851.00/5–346
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)
At 1 a.m. May 3 Mr. Lawler of the Code Room telephoned Mr. Hickerson at his house and described in general terms a top secret telegram which an officer of the Army had brought to him for clearance. This was a War Department telegram to General McNarney. It dealt with a report from G–2 to the effect that there would be a Communist coup d’état in France on May 6 if the referendum on May 5 did not approve the proposed Constitution. The telegram gave General McNarney discretionary authority to move additional US troops into France to protect US vital supplies and installations.
Mr. Lawler said that the War Department officer wanted immediate State Department clearance for this telegram and that he had suggested that Mr. Hickerson be called for this purpose. Mr. Hickerson said that he did not agree with the telegram and that he would not, therefore, agree to its going. He said that it presented very important [Page 437] questions which in his opinion should be considered by the highest authorities before any such message was sent. He said that he would be glad to consider this matter with the War Department any time they like. About 10:30 a.m. Col. Vittrup52a and two officers from the War Department came in to see Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Bonbright53 in regard to this telegram. After a brief discussion Mr. Hickerson took the entire group to Mr. Acheson’s office where the matter was further discussed. Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Bonbright pointed out why they felt that the proposed telegram was inadvisable. They said that, in the first place, present indications were that the Constitution would probably be approved by a narrow majority (in this respect they turned out to be bad prophets). Next, they said that even if the Constitution were not approved they did not believe that the Communists would attempt a coup d’état on May 6. They continued that all indications pointed to efforts on the part of the Communists to strengthen their position in the June 2 election and that unless the Communists could be reasonably certain that a coup d’état would succeed it was unlikely that they would abandon their efforts to obtain control of France by legal methods.
Messrs. Hickerson and Bonbright stated that in their talks with the War Department it had developed that the supplies in question in France are reserve supplies for our occupation forces in Germany and that the main supply line runs through Bremen and not through France. They said that they felt that the logical thing to do would be to move these vital supplies into Germany and not risk inadvertent involvement in domestic French trouble by protecting supplies which however useful were not indispensable to our continued occupation of Germany. They pointed out that US troops moving into France to widely scattered places, in the event of civil trouble might well be misunderstood, give rise to incidents involving them, and, at the worst, might even cause the Communists to appeal to the Soviet Union and send for help on the grounds that the United States had intervened. Finally they said that they felt very strongly that General McNarney should not be given discretionary authority to move troops into France and that this was far too much authority in a very delicate situation for the President to delegate to a commander in the field.
Mr. Acheson expressed his general agreement with the reasoning expounded by Messrs. Hickerson and Bonbright. It was agreed that the three War Department officers and Messrs. Hickerson and Bonbright would, therefore, prepare an alternative telegram. This was [Page 438] done and Mr. Acheson approved the alternative draft. It is attached.54 The War Department officers took the alternative draft to a meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff about 1:30 p.m.
Friday afternoon, May 3, Admiral Leahy55 took the original War Department message (with slight modifications) and the alternative draft prepared in the State Department to the President and discussed these messages briefly with him. The President indicated a preference for the War Department message and this message was sent. Secretary Patterson informed Mr. Acheson of this by telephone. Mr. Acheson discussed the matter briefly with the President Friday afternoon and arrangements were made for the matter to be discussed at the White House Saturday morning, May 4.
At 10:00 a.m., May 4, Mr. Acheson went to the White House to a meeting at which Secretaries Forrestal56 and Patterson and Admiral Leahy and several Army and Navy officers were present. Mr. Acheson argued against the War Department and in favor of the State Department message. The President reaffirmed his approval of the War Department message.
- Col. Russell L. Vittrup, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.↩
- James C. H. Bonbright, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs.↩
- Not found attached to file copy of this document.↩
- Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.↩
- James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy.↩