C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation11
| Present: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Cohen | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
The Secretary said he had asked to see Mr. Molotov to tell him that after carefully thinking over his proposal of yesterday he had come to the conclusion that it could not be accepted by the United States. He said when he had analyzed the suggestion he felt that it would be an impossible situation and that with Yugoslav sovereignty, with a Yugoslav Governor, there would be little for the representatives of the four powers to do and that there would be no connection with the United Nations. He said frankly the difficulty was that the sovereignty would be Yugoslav. He said he wished to be quite frank and make it clear to Mr. Molotov that the United States could not accept Yugoslav sovereignty over the Trieste area. He recognized that the Soviet Union could not accept Italian sovereignty. He was willing therefore to consider any proposal that offered a way out, either a proposal for United Nations administration along the lines of Mr. Bidault’s suggestion or to leave it to the peace conference. He preferred the latter since he felt that responsibility would then rest upon the 21 nations. He said he understood that the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union would not permit the Soviet Government to agree to leave the area to Italy but he wished again to repeat that the United States could not accept its transfer to Yugoslav sovereignty either openly or in disguised form.
Mr. Molotov said to leave it to the peace conference would be to obtain no solution and would merely cause great discord at the conference. He said that the question was not in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which were good, but in the fact that Yugoslavia was an ally and Italy was an enemy country. Between an ally and a former enemy country there could be no question of equal treatment not only by the Soviet Government but by any allied Government.
The Secretary replied that there was where they disagreed. He felt that Yugoslavia was receiving very great benefits—approximately 3,200 square miles with equipment for coal mines, mercury mines, etc., installed by the Italians which our experts value at 191 million dollars. The only question was how much Yugoslavia would receive.
[Page 615]Mr. Molotov stated that he had already indicated that the frontier line proposed by the Soviet experts could be modified in favor of Italy in the north according to ethnic principles. The only question was that of Trieste. The Soviet Delegation was seeking a solution which would remove the cause of discord. He said he was prepared to accept extreme measures provided they could reach agreement on other questions. But assurance of agreement on other questions must be received. He inquired whether he was right in understanding the Secretary that if Trieste was settled, the problem of reparations could be disposed of in a positive fashion.
The Secretary said he did not feel that reparations would present insuperable difficulties. If they could settle Trieste the United States Delegation was prepared to modify its views on reparations. For example, a council of our Ambassadors in Italy, or some other form of commission, could make a careful estimate of the value of Italian assets suitable for reparations and then the difference between that and the Soviet figure could be made up by deliveries from current production—on one condition, however: He said Mr. Molotov knew the United States did not wish to finance reparations for others. President had made that clear at Potsdam. Therefore, if a plan could be drawn up whereby the Soviet Union would supply Italy with certain raw materials out of which could be manufactured the products which the Soviet Union desired as reparations, that might be a solution.
Mr. Molotov said that a direct agreement between Italy and the Soviet Union to supply raw materials in exchange for reparations might be difficult, but he said that he thought the list of products to be delivered from current production and the time and details of delivery could be worked out between Italy and the Soviet Union, say for six years.
The Secretary said he had in mind for example that if the Soviet Union desired ships they could supply the raw materials for their construction.
Mr. Molotov then inquired if agreement could be reached on the peace treaties was the United States prepared to sign all five, including the one with Bulgaria.
The Secretary said he saw no difficulty on that and we would meet that question when it arose.
Mr. Molotov said he hoped there would be no delay in regard to Bulgaria. He then went on to say that in the circumstances he was prepared to take another extreme step. The Secretary had said the [Page 616] chief difficulty was the question of Yugoslav sovereignty and a Yugoslav Governor. He would therefore suggest that there be dual Yugoslav and Italian sovereignty with two Governors, one Italian and one Yugoslav. There would of course be a House of Representatives elected by the local inhabitants. He said that he felt that such a solution would be most acceptable to both Yugoslavia and Italy.
The Secretary replied that he felt that two Governors would be very impracticable in view of the feeling of the two races in that area. He said he felt that this would not really be a settlement but a constant source of conflict.
Mr. Molotov replied he thought that the Italian and Yugoslav Governments could agree on some such plan for administration and cited the example of the Republic of Andorra where Spain and France shared the administration. He pointed out that the House of Representatives would decide most questions of administration.
Mr. Cohen pointed out that some such solution might be feasible at a later date when passions had cooled, but at the present time it could only give rise to serious difficulties because of the state of feeling in the area.
The Secretary said he merely would add on all these questions that he had had no consultations with the British or the French Delegations and therefore he was speaking only for himself. He said he said this in order to show that there was no Anglo-American bloc.
Reverting to Bulgaria, The Secretary said that he was going to ask the help of the Soviet Government in order to persuade the Bulgarian Government to carry out the Moscow decision.
Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had twice attempted this but the opposition had refused and the blame therefore lay upon them.
The Secretary observed that if the Soviet Delegation could accept the French line in Venezia-Giulia we would be prepared to settle all other questions.
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had made an extreme proposal which they regarded as quite good and if it could be accepted it should ease the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy and also among the other powers. He requested the Secretary to think over his suggestion for dual sovereignty.
The Secretary concluded by saying that he did not believe that the United States could accept any Yugoslav sovereignty over this Italian area and repeated his suggestion that it be left to the peace conference if the Ministers could not agree.
- This conversation took place at Luxembourg Palace, June 25, 1946, at 3:30 p.m.↩