861.24591/3–1746: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received March 17—3:30 p.m.]
352. Having received early this morning urtel 216, March 1622 I anticipated instructions sent urtel 214, March 15 (which was delayed in transmission) and called on Qavam at noon today. While I was with him your 214 was received and delivered to me and I conveyed your message to PriMin at 12:45 p.m.
At request of Brit Ambassador I again assured PriMin that Brit and American attitudes on this point were identical.
Qavam said he concurred in our views and would send telegraphic instructions to Ala tonight or tomorrow. (Brit Ambassador has since told me he has received same assurances.
PriMin said arrival of new Soviet Ambassador is expected tomorrow, a prospect which evidently disturbs him a great deal because he foresees that Ambassador will try to deter him from recourse to Security Council and endeavor to involve him in renewed negotiations. I In fact Qavam told me today that present Soviet Chargé had already assured him difficulties would be removed following arrival of Sadchikov and appeal to SC would be unnecessary (Qavam further repeated direct to me his account of Chargé’s threat as reported mytel 343, March 15) This confirms me, and I think Qavam as well, in belief that Sadchikov’s mission is to confuse issue and make it possible for Russia to prevent SC action by asserting bilateral negotiations are still in progress.
PriMin asked my advice as to manner in which he might deal with new Soviet Envoy, pointing out that refusal to talk with him would seriously worsen Irano-Soviet relations, whereas if he entered into any sort of conversations he would give Russians pretext they are seeking. I replied that there are many subjects which he could well discuss with Ambassador without compromising Iran’s position regarding withdrawal of troops. He could make clear to Sadchikov that question of evacuation in accordance terms Tripartite Treaty is not subject for negotiation, that he (Qavam) is prohibited by constitution from negotiating in this connection and that only place question could be discussed is Security Council. Having thus stated his position there would be nothing to prevent him from carrying on conversations on other subjects of interest to the two Govts. I also emphasised that whatever unpleasantness might result from an immediate appeal to SC would be much less than was to be expected from a later appeal, [Page 362] made after Sadchikov had arrived and had attempted to open conversations. I therefore urged PriMin to get off instructions to Ala before new Ambassador presented himself. Qavam seemed to agree with my observations.
As sidelights on situation Qavam called to my attention new attacks in Soviet press on Iranian claims at time of Versailles Conference and fact that Soviet Chargé has excused himself from FonOff luncheon tomorrow in honor Sir Reader Bullard on obviously manufactured excuse that he has to meet his Ambassador (who cannot possibly arrive until well after luncheon will be over).
PriMin mentioned Herald Tribune editorial which he had seen quoted in our radio bulletin in which it was stated Iran was in great need of reform and that it was unthinkable for America to go to war over desert wastes of Iran. This seemed to disturb him. I pointed out that editorial began by condemning Russian attitude toward Iran. I went on to say that Herald Tribute is staunch Republican paper and could be expected to differ from views of Democratic Administration. I had just finished reading great quantity of American newspaper clippings on Irauo-Soviet situation which I would be glad to send him and I had been struck by fact that virtually every paper in every part of US had strongly supported Iranian case and called for action by UNO.
By close of conversation Qavam repeated what he told me March 14: That he would instruct Ala to be moderate in presenting case in SC. He observed that Ala is great patriot, deeply concerned over possible fate of his country and family and that he is inclined to be excitable. PriMin therefore thought it well to warn him against being carried away and provoking Russians. I agreed this might be desirable and added that Iran’s case is so clear that calm dignified presentation of facts should be sufficient to win it.