Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

890D.01/9–545

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

In a desire to contribute to a solution of the Levant problem, Mr. Bevin⁶⁴ discussed the situation informally with the French Ambassador in London on August 16th, making it clear that he could not commit His Majesty’s Government since the Cabinet had not yet considered the matter. Mr. Bevin was anxious to remove what is believed to be a strong French suspicion that if both British and French troops were withdrawn from the Levant States and trouble thereafter arose, British troops would return and remain in those countries.

2. His tentative suggestions were therefore as follows:

(1) both Governments should agree forthwith to withdraw their troops,

(2) if the French were afraid of attacks on the Christian minorities, it would be for the United States, Great Britain and France in the interim period before the functioning of the World Organisation to decide whether they should intervene, and if so, to determine what troops should be used. Britain, for her part, would support the employment of French troops for this purpose. Mr. Bevin thought that this would have a moral effect in preventing outbreaks and would cause the Syrians and Lebanese to take care to see that disturbances did not arise,

(3) the police force should be efficiently organised,

(4) steps should be taken to deal with the problem of exchange in order to enable the territories to be fed. This would be a matter of discussion,

(5) France’s claim to a base should be dealt with by the World Organisation when the time came.

3. Mr. Bevin concluded by stating that if this tentative approach appealed to the French Government, he would take the matter up with the Cabinet. If it would assist the French, Mr. Bevin was agreeable to the above proposals emanating from them.

4. The French Ambassador has now replied to the above proposals stating that his communication is strictly personal and confidential and that it represents the personal views of M. Bidault but does not commit the French Government, which has not discussed them.

5. M. Bidault considers that the proposal for simultaneous evacuation of the Levant States by French and British forces is open to serious objections. He believes that the Christian communities at Jazireh would be in danger following the withdrawal of Allied forces and that, should disturbances arise necessitating foreign intervention, there would be a long delay before the French troops could arrive on the spot, since the nearest point at which they are located is Tunisia. The necessary prior agreement between Washington, Paris and London would take time and in the meantime British troops would be forced to intervene for humanitarian reasons and to prevent the development of a situation threatening the security of Palestine. Such British intervention would confirm the worst French suspicions of British motives.

6. M. Bidault therefore proposes the following alternative solution. The military dispositions at present in force should be maintained, but French political officers should be abolished, together with other unspecified arrangements not consonant with the independent status of Syria and Lebanon. The French and British Governments would agree mutually to withdraw officials objectionable to each other. Sufficient French troops for intervention in the interests of keeping the peace should be retained in certain places in the Lebanon to be decided by Franco-British agreement, confirmed by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The balance of French forces, if any, would then be evacuated simultaneously with the evacuation of British troops. The French should retain an airfield at Mezze and perhaps also a further airfield in Jazireh. Such a measure would reassure the Christians and contribute to the general pacification. M. Bidault added the following further suggestions on his own account,

(a) that His Majesty’s Government should undertake to support with the World Organisation the French claim to bases in the Levant,

(b) His Majesty’s Government would undertake to refuse to supply British advisers to Syria and Lebanon administrations. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be informed of this undertaking and an attempt should be made to obtain a similar undertaking from the United States Government,

(c) His Majesty’s Government would undertake to recognise priority for France in all matters concerning loans or financial operations which Syria or the Lebanese Governments might wish to incur to meet obligations devolving on them in consequence of their independence.

(d) His Majesty’s Government would assist the French Government to obtain guarantees of safe-guarding French educational establishments in the Levant.

7. Mr. Bevin would be glad to learn the view of the State Department on this matter. He has informally notified the French Ambassador that he personally sees no prospect for a settlement on the basis of the suggestion of M. Bidault that French troops should remain in the Levant after the withdrawal of British troops. Mr. Bevin’s proposal that the French and British forces should be withdrawn from Syria was fundamental to the whole scheme which he propounded; and he had supposed that the principle of simultaneous evacuation was acceptable to the French Government in view of Count de Ostrorog’s statements to the present and previous Lebanese Governments on this subject. In the present circumstances it would be unrealistic to suppose that Syrian or Lebanese consent could be obtained for the continued presence of French forces in the Levant. Such an arrangement could in practice only be realised if it were imposed on the States by force or threat of force and could not possibly last.

8. Mr. Bevin added that in his opinion if agreement can be reached on the question of joint withdrawal a substantial measure of agreement on the other points mentioned by the Ambassador should be possible, though he could not undertake to resist the appointment of a United States adviser. Mr. Bevin appreciates the importance which the United States Government attaches to its right to provide advisers at the request of Governments who make application for them.

Washington , September 5, 1945.

64. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Labor Government organized by Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee on August 5, 1945.