Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

611.6131/3–1346

The Minister Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to Mr. John N. Hazard of the Division of Commercial Policy

secret

Moscow, April 3, 1946.

Dear John: I was very glad to have your letter of March 13 and appreciated your sending me the documents relating to the draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the U.S.S.R.⁷¹

I have read the draft treaty and much of the other material with as much care as a very hectic period here will permit. I see that a great deal of work and of careful thought went into them and that the persons who worked on this made a genuine and loyal effort to combine our traditional treaty procedures with the peculiar situation existing in the U.S.S.R.

Nevertheless, I have to tell you (and I hope you will forgive my frankness) that I consider it quite useless to attempt to negotiate an agreement of this nature with the Russians and I am afraid that the entire approach to it in Washington must have rested on an imperfect understanding of Russian realities as we know them today.

I have no time to go into details about this treaty, but I could adduce the following points in support of what I have just said.

a. Russia is not a “Rechtsstaat”. The relationships between its citizens and the State are governed only in minor degree by legal norms and rights. Of far greater importance is the sheer administrative will of the executive authority, even in minor matters.

b. If this is true with respect to relationships between Soviet citizens and the State, it is far more true with respect to residence and activities of foreigners in Russia. Questions involving residence and activities of foreigners rest, I should say, 100% on the arbitrary will of the administrative authorities. There is no Soviet law which is worth the paper it is written on in so far as it bears on foreigners in the Soviet Union. Such laws as may refer to them, or as might be interpreted to affect them, are freely disregarded by the authorities when it suits their purpose. There is every evidence that questions concerning foreigners in the U.S.S.R. lie exclusively within the administrative competence of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. I have never observed that the authorities of these agencies have permitted their actions toward foreigners to be influenced in the slightest degree by any provisions of Soviet internal legislation or of treaty. I do not believe that they have any intention of letting their actions be so influenced in the future. I doubt whether the Soviet Government would today be willing to sign any engagement of this nature which it did not feel would leave its authorities in reality complete freedom of action.

c. Much of the work done by your committee⁷² was apparently based on a study of engagements entered into by the Soviet Government long ago, at a time when it considered itself extensively dependent on the outside world, when it was interested in foreign concessions, and when it had need of foreign specialists on a large scale. As you will note, very few engagements of this sort have been undertaken since 1933, especially since the purges. All in all, I think treaties such as the German one of 1925 represented a phase of Soviet diplomacy which has passed into history.

d. Similarly, such of the internal legislation referred to in the reports of the committee meetings is very distinctly dated and has passed out of practical significance by virtue of the events of the last years.

e. The parts of the draft treaty dealing with residence of American “commercial representatives” in Russia appear to me to indicate an unrealistically optimistic conception of the extent to which Soviet Government contemplates permitting foreigners to reside in the Soviet Union in coming years. I do not believe that the Soviet authorities have any intention of permitting anything more than a handful of private Americans to live in this country for years to come.

f. These same passages also seem to me to indicate a certain underestimation of the Russian talents and possibilities for evasion of treaty provisions in such cases. As you must recall from your long residence here, there is apparently no end to the resources of the authorities in discouraging residence in the Soviet Union when this suits their purpose. He whose residence here is not entirely welcome to the authorities can find it mysteriously impossible to get housing or food cards or transportation or any number of other amenities of life. Furthermore, the efficacy of his activities can always be reduced to nil by the circumstance that no Soviet citizen will dare to deal with him either officially or personally. Yet for most of these obstacles it is almost impossible to hold a central Soviet authority responsible.

g. With the exception of the provisions concerning commercial representatives, I see no other provisions in the whole document which even seem to offer any important potential benefits to the United States. Almost all of them, on the other hand, would give to the Russians a legal basis for claiming as a treaty right many privileges in the United States which they now enjoy simply by custom and by the good will of our Government. In these circumstances, I question the desirability of concluding a treaty engagement on these points. We would be in a much better position vis-à-vis the Russians if Ave had it in our power to extend or withdraw these privileges at will, depending on treatment we are getting here.

h. The commercial and tariff provisions amount, as far as I can see, to most favored nation treatment. The only conceivable benefit that this could bring to us would be in the case of personal parcels sent to Americans in the Soviet Union. We have at present not more than one or two dozen Americans in Russia who could conceivably profit by such a benefit. Even if this number were to be increased a hundredfold, the practical significance would be negligible. And there has never been any question, as far as I know, of the Soviet authorities discriminating between countries in the duties levied on personal parcels of this sort. If they want to favor someone, they have dozens of ways of doing it besides discriminating in the duty he pays on parcels. Finally, this point is usually covered by private contract. Thus I can not regard this as a serious factor. I can see strong arguments for the extension by our Government to the U.S.S.R. of most favored nation customs treatment, as a matter of general policy. But if we wish to do this, then let us do it as a unilateral act, recognizing frankly that Russia with its trade monopoly has no equivalent concessions to offer. If (in the absence of a treaty) this takes legislation, let the State Department suggest to Congress the legislation that would be appropriate. Whatever legislation is passed should give the executive branch of our Government wide leeway to withdraw the concessions if Russian commercial policy toward United States were not regarded as satisfactory in Washington.

i. Our draft treaty is long, legalistic, obscure in wording, unadapted to Soviet institutions and conceptions. It would take the Russians weeks to translate it, months to study it and years to understand it. They would have real difficulty clearing it through the top people in their Government, due to the fact that those people are busy and practical and do not like to react to any but simply stated and clear proposals. In my experience it is useless and sometimes worse than useless to put to the Russians long and intricately worded proposals, particularly on matters not of highest political importance. Even if they can be brought to sign such documents at all, they have little respect for them and no serious intention of executing them. Their minds simply do not work that way.

j. This agreement touches on very few of the points which are really important to us. We would like to get straight such things as the following:

1. Functions and rights of American official establishments in the Soviet Union;

2. Treatment of American official personnel in the U.S.S.R. and facilities granted to them for their life and work;

3. Numerical limitations of official representatives in both countries;

4. Reciprocal arrangements for granting or refusal of visa applications within a given time;

5. Arrangements for definition and treatment of dual nationals;

6. Claims of American citizens against the Soviet Government;

7. Aviation questions;

8. Status of Amtorg;⁷³

9. Informational and propaganda activities of the two Governments;

10. Facilities for press reporting, et cetera.

k. If we are to propose any treaty to Soviet authorities (I am skeptical of the value of treaties with the Russians in general), then I would suggest that it be a brief and simply-worded one going right to the heart of each of the problems which are really of importance to us here. The treaty which has been drafted in Washington seems to me to have been drafted with the idea rather of helping the Soviets to get legal guarantee for privileges in our country than of helping us to overcome some of the crushing difficulties which we have been facing here in recent months and years.

I am sorry to take so negative an attitude toward a document which embodies so much careful work. But the realities of Moscow are rarely pleasant these days. And I am afraid this is one of them.

With all good wishes [etc.]

George Kennan

P.S. Since drafting this I have discussed it with the Ambassador and the result has been the telegram which you will undoubtedly have seen saying that we are going to comment in detail on the treaty at a later date.⁷⁴ We will make these comments as detailed and constructive as we can, but I am afraid it can not change my deep personal conviction that the United States has nothing to gain from the negotiation of such an instrument with the Soviet Government. GFK

71. None printed.
72. The U.S.S.R. Committee of the Department of State.
73. The Amtorg Trading Corporation, official purchasing and sales agency in the United States of the Soviet Union, New York, N.Y.
74. Telegram 1041, April 4, 1946, from Moscow, not printed; see telegram 1894, June 15, from Moscow, p. 762.