501.BC/3–2646: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)
urgent
6. Tuesday’s Council session50 opened with all the members fully aware of the existing tension revolving on Russia’s insistence upon postponement of discussion of the Iranian question. By the time the delegates convened for the session at 11 a.m. there was a distinct possibility that Russia would withdraw from these Security Council meetings and possibly from UN as a whole.
[Page 384]There was indication of this at the luncheon given by Secretary-General Lie Monday noon for Security Council members. At the luncheon Mr. Stettinius had a conversation with Mr. Gromyko concerning the Iranian question. Gromyko advised Mr. Stettinius that at the Tuesday meeting of the Council he would make a statement which would make his position very clear.
Gromyko stated that while he was perfectly willing to have the ceremony opening the Council session he could not participate further if we pressed the Council to deal with the Iranian question before April 10.
When Gromyko asked Mr. Stettinius if the U.S. position was still firm, Mr. Stettinius replied that it was the American delegation’s opinion that the Iranian question should be dealt with promptly. Mr. Stettinius inquired if a short postponement would help him. Mr. Gromyko replied: “I don’t need any help.” He reiterated that in the event the Security Council decided to deal with the Iranian question before April 10, he would not participate in the discussion.
At this point, Mr. Stettinius suggested: “Perhaps it would be wise for some of us to have a discussion about this whole question after the meeting today or this evening.”
On Tuesday, by the end of the day’s sessions the situation was completely in the open but apparently was not as serious as feared. Gromyko stated that if any substantive matters on the Iranian question were discussed Russia “could not participate and could not attend” such discussions.51 However, this was interpreted by the U.S. and other delegations to mean that the Soviet delegation would not withdraw completely from Security Council or UN” deliberations.
All of Tuesday’s Council discussion centered on procedural matters. After Russia’s motion to take the Iranian question off the agenda was defeated, by a vote of nine to two, Poland supporting Russia, Council members voted to accept the Iranian item in the Secretary-General’s proposed agenda.
With passage of this item, Mr. Gromyko immediately proposed postponement of discussion on the Iranian question and this precipitated lengthy and detailed argument which boiled down to three specific proposals:
- 1.
- Gromyko’s proposal that the whole question be postponed until April 10;
- 2.
- Egypt’s proposal that the Iranian representative be called in to explain how he felt about postponement, and then the Council would decide from the views presented there as to whether or not postponement was indicated; and
- 3.
- Australia’s suggestion that Iranian views and documentary material be presented in writing, as well as orally, for quasi-judicial [Page 385] Council deliberation, discussion and decision, on whether or not the Iranian question should be postponed.
Secretary Byrnes and Sir Alexander Cadogan of United Kingdom appeared to be bearing the brunt of the argument, urging, first, that postponement could not be countenanced if Iran was in a desperate situation, and second, that Iran—as a pledge to all other small nations—must at least be heard by the Council.52 Poland’s Dr. Lange backed Soviet arguments thoroughly, with some amplification, but urged that documentary evidence come from Teheran and not from the Iranian Ambassador alone. Mexico took issue with Gromyko’s proposals practically at every turn. Van Kleffens, of Holland, pointed out that the Council was obliged, under Article 31, to allow Iran to participate since it was quite obvious that Iran’s interests were “specially affected”.
With tempers fraying and little progress being made, delegates finally agreed on France’s proposal that a three-man subcommittee thrash out the three aforesaid proposals and come to agreement on what the Council should do about them and present their conclusions by 3 p.m. Wednesday. Dr. Quo, Council Chairman, then appointed the U.S., U.S.S.R. and France to this committee, to the apparent discomfiture of all three. Adjournment, which had been sidetracked by Bonnet’s subcommittee proposal, came quickly after this.
Ambassador Ala, Iranian representative, hopes to be called to present his case, and is extremely anxious to tell his country’s story to the Council. He intends to put forth a lengthy exposition of his country’s situation, and will of necessity present many substantive items to the Council, as well as his views on whether or not discussion should be postponed. His main objective, it was said, is to keep the Iranian question definitely on the continuing agenda.
[Here follow discussions on matters other than the Iranian question.]
- For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on Tuesday, March 26, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 10–43.↩
- For amplification of Mr, Gromyko’s views, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 37.↩
- The most significant statements made by Secretary of State Byrnes are to be found in SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 30–36.↩