890F.248/7–1545: Telegram
The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:55 p.m.]
270. ReDept’s 198, July 13. I agree that King’s rejection of military air training mission and military road building was decisively influenced by British pressure which King admitted. However, Pan-Arab nationalism and internal fanaticism also have influenced King to keep Holy Land free from taint of foreign occupation.
Rejection of road is most serious and should weaken King’s future appeals for sand equipped trucks to cross Dahna which Britain might well be now expected to supply.
King’s request for pilot training however was always limited to training in USA. He never accepted proposal of air mission in Saudi Arabia (reLeg’s despatch 33, Nov 8, 194461) and I believe even at that date British were opposing any further US military missions.
I see no absolute assurance that future Saudi Government will maintain order with or without roads.
I am convinced British do not want US to build Saudi army or air force, preferring in future themselves to “rescue the land[”] if disorder arose as they have rescued Syria and Lebanon.62
However, no use in scolding King for this situation; he expects us to have more influence with British with our greater power as creditor and principal Ally but he fails to see proof of our influence (Leg’s despatch 150 July 8 paragraph 8 and 9). Furthermore he was assured [Page 930] Connor Mission proposals were not connected with permission for air field (Dept’s 130 May 3 paragraph 5).
As soon as supplementary aid for 1945 is announced to Saudi (Dept’s 197 July 13, paragraph 3) pressing [freeing?] US aid [for] the first time from British joint limitation, I recommend the US assure security of airfield by stipulating in negotiations that when the field reverts to Saudi Government all foreign technicians employed shall be Americans since US built the field with its funds and personnel.
General comment: I have no immediate evidence of British maneuvering beyond King’s statement, but British resentment at our overtures re civil airways, opposition to radio communications, jealousy of Shomber Mission which they insisted on matching in numbers, bank and military lend-lease given, all tell one story: British oppose and will oppose any US activity in Saudi Arabia which gives even appearance of political or military precedence. British permit us to relieve them of burden of supply but will not part with decisive vote and veto power. I hope we never join in joint subsidy or supply again but instead attach our independent economic aid to our own strings instead of to British apron strings.
To match Britain’s political influence in Saudi Arabia we need:
- (1)
- A financial plan for nonrepayable funds such as Navy purchase of oil reserves mentioned in Dept’s 178, June 27, section 2 paragraph 2.63 If our national interest is really strategic we can afford surely to outbid Britain as economic stabilizer and do it with dollars to be spent for only US goods and services.
- (2)
- Open agreement with Britain on highest level recognizing the primary interest of US in Saudi economy and candid statement by British Govt that they welcome all constructive moves by US to assist in Saudi development.