Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe, Volume V
851.00B/12–2046
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
[Received December 2.]
Dear Doc: I suggest that you have a look at Norris Chipman’s memorandum no. 345, dated November 23, 1946.
Very sincerely yours,
Memorandum by Mr. Norris B. Chipman, Second Secretary of Embassy in France
No. 345
The Tactics of the French Communist Party According to a Source Maintaining Close Contacts With Important Communists
The former representative of the Italian Communist Party at Moscow, Rossi (Tasca) who was also formerly an important agent in [Page 472] Western Europe of the Comintern, has furnished me the following information based on a recent conversation which he had with a friend maintaining close and friendly relations with certain members of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party. Since I have confidence in the political judgment, as well as intellectual honesty of Rossi, who broke with Moscow on democratic grounds in protest against the Comintern’s brutal methods and interventions in the affairs of the various Communist parties abroad, I consider that this highly interesting report should receive serious attention.
The Return of Thorez from Moscow
Thorez returned to Paris from Moscow at the beginning of last September. His brief trip was clandestine since no mention thereof was ever made by the Party which, however, by way of explaining Thorez’s absence from State councils, issued a laconic communiqué stating that its Secretary General was sick. His trip was taken at the instance of the Soviet authorities and in this connection it is noteworthy that it was Thorez and not Duclos who was summoned to Moscow because the Kremlin desired to discuss the Communist position within the French Government rather than strictly to investigate Party matters; if the problem under discussion had related to internal Party questions the Kremlin naturally would have summoned Duclos.
At the first meeting held by the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party subsequent to his return to Paris, Thorez delivered a report on the international situation as viewed by the Soviet authorities. While he did not indicate, according to the source under reference, whether he had conferred with the “boss” that is, Stalin, Thorez left no doubt that his views were inspired by the highest Soviet authorities. He spoke as follows:
The international situation is favorable in general to the interests of the Soviet Union but the latter is not in the position at the present juncture of European affairs to draw the greatest possible benefit therefrom. The Soviet Union is not prepared for war and its military preparations will not be completed for a number of years. Hence, the necessity to gain time and to avoid situations of a highly dangerous nature while endeavoring to maintain and even consolidate positions already acquired. The policy and tactics of the French Communist Party must follow closely in line with this perspective and should be oriented in an intelligent manner with Soviet policies.
Because the Soviet Union is in the position of having to avoid during a relatively long period participation in a major war, it follows that the French Communist Party should not advance too rapidly and above all else must not endeavor to seize power by force [Page 473] since to do so would probably precipitate an international conflict from which the Soviet Union could hardly emerge victorious. The eyes of the United States and England are directed towards France and should the French Communists become too openly aggressive, they would bring about a major crisis which might too deeply involve the Soviet Union.
At the same meeting of the Political Bureau Duclos spoke for the purpose of stressing the point that Thorez’s report confirmed what he had always said, namely, that a Communist party “worthy of the name must know how to make the necessary sacrifices on the internal level in order later to reap more substantial harvests from the international situation”. He indicated in this way that while the French Communist Party was now in the position forcibly to seize power, it was obliged to shape its policies so as not to conflict with the larger interests of the Soviet Union; in the final analysis the maintenance of Communist power in France would depend upon the success of the Soviet Union in Europe.
The “Reassuring” Declarations of Thorez
The situation as outlined above explains to a considerable extent the motives behind the interviews given recently by Thorez to Reuters, the London Times and the INS. Thorez had not resorted previously to issuing such “reassuring” statements because Moscow awaited the results of the elections; since the latter were even more favorable than the Communist leadership had anticipated in their most sanguine moments and have rendered the Communists not only the first National party but also the only great party on the so-called Left, it was expedient that Thorez take a public stand on the basis of his Moscow conversations.
These interviews were rendered necessary by the unexpected success of the Communist Party at the polls on November 10 when the Communist leadership anticipated that their Party would not increase its representation in the National Assembly by more than five or six seats at the most; as a result of this success the Communists received the order from Moscow to make a serious bid for the formation of a Cabinet under Communist direction and consequently the Thorez interviews should be regarded in the light of the general campaign of the Soviet Union at the present juncture to reassure the distrustful Anglo-Saxons and thus attenuate the existing international tension. In this manner, the outbreak of the “inevitable” armed conflict with the British and Americans would be postponed until the Soviet Union had improved its military strength and had further consolidated its political position in eastern, central and southeastern Europe.
[Page 474]While the Soviet authorities wish to avoid the creation of a French Communist Government which would too greatly alarm England and America, the French Communists are in the position now where they must continue to march towards the attainment of final power because not to do so would break the powerful current that is advancing their dynamic movement. The Communists feel certain that this current as well as their organizational genius will bring them even greater success at the elections on November 24 for the Council of the Republic than was achieved at the polls on November 10. Should this success be realized, the expediency of the Thorez interviews becomes still more justified.
The Realignment of Foreign Policies
It is certain that Soviet foreign policy as executed during the past six months has often embarrassed and rendered more difficult the role of various Communist parties in Europe, especially the French Party with respect to the German problem and the Italian in connection with Trieste. In conformity with the general tactics of the Neo-Comintern, both parties had successfully exploited the national and even nationalist sentiments existing within their countries, but finally found themselves in open contradiction with the official position of the Soviet Union; they were thus confronted with the disagreeable alternative of repudiating the Soviet Union—an impossibility—or of seeing their patriotic coat of arms somewhat besmirched.
The Kremlin has seldom, if ever, seriously worried about the difficulties thrust upon the various Communist parties abroad by its foreign policies because it always felt sure that these parties would re-remain obedient and would finish by faithfully supporting Soviet interests even if embarrassing explanations of zig-zag changes of the party “line” became necessary. The law of self-interest is the only principle that Moscow invariably obeys but this time Soviet interest itself was at stake and accordingly it became expedient that the foreign policies of the French and Italian parties be realigned with “general Soviet” policy. In this manner the double purpose of aiding Soviet interests, as well as those of the two greatest Communist parties in Europe would be served. In view of Soviet unpreparedness, neither the German nor Adriatic situations could be pushed to the breaking point.
This explains Molotov’s recent attitude at the Security Council and his search for a direct compromise between Italy and Yugoslavia announced by Togliatti’s visit to Belgrade.76 For some time it was clear [Page 475] that the Soviet Union was disposed to make certain concessions to Italy rather than to abandon Trieste to an international regime which might entail the more or less permanent installation in this strategic territory of Allied armed control. The Soviet Union in reality preferred an Italian administration with as little power as possible in the hands of the city government in order to augment the pressure which could be exercised by the Slav elements of the surrounding countryside. Tito proposed the “exchange” of Trieste for Gorizia for two reasons; first, to dominate militarily the valley of the Isonzo and the Julian Marches, and, secondly, to eliminate Anglo-Saxon troops from this vital area.
The coincidence of three important factors should be noted with respect to the policies outlined above, namely, the Soviet Union’s desire to gain time, its necessity to maintain already conquered positions, and its self-interest in re-aligning the foreign policies of the French and Italian Communist parties in the aim of ameliorating their internal positions. The results of the Italian municipal elections indicate that this re-alignment and conciliatory attitude in the case of Italy was not without success.
In the case of Germany, Stalin perceived the expediency of reinforcing the position of the S.E.D. (Socialist–Communist group) and disarming the distrust produced by the policy of the “Iron Curtain” in the Soviet zone. This explains Stalin’s clear stand on the necessity of a united political and economic Germany expressed in his interview with Alexander Werth and the President of the United Press, Hugh Baillie.77 But prior officially to taking position on the matter, the Kremlin considered it expedient to reorient the French Communist “line” on Germany with its own German policy. The Thorez visit to Moscow laid the groundwork for this reorientation.
The New German Policy of the French Communist Party
Owing to the possibility that Thorez might direct the new Cabinet to be formed on the basis of the November 10 and 24 elections, it became all the more urgent that he begin publicly to clarify his Party’s views on Germany. While it is true that the new French Communist position already had been clearly set forth in the September issue of the theoretical organ of the Communist Party Cahiers du Communisme, nevertheless the French public remained largely ignorant of this latest corkscrew twist of the Party “line”. (In this connection see memorandum no. 336 dated October 29, 1946).78
[Page 476]The Party in other words waited for the election results prior to making the necessary declaration as set forth by Thorez in his interview with Reuters in which he insisted that an accord “should be found” between the Soviet formula of “interallied control of the Ruhr” and the French Communist demand for internationalization”. Thus, once more the French Communists repudiated their own policy, as well as that of the MRP, without being seriously attacked even by the latter.
The French Communist Party and the MRP
At the first meeting of the Political Bureau which took place subsequent to the November 10 elections, Jacques Duclos expressed great satisfaction over the results of the elections, especially since they had placed his Party in first position on the national scale, as well as on the “Left”. Duclos ventured the view that had the MRP pursued the tendency espoused by Lecourt—one of the most anti-Communist leaders of the MRP—it would probably have obtained not less than 200 seats and would have thus remained the first party of France. Fortunately, added Duclos, the Bidault–Gay tendency had dominated the Catholics despite the fact that the vast majority of the MRP is anti-Communist.
Duclos further insisted that the MRP would continue to play a very important role in the political life of France and consequently it was necessary not only to maintain but also reinforce the liaison now happily enjoyed between the Communist and the Bidault–Gay tendency. Duclos added that Bidault remained favorable to collaboration with the Communists within the Government and that one could nearly always count on him by “playing on his vanity”; he explained that the close ties between Bidault and the Communists had been established in 1943 when an accord was reached on the basis of Communist support for Bidault as Foreign Minister in the Government to be formed following the Liberation.
Military Preparations
While continuing the policy of “legality” required by the exigencies of the international situation, the Communists are by no means slowing up their secret penetration of State institutions or their clandestine military preparations. On the contrary the International Brigades are being reinforced—recently strengthened by two brigades—and in this connection it should be noted that Marty’s79 trip to Moscow last September already has brought results (see memorandum no. 51880).
[Page 477]Moreover, the Communists now count on fresh sources of recruitment for their armed groups, namely, among the 200,000 Italian workers who plan to immigrate into France. The organization of this recruitment in Italy is in the hands of the Communist dominated Italian C.G.T. and on the French side is being carried out by the present Minister of Labor and veteran Communist trade unionist, Croizat. Since a large number of workers in Northern Italy are Communist and possess military training the opportunities offered by this mass inflow of Italians into France certainly will not be neglected by the Italian and French Communists.
Finally, it is noteworthy that should Thorez head the next Cabinet the Communists would hold an ace card in extending their power and influence over the State because the civil service bill just promoted by Thorez and accepted by the Assembly places the career of every government official in the last instance under the control of the President of the Council and not the Ministry with which the employee is connected.