Office of the Historian

890F.248/11–3045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, November 30, 1945—11 a.m.

10394. Re London’s 12421, Nov 28. Please inform appropriate Brit authorities urgently substance of the following:

1.
Following termination hostilities Army had no authority to continue work on Dhahran airfield without specific approval of President and Congress. This approval including necessary appropriations has now been given by both President and Congress with stipulation that Dept of State secure at once agreement to conditions specified Dept’s 10103 of Nov 19.
2.
We do not see how airfield negotiations under reference would affect “Principle of regional defense” outlined in Articles 51 or 53 (not 43) San Francisco Charter since upon completion airfield will become property of Saudi Arabian Govt (SAG) and will be operated on behalf of SAG under general control of SAG. Any use of airfield by Security Council would be subject to future negotiation between Security Council and SAG under Article 43.
3.
Because airfield is still under construction military traffic is not routed via Dhahran. US military traffic continues routed via Abadan.32 However in view of international complications in Iran which [Page 972] have led to our joint decision to withdraw armed forces from Iran on or about January 1, 1946,33 operations at Abadan airfield must soon cease. It is planned that traffic be rerouted via Dhahran as soon as that field is completed. As of January 1, 1946 approximately 120 military planes per month will be operating between Far East, India, and Cairo, hence the necessity of having Dhahran airfield available soon as possible.
4.
This Govt does not consider Dhahran airfield related to larger question of an Anglo-American air transport agreement. The Brit position on “Fifth Freedom” is understood and it is not this Govt’s intention to maneuver Brit into approval of the general Fifth Freedom concept by securing Brit approval of our proposed negotiations with Saudi Arabian Govt. On other hand this Govt continues to maintain its position that it has the right to negotiate Fifth Freedom traffic rights with independent third Powers if such Powers are willing. This Govt is merely requesting, in view of the urgent need for Dhahran field, that Brit Govt not endeavor to obstruct Saudi-American negotiations involving a bilateral air transport agreement.
5.
In answer to last paragraph London’s 12421 it should be pointed out that this Govt has requested several times that Brit officials meet with American officials for such negotiations, and it is still hopeful that Brit Govt is prepared to enter into such discussions at an early date.
6.
In view of the stipulations referred to above laid down by the President and Congress the Dept must approach SAG at once on this subject. Otherwise the Army may be charged with the misuse of funds. Dept therefore, in any event, must issue instructions to Legation in Jidda within few days to begin negotiations with SAG. It is hoped therefore that Brit Govt will issue appropriate instructions to its Legation in Jidda without delay and will inform us of its action.

The situation may be summarized as follows:

(a)
This Govt, under stipulations already set forth which we believe are fair and reasonable, can build an airfield available to all.
(b)
If work is stopped now and labor and material already assembled is dispersed it is not likely that this Govt will be able later to complete the field.
(c)
We believe the Brit Govt would agree with us that it would be regrettable if the airport, which would be extremely useful, particularly in times of possible stress, is not built within the next few months and be readily available for future contingencies.

Sent to London, repeated to Cairo for Minister Eddy.

Byrnes
  1. For documentation on the use by the United States of facilities at Abadan, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, pp. 486 ff.↩
  2. For documentation on this subject see pp. 845 ff.↩