851.00/8–246
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Wallner) to the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)73
General De Gaulle’s speech of July 28 was destined principally for internal French consumption and may be regarded as an attempt by [Page 467] the General to crystallize around himself as a focus the gropings of the large anti-Communist majority in France towards a western orientation which began to make themselves manifest at the polls in the May referendum and the June elections. It has been suggested that the General will be a candidate for the Presidency if the Constitution now being formed is to his liking, particularly the provisions concerning the strength and authority of the Chief Executive. Without speculating on the success of the General’s bid, it should be noted that the speech will hinder rather than help any efforts which Bidault may be contemplating toward persuading the present tripartite Government to take a more westerly orientation or to recommence negotiations for an Anglo-French pact. However, we may assume the General is looking to the future.
Regarded as a purely political speech, it was one of the best the General has ever made. It clothed in clear, strong and emotionally well-attuned phrases answers to questions, hitherto more unspoken than spoken, which lie in the heart of every non-Communist Frenchman. It painted, not as a spectre but as a fact, the picture of a world dominated by two great powers each animated by basically different concepts. Shrewdly, the General did not ask the French people to choose. He offered the hope of an “old Europe”, united within itself, holding the moral balance between the two worlds. To bring this about two things were necessary: The security of France and a Franco-British alliance.
To General De Gaulle, as to every Frenchman, the security of France begins with Germany, and he called for a Germany decentralized and regrouped around its traditional federal components, the Ruhr to be placed under international control for the benefit of both Germany and Europe as a whole. He did not dispute Polish control as far as the Oder and reiterated, but not aggressively, his claim for compensatory French dominion along the Rhine.
Of interest is the General’s studied vagueness concerning the future of the Ruhr. He did not speak of political separation but only of international control, presumably of the region’s economic resources. This brings him very close to the British thesis.
To my mind, however, the most notable feature of the speech was the thesis, hitherto no more than hinted at, that the great danger to France lay not in Germany’s own potential strength but in the temptation for Germany “to test whether fortune might permit her to regain her greatness by combining her ambition with that of someone else.” The reference to Russia, while unspoken, was clear.
- Mr. Hickerson sent the memorandum to Under Secretary Acheson with the following notation: “You will be interested in Wallner’s comment on Gen. De Gaulle’s speech. I agree with these comments. JDH”↩