Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Fifth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 11, 1946, 10:30 a.m.²¹

New York, November 11, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY) 5th Meeting

Rumanian Treaty (Continued)²²

Secretary Byrnes: Can we now proceed to do business, gentlemen?

At our last meeting we had completed the Rumanian Treaty with the exception of the Annex. I am advised that the Annex proposal is the same as that in the Italian Treaty with the exception of 30–A, having reference to petroleum. What is the pleasure of the Council? Shall we proceed to the consideration of these Annex proposals that have already been considered in connection with the Italian Treaty, or shall we take up the Annex 4–D,²³ petroleum proposals, and consider that and leave the others for the determination in connection with the Italian and the other treaties?

Annex 4–B

Mr. Molotov: I should like to say that I have no objection to repeating the discussion as regards those questions which repeat themselves in this Treaty, but I should like to make a statement on certain points. I should like to point out that as regards Annex 4 the Soviet delegation has objections with respect to Section B.²⁴ In this section the time limit which was previously agreed upon in the Council of Foreign Ministers and which is laid down in the other treaties was changed from 18 months to 3 years, and I wish note to be taken of the fact that the Soviet delegation takes its previous view as to 18 months.

Secretary Byrnes: Gentlemen of the Council, what is the wish of the Council? My recollection is that in the case of the Italian Treaty this was referred to the deputies. Is there any wish on the part of any member of the Council that instructions be given to the deputies as to this period, whether it shall be 3 years or some different period?

Mr. Bevin: I thought on the Italian Treaty, Mr. Chairman, we referred the question to the deputies. I am not prepared to alter the instructions. I am willing for them to go into the question of the period.

M. Couve de Murville: I think, Mr. Chairman, that would be the best course to adopt, adopt the same solution as in the case of the Italian Treaty.

Secretary Byrnes: Unless there is objection, then, this proposal shall be referred to the deputies under the same instructions as were given with reference to a similar position in the Italian Treaty.

Mr. Bevin: On the shipping …²⁵ not the recommendation.

Annex 4–D

Secretary Byrnes: There is a recommendation as to the petroleum. It is in the English copy Annex 4–D, the United Kingdom proposal, and it was in the majority recommendation as to paragraph 3 of the proposal.

Mr. Bevin: In this case, Mr. Chairman, I am directed by my Government to insist on the amendment of the 1942 Mining Law. The amendment would not give us a privileged position …²⁵ We seek no privilege, but we object to these companies being forced into bankruptcy by these indirect means. The law was carried at the instigation of the Nazis. It is a very keen point as far as my country is concerned, and we should be treated on equal terms.

I would like to say as well that the action of the Rumanian Government at the time supplying oil to the Nazis forced the Soviet, British and American air forces to bomb the remaining oil fields. I think it is only fair that they should be put on their feet again.

Secretary Byrnes: Gentlemen of the Council, in the United States we have a custom that on Armistice Day at 11 o’clock all activities should cease for 2 minutes in order that we may pay tribute to the memory of those who made the supreme sacrifice in our two wars. I think it would be a good thing for us to observe this custom and in doing so it may help us to reach agreement on our common objectives, objectives for which our boys gave their lives. I will ask you to cease from business for 2 minutes, if there is no objection.

(Two minutes of silence.)

Secretary Byrnes: Gentlemen, we can now resume. Are there any further comments as to this paragraph?

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation wishes to note the fact that this was adopted at the Conference by 11 votes against 8 and 2 abstentions, and among those who voted against were the Soviet Union and the United States of America. That is, 2 of the Delegations here. As to the substance of the question, we hold that it will be incorrect to prescribe to Rumania what laws she has to abolish and what laws she has to restore. We think there can be no justification for such actions in foreign countries.

As to certain oil companies, they made certain profits during the war while they helped our enemies to fight our armies. Consequently, their interests were adequately safeguarded during the war when they helped not us but our enemies.

On the other hand, if one is to speak of eliminating discrimination, as it is suggested in section (d), adopted by the Conference, then the necessity for this lapses in view of the fact that there is Article 4²⁶ providing for this, an Article to which we all agreed. Under Article 4, Discrimination, the laws of discrimination shall be abolished and whatever there may be of discriminatory character in the oil industry of Rumania will be abolished under Article 4, and therefore if this Article is carried, is put into effect, this Article which we all support, there will be nothing of a discriminatory character in the position of this or that oil company in Rumania.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, I thought that clause referred largely to racial matters. If Mr. Molotov agrees, and if words can be found to make it clear, to cover this, I should be quite happy to have the deputies look at it. I should think the English text really applies to racial discrimination.

This is a reproduction of an Article which is in the Armistice, and this is not being done, this problem is not being dealt with under it. If Mr. Molotov agrees it ought to be done, if it should be made a little clearer, I should be willing to accept that.

Secretary Byrnes: The United States voted against it in the Conference because of the belief that it was covered by other language in the treaty. The United States did not have in mind the Article referred to by the Soviet Delegation but did have in mind Article 24²⁷ of the Economic Clause. In that Article it is provided that the Rumanian Government should nullify all measures, including seizures, sequestration or control taken by it against United Nations’ property.

We also would sugggest that Article 30, which has been discussed by the Council would be relevant to this proposal. The first part of that Article 30, paragraph (c),²⁸ has been agreed to. The latter part has not been agreed to. The first part provides that nationals of the United Nations, including juridical persons, shall be granted national and most-favored-nation treatment in all matters pertaining to commerce, industry, shipping and other forms of business activity within Rumania.

If we can agree that we should prevent discrimination, why should we not refer it to the deputies to have them determine whether or not the two paragraphs to which I have called attention are adequate for the purpose, and if not, then to agree upon language which would prohibit discrimination without singling out any particular industry?

Mr. Molotov: I agree that Article 4 only partly covers this question, and the remarks made by Mr. Byrnes threw additional light on this question, and I have no objection to the deputies taking this question up for consideration.

Secretary Byrnes: Is there objection? (No objection)

There is no other recommendation in the Annex which is different from the proposals contained in the Italian treaty. Therefore, following the procedure which we followed in connection with the Italian treaty, I ask whether or not the Council desires to have considered at this time any proposal which did not receive recommendation from the Conference but which should be considered.

Annex 4–C²⁹

Mr. Bevin: There is Annex 4–C, on Shipping, which I have been hoping to raise. The arguments advanced for this article—this Annex, repair of damage to United Nations’ property in Article 24, the language is not altogether satisfactory in the case of shipping. The shipping lost should be replaced by a suitable compensation or repair of the United Nations’ shipping damage during the war should be undertaken by the Rumanian Government itself. We have pressed for the vote of this Annex, the acceptance of paragraph 1.

Secretary Byrnes: I thought that in the Italian treaty we had referred to the Deputies the question of arriving at a definition of shipping. If that would be satisfactory, we could let this question await the efforts of the Committee on arriving at a definition.

Mr. Bevin: It is really linked up with Article IX of the Armistice terms.³⁰ The Rumanian Government there assumes full responsibility for damage and destruction of the property until the moment of transfer of property to the Allied-Soviet High Command. It is really linked up with that clause. I should like to have the deputies look into it.

Secretary Byrnes: Then, gentlemen, we will consider the Council agrees to have the Economic Committee look into it to see if they can arrive at a definition of “shipping” that is satisfactory. Then it’s understood that as to the other proposal the same action is taken as in the case of the Italian Treaty. For instance, I have in mind one proposal that was agreed to in the Italian Treaty.

Mr. Bevin: I accept the same here.

Secretary Byrnes: We will understand that the same action is taken here as in the other case. If there is no objection, we will go on to the consideration of the Bulgarian Treaty.

Article 27

Mr. Molotov: I have one point to raise which does not relate to the recommendations. I have in mind Article 27³¹ with respect to which a decision was made at the Conference by 13 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions. The Soviet Delegation deems it essential to uphold its own wording.³²

Bulgarian Treaty

Article 1, 2(a)

Secretary Byrnes: I thought we had discussed that on Friday. It’s a recommendation and we understood that it’s not agreed to. The first question in the Bulgarian Treaty appears in the first Article.³³ There is no recommendation, and if you follow the course that we have heretofore pursued, we will pass on to the first recommendation. The first recommendation is Article 2(a),³⁴ No Discrimination, adopted 12 to 7. This is the same provision that is in the Rumanian Treaty. Are there any comments? We then pass to the next which is Article 11.

Mr. Bevin: It didn’t get the two-thirds majority. The decision is not quite the same in the Bulgarian as it is in Rumanian, and I think I may as well withdraw it.

Article 11(a)

Secretary Byrnes: Article 2(a) is withdrawn. The next Article is 11 (a).³⁵ This Article was adopted by a, vote of 12 to 6 with 3 abstentions. What is the pleasure of the Council as to 11(a)?

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation believes that there are no grounds whatsoever for the adoption of this Article. Bulgaria threatens no one.

Mr. Bevin: This was a point of acute controversy. The United Kingdom supports this Article. There was an analogous disposition in the Italian treaty. Therefore I think it is indispensable.

Secretary Byrnes: The United States is in favor of including the Article in the Treaty. I am informed that it was adopted in the Military Commission by the same vote that was taken in the Conference. Any further comments, or shall we proceed?

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation wishes to recall that the Military Commission ascertained that there have not been and that there are no military fortifications on the Greater Bulgarian frontiers, and consequently this Article has no justification. The way the Article was voted upon was 12 to 6 with 3 abstentions, and this fact shows that probably many delegations had, if not objections, then at least misgivings as to this Article.

Secretary Byrnes: I suppose in any vote of 21 governments, somebody has misgivings about a proposal. The fact that 3 governments abstained doesn’t indicate that they abstained because they had a misgiving. It’s very difficult to tell the motives prompting abstention, but by a vote of 2 to 1 the Commission after its investigation made the recommendation, and therefore, the United States stands by the recommendation of the Military Commission and of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Molotov: In as much as reference has been made here to the Commission, I shall recall that the results of the votes in the Commission were 11 for, 7 against, and 3 abstentions, and consequently this Article was adopted only by a majority of 1 vote.

Secretary Byrnes: 11 to 4—I count that a majority of 7 in my arithmetic. 11 to 7 is a majority of 4. It’s simple arithmetic. 11 to 9 is a majority of 2. If there is no further comment, we pass on to Article 12.³⁶

Mr. Bevin: Since this provision was included in the Italian treaty it should be in the Bulgarian. MTBs are an offensive weapon and should be prohibited.

Mr. Molotov: I shall recall that Italy has not been prohibited from having battleships, cruisers and destroyers, whereas Bulgaria hasn’t got anything of this kind, and if Bulgaria is prohibited to have motor torpedo boats, it will mean that Bulgaria will be rendered incapable of defending herself. The Soviet Delegation cannot accept such an unjustified, unfair attitude and cannot agree with this proposal. Out of the 4 delegations here, only 2 voted in favor of this proposal whereas the Soviet Union voted against and France abstained. This also ought to be taken into account in the final solution of this question.

Secretary Byrnes: I agree I think it ought to be taken into consideration that only 1 voted against the provision. The only point I make is that we don’t agree exactly on this abstention business, that whenever a man abstains, it must be counted “no.” If he wanted to vote “no,” he could vote “no,” but he abstained from voting. I thought it meant that for reasons satisfactory to a delegation that it did not wish to be counted either way on a particular question, and that its wish would be followed and should not be counted for or against the thing.

Mr. Bevin: In the Commission the point really arose on a question of drafting. The majority seems to count sometimes and it doesn’t count on another. I would remind the Council that the Bulgarian naval forces before the war was about 1500 tons. They have been allowed 7000 now, so I don’t think that the Commission was ungenerous to Bulgaria.

M. Couve de Murville: Since the vote of the French Delegation has been mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to point out why we abstained. The reason is quite simple. This Article had been agreed upon in the Council of Foreign Ministers, and we had doubts since this was an Article which had been subject to an agreement of the Council whether it could raise the question at the Conference and have the Conference modify it.

Mr. Molotov: I think that the reminder of M. Couve de Murville is quite appropriate. This is another proof of the fact that in certain cases, the delegations of the United States of America and Great Britain departed from what had been previously agreed upon in spite of the fact that it ought not to have happened.

M. Couve de Murville: But I was about to add when Mr. Molotov made his remarks, that since the question is discussed here where we have freedom of action, there is no reason to depart in the Bulgarian Treaty from the wording which existed in the military provisions of the Bulgarian [Italian?] Treaty. It should be recognized on the same terms as the military provision of the Bulgarian Treaty.

Mr. Molotov: If I am not mistaken, then the second remark made by M. Couve de Murville is in contradiction with his first remark.

M. Couve de Murville: There is no contradiction, Mr. Chairman, the French Delegation, maybe by excessive conscience, thought they had no right to change an agreed provision of the Conference, and if this question has been construed differently by other Delegations, then it is a question of appreciation.

Mr. Bevin: I understand, Mr. Chairman, that this draft was put down and thought by everybody at the beginning that it included MTBs, but afterwards this question was raised and therefore it became a question of interpretation and the delegations on the Commission, the majority of the delegations, said that their interpretation was it included motor torpedo boats, others disagreed, therefore, the words “motor torpedo boats” were put in to make it quite clear. That is the meaning, because of the disagreement on what the Article originally intended to convey. In the majority vote of the Commission they held it did include motor torpedo boats. I think wherever there is a doubt like this, we ought to be ready to put it right and this is a question of putting right what the Council originally did, as I understand it.

Secretary Byrnes: Of course, when the Commission changed from the language of the Article, as agreed to in the Council before the Peace Conference, in the first place there was no reference to atomic weapons in the military committee and someone proposed to include that and the Soviet Government voted for it, to change the Article from the way it was agreed to in the Council and so did the other governments here. And then the language in the parentheses beginning “other than torpedoes” that language was not in the Article as agreed to by the Council. It was proposed in the military committee at the Peace Conference and the Soviet Government, along with the rest of us, voted for it, to change it from its original language. Another proposal was to add the words “or torpedoes” not in the agreement in the Council, and it was added and the Soviet Government, as well as the United States Government voted for that. That last vote, adding the words “or torpedoes” was proposed by the Soviet representative proposing to change the sacred words that had been agreed to in the Council before the Conference met. The Soviet Government was right in my construction of it. It had a right to do that, it was offering a proposal which was not included in the original language and which was not contradictory to that language. We thought they were right and we agreed to the change. The United States position was that the language “or specialized types of assault craft” would include the motor torpedo boats. Someone in the French Delegation believed there was doubt as to whether it was included and wished to clarify the language by the insertion of those words in the Italian treaty and it was agreed to. I do not think it important, I make the statement only because I do not like the statement that the United States Delegation violated the agreement. If that had been true, the Soviet Delegation, the French Delegation, as well as the United Kingdom Delegation and the United States Delegation violated the agreement. I repeat that I think no one of us violated the treaty and it is not so very helpful to indulge in statements of that kind.

Mr. Molotov: I should like to say that the observation that the Soviet Delegation has violated decisions does not apply to the Soviet Delegation. As to the factual information furnished here, I should not like to waste time in furnishing more exact factual explanations because we have so very little time for this purpose. The Soviet Delegation wishes to note certain things out of what we have been discussing. It seems to us incorrect to permit Italy to have battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and not to permit Bulgaria, which does not have anything of this kind, to have even motor boats. I do not know whether this attitude can be recognized as fair. The Soviet Delegation considers this view to be unfair and, therefore, we cannot support the proposal to prohibit Bulgaria from having even a few motor torpedo boats.

Article 20, Paragraph 2

Secretary Byrnes: No further comments? We’ll proceed to the next Article, Article 20, second paragraph,³⁷ having to do with reparations. Separate votes were taken on the amount of reparations. The United Kingdom proposal for $125,000,000 was adopted by 13 to 6 with 2 abstentions. Are there any comments as to that recommendation from the Council?

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation declares in favor of the proposal made by the Yugoslav Delegation, namely, to fix the amount of reparations from Bulgaria at $25,000,000.

Secretary Byrnes: The two proposals should be considered together, one was recommended by the vote 13 to 6, and there was a proposal by the Yugoslav Delegation for $25,000,000 with 6 votes in favor of it and 13 against. Can we reach agreement as to the amount?

Mr. Bevin: What is before us?

Secretary Byrnes: It is the recommendation of the Conference that reparations payable by Bulgaria to Greece and Yugoslavia shall be $125,000,000 payable in equal parts to both countries. Not being a recommendation by 14 votes, the United States is in favor of the proposal as it stands but is willing to consider any other proposal. I make the suggestion because it appears from the document that the Yugoslav Delegation is satisfied with $25,000,000. Under the recommendation of the Conference Greece will get one-half of $125,000,000 which would be $62,500,000 and we might give Yugoslavia what she asks for, $25,000,000, and give Greece $62,500,000 that she was awarded by the Conference, as a compromise.

I am advised that the Yugoslav proposal, $25,000,000, was the fixing of $25,000,000 as the total amount to be divided $16,000,000 to Yugoslavia and $9,000,000 to Greece. Any comments?

Mr. Bevin: The United Kingdom Delegation cannot accept anything less than $62,500,000 for Greece. She was at war a long time and suffered terribly, I think it is the minimum she ought to get. We recognize the part played by Yugoslavia in the war and I felt this recommendation of $125,000,000 divided equally was a sound decision and I stand by the recommendation. Everybody knows my view about reparations but this thing was scratched out so carefully and I think we worked well in arriving at this decision in the Conference, and I think we should take a decision of the Conference sometime.

Mr. Molotov: It seems to me a rather strange situation will arise if we accept this recommendation. The Yugoslavs consider that $16,000,000 reparations will be enough for them in spite of this they are offered $62,500,000 reparations. I do not know what strange situation will arise when we try to impose upon Yugoslavia the sum of reparations of four times as great as that suggested by them. This will constitute a rare case and it is mighty risky to say that this course of action is justified. I am not certain whether the capacity of Bulgaria to pay reparations to the amount of $125,000,000 has been subjected to a thorough study. As a rule, the capacity of a country to pay reparations is a subject of thorough study, but as far as I know no calculations have been made to ascertain the capacity of Bulgaria to pay that amount in reparations. Perhaps certain Delegations consider Bulgaria capable of paying that amount. Perhaps they have some data to substantiate this, but the Soviet Delegation has no reason to suppose that Bulgaria will be capable of paying $125,000,000 reparations. And then, in addition, we should not forget the fact that Bulgaria helped us to expedite the termination of the war against Hitler and Mussolini and we think that we should take this fact into consideration and that we should not make unbearable reparations for Bulgaria. In our view it will be adequate to fix reparations, if not at $25,000,000, then at $30,000,000.

Secretary Byrnes: I agree with the statement of the Soviet Delegation as to the proposal. When I suggested $25,000,000 for Yugoslavia a few moments ago it was only because this document shows the Yugoslav proposal of $25,000,000 being rejected. It did not show the breakdown of that $25,000,000 proposal. I do not think Bulgaria should be caused to pay reparations to any country in excess of the amount asked by that country.

I am advised that careful examination was made by the Economic Committee, but in the way the Committee was called upon to vote the first proposal was one by Greece that the total reparations should be $200,000,000, which received only one or two votes and the next proposal was the Yugoslav proposal of $25,000,000, which received six votes. Then the third proposal was the United Kingdom proposal of $125,000,000, which was adopted by the Committee.

My statement was, as to the examination, to the capacity to pay. I submit, though, that here with the Conference by a vote of more than two to one, even though it was not a two-thirds vote, it stated that Greece should receive $62,500,000 and Yugoslavia does not want more than $16,000,000, that the proper disposition is to figure the total amount at $78,000,000 divided, one-half as the Conference intended Greece to participate, or $62,500,000 and then $16,000,000 that Yugoslavia says it wants.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, whatever manipulations are made, without making any long speeches, Greece was the greatest sufferer, and I could not reduce the amount to Greece.

Secretary Byrnes: My information is that Greece’s first request was $400,000,000 and by action of the Committee and by action of the Conference it winds up the Conference recommended the $62,500,000 to Greece. I suggest we add to that $62,500,000 the amount that Yugoslavia says it wants.

Mr. Molotov: The fact that the Greek Delegation demanded $400,000,000 from Bulgaria as reparations goes to show the degree to which the Greek Delegation was light-minded in its attitude toward this question. Therefore, there can be no doubt, it seems to me, that this demand of the Greek Delegation was entirely unsound, and the Soviet Delegation believes that $30,000,000 reparations will be sufficient to satisfy both Yugoslavia and Greece.

Article 22, Paragraph 4³⁸

Secretary Byrnes: If we can’t reach an agreement, then we shall pass on to the following question, Article 22. This question has been discussed in connection with the other treaties. Unless someone objects, I suggest we go to the next recommendation.

Article 24³⁹

Secretary Byrnes: In this article that was adopted by 15 to 4, with 2 abstentions, Article 24, this article was adopted in the Italian and Rumanian treaties in this form. In the other treaties it was agreed to by the four of us.

Mr. Molotov: With regard to Bulgaria, which was robbed by Germany during the war and which has not yet recuperated economically from the consequences of the war, the Soviet Delegation thinks it would be proper to support its own proposal on the subject.⁴⁰ There is no need for me to repeat this proposal which was set forth in the drafting.

I shall recall that in the case of Finland we adopted the same course, as now, the Soviet Delegation suggests we should adopt in the case of Bulgaria. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation does not suggest anything that would be unacceptable to the other delegations as far as this subject is concerned. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation suggests that we extend to Bulgaria the same manner of disposition as adopted by us in the case of Finland. It is a question of restoring the right of Bulgarians and Bulgaria in Allied and Associated Powers’ territories since these rights were restricted during the war. We adopted this in the case of Finland, though the part played by Finland in the war was far worse than that played by Bulgaria.

The Soviet Delegation considers it right to treat in that way the small countries in spite of the fact that they were in the enemy’s camp. Therefore, we ask that the same treatment be extended to Bulgaria as that in the case of Finland.

Secretary Byrnes: Of course, this proposal, Article 24, comes to us with a strong recommendation, 15 to 4 and 2 abstentions. It is the same provision that applies to Italy and Rumania, and it is very difficult for the United States Delegation to see why it should not likewise apply to Bulgaria. We had nothing to do with the drafting of the treaty with Finland, but we think that this clause certainly should be included. It deals only with the amount of claims against Bulgaria by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr. Bevin: We accept the decision of the Conference, Mr. Chairman.

Article 25⁴¹

Secretary Byrnes: Any further comment?

As we are in disagreement we shall proceed to the next recommendation, which is 25, proposal of the United Kingdom, United States and France, recommended by a vote of 14 to 6.

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation suggests that we adopt in this case the same provisions as those we adopted in the case of Finland. Bulgaria is a small country and the same regulations should be extended by us to her as those we extended with regard to other small countries.

Secretary Byrnes: I do not understand that we have yet adopted the Finnish Treaty, but I do think the same provision now under consideration was included in the treaty as to Italy and Rumania. It was adopted at the Conference but it has not been agreed to by the Council.

If we cannot agree that it is the same question, we may as well go on.

Mr. Molotov: References have been made to the decisions adopted by us with regard to Italy and Rumania. The Soviet Delegation holds the view that we acted rightly with regard to Italy when we adopted the decision that no Italian assets in Germany should be returned to Italy. But we consider it would be unjust to adopt the same course in the case of small countries, but, however, if other Delegations consider that no assets of Rumania or Bulgaria in Germany should be seized as well as no assets of Bulgaria and Rumania in Allied countries should be seized, if the other Delegations consider this proposal to be acceptable, then we are ready to support it. But we should bear in mind the fact that we should be especially considerate in our actions towards small countries, and therefore to adopt in the case of Rumania the same provisions as those for Bulgaria, which were applied to certain small countries—other small countries.

Mr. Bevin: I am not quite clear as to the proposal. I am sorry. Would you repeat it?

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation suggests that in the case of Bulgaria and Rumania we should adhere to the same principles as we have adopted in the case of Finland. If we have made an exception in the case of Italy as a great country, which is far stronger than small countries—than the small countries interested—then with regard to the small countries the same principle should be applied; namely, that the assets of Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland in Germany and in Allied countries should be reserved to those countries. If the other delegations are agreeable to the suggestion, then we are willing to revise our previous decision regarding Rumania.

Mr. Bevin: I am afraid I could not accept that.

Article 28⁴²

Secretary Byrnes: I suggest we proceed to the next Article, Article 28. It is the same proposal as discussed in connection with the Rumanian treaty. Have the members of the Council changed their minds so we can reach an agreement on this? If not, it is useless to continue discussion of this.

Article 28(a)⁴³

Secretary Byrnes: Then let us proceed to 28 bis. (28)a. Is there any comment on Article 28 bis?

Mr. Bevin: We are in favor of it …⁴⁴ consider it to be very desirable that railway transit between the countries be restored.

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation believes that the neighbors in question will be able to reach agreement without this special Article, the wording of which may give rise to misunderstanding.

Mr. Bevin: I would remind you the Rumanians asked for this in the Hungarian treaty and the Greeks in the Bulgarian treaty. I understand this form or device to apply to both treaties. I fail to see what misunderstanding it can possibly create. I should have thought it was one Article which we laid down at the Peace Conference that we could adopt so these people can begin to live together in peace again.

Mr. Molotov: All this can be referred to discussion of the question whether Bulgaria has extended the facilities in question or not, and consequently misunderstandings may arise. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that the neighboring countries will not succeed in reaching agreement among themselves. The Soviet Delegation has no doubt that the neighbors will be able to do so and that Bulgaria will help to reach a satisfactory agreement.

Article 29⁴⁵

Secretary Byrnes: I suggest we proceed to Article 29. There is the same language as contained in the other two treaties. There was disagreement as to both those two treaties. Are we ready to adopt this proposal or shall we go on?

Article 32⁴⁶

Secretary Byrnes: If there is no comment, I proceed to Article 32, the Danube. The Conference recommendation was adopted 15 to 6. Is there any argument or shall we wait—That is, as to the first paragraph. The second paragraph was 14 to 7. Does anyone desire to present argument on this question at this time?

Mr. Bevin: Well, I gave my argument on the Rumanian. I take the same stand.

Secretary Byrnes: The United States stands by the recommendation of the Conference.

Mr. Molotov: The attitude of the Soviet Delegation towards this question is well known.

Article 34⁴⁷

Secretary Byrnes: The Article is in disagreement.

Let us proceed to Article 34. That Article has also been discussed in the previous treaties. Do you desire to present any views with reference to it now?

Mr. Molotov: The attitude of the Soviet Delegation was set forth in the course of discussion of the Rumanian Treaty.

Secretary Byrnes: The attitude of the United States remains the same and I, hearing no objections from other Members of the Council, assume that that is true in the case of France and Great Britain.

Annex

Secretary Byrnes: Then we proceed to the Annex. There is no difference in the provisions in the Annex except in reference to the insurance clause where, I am advised, there is a difference in the vote by which—it is not recommended in this. The other provisions being the same, can we have it understood that the positions of each delegation as to the provisions of the Annex are exactly as the positions were in the case of the Rumanian?⁴⁸

Then is there any proposal with reference to this treaty other than the recommendations?

Article 1

Mr. Bevin: The First Article, Mr. Chairman—I discussed it today—that is the Greek Frontier Plan with reference to Bulgaria.⁴⁹ This amendment—Bulgarian Frontier—was left open for the Conference and nothing was carried. The Greeks desired to have certain frontier rectifications in their favor in connection with the Bulgarian frontier.

We have the map, I think. Greece has been attacked three times by Bulgaria in the last 50 years, and we regard those rectifications as necessary for their protection as a defense. There are many arguments from the ethnic principle, but we have ignored that principle in other cases, as in the case of transfer to Czechoslovakia of territory almost wholly inhabited by Hungarians. The area opposite Transylvania, also the Polish case was discussed.

The Greek nation is very perturbed about the attacks upon them coming from this area, and the history is that it has caused them so much suffering. The Greek nation has fought heroically and took a great part in this war and we are anticipating giving them equitable settlement in the peace treaties. The areas have been modified from their original claims, but the claim now set forth is regarded militarily as essential for the defense of Greece against another attack.

As to the areas in the West—they are necessary for the protection of Salonika. We’d be willing to let it go to the expert committee particularly with reference to the areas in the West.

Secretary Byrnes: Any other comments on the proposal? The United States would be willing to let it go to the Deputies to see if they could consider the new proposal which is now made by the UK.

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation believes that the time is not proper for raising new questions, particularly any questions relating to the modification of Bulgarian frontiers. If we are anxious for peace between Bulgaria and Greece—and we are anxious for this—the best thing for us to do would be not to touch upon the question of the Bulgar-Greek frontier. If we touch upon this question of the Greek-Bulgar frontier, we shall undoubtedly give rise to the counter-claims on the part of Bulgaria which in my view are far more fully justified than those on the part of Greece against Bulgaria. I shall recall the results of the vote taken on this question in the Commission which dealt with this question. The results were 10 votes for, 2 against, and 1 abstention, and by this vote, the existing frontier was recognized. Great Britain, United States of America, and the Soviet Union voted not to make any modifications in the Greek-Bulgarian frontier.⁵⁰ What has happened since then that makes it necessary for us to change this decision? The Soviet Delegation suggests that we stand by the decision which was adopted in the Commission for Bulgaria.

Secretary Byrnes: The difficulty is that the Commission, which is a subordinate committee of the Peace Conference, did make a recommendation, but the Peace Conference, comprised of the 21 governments did not agree and in this Article we have a proposal which has not been agreed to by the Council and as to which we must reach an agreement. What the Conference did was not to make a recommendation. We had specifically asked for a recommendation. They didn’t give it to us. Now it becomes our duty to determine the language of Article 1. We did have in the text the statement that the text should be considered as tentative and the Conference received it. It didn’t submit a recommendation. So the question is whether we should continue to discuss it or whether we should follow the suggestion of Mr. Bevin and send it to the Deputies first and see if they can make the recommendation. Now is there any further comment?

M. Couve de Murville: Mr. Chairman, as regards this question of the border between Greece and Bulgaria, the French Delegation has expressed its position in the Conference and in the Commission, and also in the vote which was cast at the Plenary Session of the Conference. This position was that Article 1 in its present form, might be accepted and we still consider that it might be accepted by the Council. However, other delegations have doubts and want to re-examine this Article in the light of the new proposals which have been made by the Greek Government. Of course, it’s not possible and won’t even be desirable to oppose such wishes. Therefore, we have no objection to having this question referred either to the Deputies or to some other committee in order that they might study the Article in the light of the new Greek proposals, it being understood, however, that the French Delegation holds the same position as it has in the Conference.

Secretary Byrnes: Does the Soviet Delegation agree to sending it to the Deputies or shall we pass it as a matter in disagreement.

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation believes that this question ought to be settled by the Council of Foreign Ministers itself.

Secretary Byrnes: Then the Article will be passed. Any other proposals as to the Treaty which anybody in the Council desires to be considered? If not, I propose that we adjourn. Hearing no proposal, I assume that we adjourn.

Mr. Bevin: I don’t mind.

Secretary Byrnes: 4:30?

Mr. Molotov: Today?

Secretary Byrnes: Yes.

Mr. Molotov: I have no objection.

Secretary Byrnes: Shall we fix the time to adjourn at 7? How about it?

Mr. Bevin: I will do whatever you wish.

Secretary Byrnes: I propose 7.

Mr. Molotov: That’s satisfactory.

(The meeting adjourned for lunch at 1:50 p.m.)

21. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
22. Under consideration at this point was the Record of Recommendations of the Peace Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, vol. iv, p. 918.
23. ibid., p. 926.
24. ibid., p. 924.
25. Ellipsis indicated in the source text.
25. Ellipsis indicated in the source text.
26. For article 4 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, which was adopted by the Peace Conference without modification, see vol. iv, p. 64.
27. ibid., p. 70.
28. ibid., p. 76.
29. For the United Kingdom proposal for Annex 4, Part C, see vol. iv, p. 85. The proposal had not been adopted by the Peace Conference.
30. For the text of the Armistice agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Rumania, September 12, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490.
31. Record of the Recommendations by the Peace Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, vol. iv, p. 918.
32. See footnote 97, p. 1065.
33. The documentation under consideration at this point was the Record of the Recommendations by the Peace Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, vol. iv, p. 927.
34. ibid., p. 934.
35. The reference here is presumably to article 11 bis, ibid., p. 935.
36. Vol. iv, p. 929.
37. Vol. iv, p. 935.
38. Vol. iv, pp. 930, 935.
39. ibid., p. 930.
40. The Soviet proposal for article 24 was included in the Draft Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, ibid., p. 99.
41. Vol. iv, p. 931.
42. Vol. iv, p. 932.
43. Ibid.
44. Ellipsis indicated in the source text.
45. Vol. iv, p. 932.
46. ibid., p. 933.
47. Ibid.
48. Under consideration at this point were annexes 4, 5, and 6. See the Record of Decisions regarding this item, p. 1093.
49. The reference here is to C.F.M. (46) (NY) 2, November 3, 1946, p. 956 (and see footnote 22, ibid.).
50. Regarding the decision of the Political and Territorial Commission for Bulgaria, at its 15th Meeting, October 1, 1946, with respect to article 1 of the Draft Treaty with Bulgaria, see vol. iii, p. 610.