Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/5–646: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

Tehran, May 6, 1946—10 a.m.
[Received 5:48 p.m.]

641. We learned last night that on May 3 Shah sent his aide General Riazi, to British Ambassador Le Rougetel¹⁹ to express fear lest PriMin Qavam rush into agreement with Azerbaijanis which would leave Azerbaijan Army in being and prevent reestablishment of regular Iranian Army in province. Shah thought Qavam would feel obliged conclude agreement before May 6 and might make excessive concessions to achieve this. He hoped British would use influence to prevent it.

Le Rougetel reported this to Bevin at Paris and yesterday received instructions in following sense:

1. British Govt saw no reason why Qavam need conclude agreement by May 6. If he were being pushed to do so by Russians it might mean they wanted Iranian Govt recognition of continued existence Azerbaijan Army, nominally as part of Iranian Army, in order that they might claim tanks and other arms turned over to Azerbaijanis were in reality supplied to Iranian Govt and so not proper subject of any complaint.

2. Qavam should not hasten agreement merely to induce Russians to evacuate Iran. British Govt had no intention of passing over in silence any further failure of Russians to carry out their agreements this regard. PriMin should remember Iran question still on Security Council agenda.

3. However British Govt felt that Iranian Govt and Azerbaijan Govt should be able reach amicable agreement and felt Iranian Govt should avoid use of force against Azerbaijan.

Le Rougetel was authorized communicate foregoing views to Shah and Qavam. Bevin expressed opinion it would be useful if American Embassy supported this action.

British Ambassador was to see Shah and/or Qavam last night. I have not heard result.

In absence of instructions I do not propose make any formal démarche this regard, although I feel British position is well taken. As reported mytel 639, May 4, Qavam has given me to understand he will stand firm and does not intend to be rushed into making concessions beyond his publicly announced position. However experience has shown he sometimes weakens in situations of this kind when strong pressure is brought to bear and I think it might be useful if Dept were to instruct me to inform him of US Govt’s views.²⁰

In this connection I assume Dept agrees that continuance of well-armed Azerbaijan Army under control of local govt Tabriz would effectually perpetuate present de facto independence of province and make any agreement reached by Qavam purely face-saving device.

Sent Dept 641; repeated Moscow 186 and Paris for Delam.

Ward

19. Sir John H. Le Rougetel, who was designated British Ambassador to Iran on April 18, 1946.
20. In telegram 400, May 7, 8 p.m., the Department informed the Chargé: “We leave to Amb’s discretion views which should be expressed to Qavam regarding negotiations between Govt and Azerbaijanis. For our part we do not believe this Govt should accept responsibility for advising Qavam as to methods he should use in reasserting Iranian authority in Azerbaijan.” (891.00/5–746)