armed and were “officers, not enlisted men”.
In response to a further question, he said that as far as he was aware the military supplies and arms Russians still retained at time of their departure were taken away with them. He added, laughing, that they did not need to leave any behind, since they had armed the Azerbaijanis well already.
The two commissioners sent to Azerbaijan to determine whether Russian troops had withdrawn had visited only Tabriz and Julfa up to present time. Russian troops had in fact evacuated those points.
Qavam asked whether a public statement by Soviet Ambassador, or by Soviet Govt in Moscow, that all Russian troops had withdrawn from Iran would be satisfactory. I said that I did not think that would be sufficient, and that Iran Govt should make a further report to the Security Council as soon as it was in position to state on first hand knowledge that all Soviet troops had withdrawn. I pointed out that public statements to the press are neither a sufficient nor appropriate means of conveying information to the Security Council of the United Nations. Qavam nodded acquiescence.
The Prime Minister said that Soviet Ambassador had requested permission for 40 Soviet trucks to remain in northern Iran, to be used in fighting locusts. Soviet personnel to man these trucks would remain on Soviet side of the border (apparently until needed for locust control work). Qavam had refused the Soviet request, stating that any residue either of Soviet troops or material in northern Iran would give rise to claims that Soviets had not fully evacuated the country.
In response to my inquiry, he said that he was satisfied with Colonel Schwarzkopf and his mission, and that he liked Colonel Schwarzkopf personally. He also thought that General Ridley and the members of his mission were doing the best they could but that the Shah had not permitted them to accomplish anything with the Army.
During the conversation Qavam emphasized that he spoke in strictest confidence, both as regards his relations with Shah and his statement that Iran was still suffering from British as well as Soviet [Page 456] pressure. As regards the latter, he may have been referring to his belief that British are trying actively to oust him in favor of a Prime Minister who would follow less conciliatory course with Russia. [Allen.]
- George V. Allen, the appointed Ambassador to Iran, did not assume charge of the Embassy until May 11.↩