Files of the Council of Foreign Ministers: Lot M88: Box 2063
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers
| Participants: | Secretary Byrnes |
| Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen9 | |
| Mr. Charles E. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Vyshinski | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
The following is a summary of the conversation by subjects which took place before and after the dinner given by the Secretary for Mr. Molotov:
[Here follows section dealing with Bulgaria, printed in volume VI, page 100.]
Iranian Case
Before dinner, Mr. Molotov complained to the Secretary of the attitude of the United States in the Iranian case. He charged that the actions and attitude of the United States in the Security Council had not been those of a friend. He particularly mentioned U.S. refusal to postpone consideration of the case until April 10, as requested by the Soviet representative, and our insistence in keeping the matter on the agenda even after full agreement had been reached. The Soviet Government felt that it was the victim of an “anti-Soviet campaign” which had artificially exaggerated the Iranian situation and that the Security Council was being used as an instrument for the furtherance of this campaign.
After dinner, the Secretary outlined in great detail, with the help of Mr. Cohen, the actual course of events in the Security Council. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had attempted to be as conciliatory as possible and, by providing the resolution of April 4, had in effect postponed any discussion of the merits of the case until May 6, when we had hoped there would be nothing to discuss and the entire case dropped. He said that Gromyko’s subsequent motion to expunge the case from the agenda would merely serve to reopen the matter when it had in effect been really closed.
[Page 442]During the course of the discussion, both Molotov and Vyshinsky admitted that no agreement had been reached until April 5, and in general did not appear to be very much convinced with their own arguments.
The Secretary recalled the efforts he had made at Moscow with Generalissimo Stalin and with Mr. Molotov to deal with the Iranian question precisely in order to prevent its coming before the United Nations when he had then told them the United States would be forced to take a position in opposition to the Soviet Government.
Mr. Cohen made the point that, whereas before a public event such as the retention of Soviet troops, beyond the treaty date, in Iran had occurred, it was possible to attempt privately to arrange matters in dispute, but that once a public event such as in this case had occurred, the issue had to be met in the light of public opinion, and it was impossible then to settle such things on the basis of any deal.
In reply to the Secretary’s reference to the words “unforeseen circumstances” in the original Soviet assurances to the Iranian Government regarding withdrawal, Mr. Molotov stated that this phrase was to safeguard against the establishment of a new Iranian Government hostile to the Soviet Government. Once this was no longer regarded as a danger, the Soviet Government withdrew the qualifying clause. (It is interesting to note that by this statement Mr. Molotov went far toward admitting that the Soviet troops were retained in Iran in order to influence internal political developments in that country.)
The observations of Molotov and Vyshinsky again reveal the Soviet thesis that the relations between the great powers were more important than the strict observation [observance?] of the Charter and that their actions and policies in effect were outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Although Molotov and Vyshinsky did not withdraw their complaints of “unfriendly action” on the part of the United States, they did not press the arguments with any great vigor and the subject was dropped.
[Here follow remaining two sections dealing with Germany and Austria, printed in volume II, page 146.]
- Counselor to the United States delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers.↩