740.00119 Control (Germany)/12–646
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State
I understand that the Danish Foreign Minister14 intends to raise with you personally the question regarding the repatriation to Germany of the approximately 200,000 German refugees who have been in Denmark since the last days of the war. The following background may therefore be of interest.
These refugees in Denmark fled to that country in the last days of the war from their homes in various parts of Germany, the majority (about 166,000) coming from east of the Oder-Neisse line. These 200,000 refugees constitute about 5 per cent of the population of Denmark and are accordingly a great economic burden for the Danes. The Danes feel that they should all be returned to their homes but so far have been unable to effect this.
The Potsdam Agreement called for the transfer to Germany of the German populations (Volksdeutsche) in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria. On November 20, 1945 the Allied Control Council in Berlin decided on the distribution of these transferred German populations within the four zones of Germany. Germans from Poland (including German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line under Polish administration) were to be absorbed in the Soviet and British zones. Germans from Czechoslovakia in the American and Soviet zones. Germans from Hungary in the American zone and from Austria in the French zone. No mention was made of the refugees in Denmark, as the Potsdam Agreement did not cover temporarily displaced refugees but only Volksdeutsche.
Members of the Control Council in Berlin have not objected to receiving in their respective zones those refugees in Denmark who were formerly domiciled in their zones but have not agreed to take the 166,000 who came from areas now under Polish administration. (15,800 came originally from the Soviet zone; 10,300 from the British zone; 1,280 from the American zone and 530 from the French zone.)
Recently the British have agreed to increase the number to be received in their zone to 12,000, which would take care of refugees with relatives in the British zone. The French have also agreed to take 12,000, which they can do quite easily in as much as the French have received practically no Volksdeutsche into their zone. (The November 20 agreement specified that the French would take 150,000 Germans from Austria; very few have been transferred and later statistics [Page 190] revealed there were nowhere near 150,000 Germans in Austria eligible for transfer.)
The Danes have also been pressing OMGUS to accept the same number (12,000) as the British and French, but OMGUS has taken the view that it cannot accept any more than the 1,280 who originated in the American zone. OMGUS points out that the obligation to receive the greater part of the refugees in Denmark rests with the British and Soviets, who were obligated under the November 20 Agreement to receive the Germans to be transferred from the eastern areas. Furthermore, OMGUS emphasizes that the acute housing and food situation in the American zone and the commitments to receive Germans from Czechoslovakia and other sources make it impossible to consider taking any from Denmark. OMGUS suggests that in view of the small numbers who have been taken into the French zone it would not be unreasonable for the French to help out in this problem. If they took as many as 100,000 they would still not be exceeding the quota allotted to the French zone by the November 20 agreement. On the other hand the French take the view that they are not committed by the November 20 agreement to accept any Germans from the eastern areas.
When the Danish Foreign Minister was in Moscow last May, Stalin informed him that the Soviets would accept 100,000 German refugees from Denmark in their zone provided the three other powers accepted an equal number in their zones. The Soviet representatives in Berlin, it seems, were not informed by Moscow of Stalin’s commitment to the Danish Foreign Minister. Whenever the subject has been raised in quadripartite meetings in Berlin the Soviet representative has stated that he had no instructions. What the Danes now seem to want us to do, that is, to receive 12,000 in our zone, will not solve their main problem, which is to dispose of the large numbers coming from east of the Oder-Neisse line.
A good deal of publicity was given in the Danish press to Stalin’s offer. The lack of progress since then has been made to appear in the Danish press as resulting from the three western powers’ refusal to agree to take an equal number. The Danish Government authorities understand that Stalin’s offer has really never been discussed in Berlin because of the failure of the Soviet representative to receive instructions but this situation has not been made clear to the Danish people. Recently publicity has been given to the fact that the Russians will take 15,000 in their zone, the British and French 12,000 in their zones and the Americans only 1,280 in their zone. This puts us in a bad light, particularly as no explanation has been given by the Danish press for the small numbers to be received in the American zone.
[Page 191]You may wish to ask General Clay about the problem. It is unfortunate that we should be getting such bad publicity on the matter in Denmark. On the other hand the question is one which the Danes should thresh out with the Soviets and British.
- Gustav Rasmussen.↩