501.BC/3–2746: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
10. The United Nations Security Council continued to discuss Wednesday afternoon54 the advisability of immediate consideration of the Iranian question after the Soviet delegation walked out of the Chamber in protest over the failure of the Council to accept its demand to postpone all action on that issue until April 10.
Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate, who had argued in vain for hours for the delay, and his three advisers dramatically stalked out of the Chamber shortly after the Council had voted down the Soviet postponement proposal.
Before taking this action Gromyko made a brief statement, pointing out that he had made it clear that for reasons he had expressed that he could not as a representative of the Soviet Union participate further in the meeting. He then carefully packed his papers in a case and led the three advisers out of the hall.
The Soviet group left the Chamber at 5:20—more than 2 hours after the meeting opened. Up to that time delegates discussed without a break their views on the Soviet postponement motion. Arguments followed much the same line as the previous day.
Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-Chi opened the third New York Security Council session with a report that the three-nation sub-committee had been unable to reach agreement on the postponement question. He called for additional observations.
The sub-committee, comprising delegates of France, U.S.S.R. and the United States, was named late Tuesday when the Council was confronted with three separate proposals on the Iranian issue.
Again on Wednesday U.S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, and Gromyko had the leading roles in debate on the Iranian question, Byrnes steadfastly maintained that the Council should not act on the Soviet postponement motion until it had heard the views on the suggested delay from the Iranian representative.
The U.S. delegate pointed out that he had information from the American representative in Iran that no settlement had been reached in the Iranian-Soviet negotiations. He said that all confidence in the effectiveness of the Security Council would disappear if the Iranian representative were denied a chance to state his Government’s views on the postponement motion.
[Page 389]“UN will die in its infancy of inefficiency and ineffectiveness,” Byrnes added.55
Considerable discussion followed before the actual vote on the Soviet postponement motion was taken. Only Russia and Poland voted for the delay.
After the vote the Polish, Egyptian and French Ambassadors were called on for remarks before Gromyko had a chance to announce he would leave the Chamber.
The Council then proceeded to vote on an Egyptian motion to invite the Iranian representative to express his views on postponement before that body decided whether to delay consideration of the substance of the Iranian complaint that the presence of Soviet troops and agents in Iran pose a threat to international peace and security.
Seven votes were required to carry the Egyptian motion and eight were obtained. Australia and Poland abstained and Russia was not represented at the time.
Ambassador Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, whose letter of March 18 called the Security Council’s attention to what was termed a dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union, was then asked to sit at the delegates’ table.
Ala said that he knew of no agreement, secret or otherwise, on the matter now before the Council. He added that negotiations at Moscow between the Iranian Prime Minister and officials of the Soviet Government, including Stalin and Molotov, did not result in an agreement because of the Russian demands. He pointed out that Soviet troops were still in Iran, despite a treaty calling for their evacuation by March 2. He said he was prepared to proceed immediately with the case.
When Ala began to discuss the substance of the complaint, Secretary Byrnes suggested that he confine his remarks, as closely as possible, to the question of postponement.
Ala then said he had no instructions from his Government to agree to a postponement. He added that Soviet troops and agents in Iran interfered with internal affairs and that demands had been made on Iran’s sovereignty. He described the situation as explosive. He stated that a delay would be a threat to peace, and then asked for immediate action on the issue.56
When the Polish delegate indicated he would like to ask certain questions of the Iranian representative, it was suggested that he wait until the next meeting for answers, in view of the lateness of the hour. [Page 390] He was agreeable and Chairman Quo adjourned the meeting at 6:45 p.m.
The Security Council will meet in private session Thursday afternoon at 4:00 o’clock.57
- For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on Wednesday, March 27, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 44–70.↩
- For full text of Mr. Byrnes’ remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 49.↩
- For text of Ambassador Ala’s remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 62.↩
- The purpose of the private session was to discuss the serious problem arising from the walkout of the Soviet delegation. In telegram 9, March 27, 10 p.m., the Secretary noted that “Under terms of the Charter the Security Council cannot take a substantive decision when any member of the Big Five Powers is absent from the meeting, unless the absentee has been declared a party to a dispute. The Soviet Union has not been officially declared a party to a dispute. This poses a serious problem as Gromyko has repeatedly declared in the last 2 days that he cannot participate in or attend as a representative of the Soviet Union any Security Council meeting prior to April 10 at which the Iranian issue is discussed.” (501.BC/3–2746)↩