121.893/12–3145
Memorandum by General of the Army George C. Marshall
5
to Fleet Admiral William D.
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy
Washington, November 30,
1945.
General Handy6 has just informed me that you told him you
had been directed by the President to draft a statement of U. S. policy
regarding China. For that reason I am sending you the attached paper.7
The other day the Secretary of State read to me (and to himself for the first
time) a draft of a statement of such a policy. It did not appeal to me as
sufficiently plain to be understood by the public, it appeared susceptible
of serious misunderstanding, and was not sufficiently definite to form the
sure base for a directive to Wedemeyer.8 Therefore I asked him to let
me have the carbon to try my hand on it. The attached is the result.
I have some hesitancy in sending this to you since it came to me direct from
Mr. Byrnes as an uncorrected draft, but under the circumstances, I have
decided to send it to you confidentially.
[Page 748]
The rewrite attached represents the combined efforts of General Handy,
General Hull,9 General Craig,10 and myself, with some consultation with others. The
endeavor was to couch the policy in such language that the public at home
could really understand what we were talking about and what the implications
were. Also, that it would both give the Generalissimo11
sufficiently definite data on which to calculate the troops available to
him, having in mind that Marines would be in certain ports to guarantee
their security, and so that it would at the same time be couched in such
manner that we could hold him to action in other matters more purely
political. Incidentally, it was felt that the statements should be of such a
nature that the Chiefs of Staff could really use it as the basis of a new
directive to General Wedemeyer, the previous instructions not being
satisfactory for this purpose.
I am clear that we must not scatter Marines around China, but on the other
hand, I feel we must hold them in certain ports to protect our beachheads.
By such action the Generalissimo would be free to remove most of his troops
from those ports, feeling secure in regard to them and having these released
troops available for the extensive task of taking over rail communications
in North China and releasing the Japanese troops now holding those
lines.
I assume that the Communist group will block all progress in negotiations as
far as they can, as the delay is to their advantage. The greater the delay
the more they benefit by the growing confusion of the situation and the
serious results which will follow from the non-evacuation of the Japanese
military. Also the longer the delay the less probability of the
Generalissimo’s being able to establish a decent semblance of control over
Manchuria, with the consequent certainty that the Russians will definitely
build up such a control.
I suppose we will find ourselves, in this matter, on the horns of a
dilemma—on the one side, the reluctance of the Government or the State
Department to make so plain and bold a statement; and on the other side, the
necessity of saying what we mean so that the people at home and the people
in China, and the Russians also, will clearly understand our intentions.
[Page 749]
[Annex]
Draft Statement Prepared in the War Department Based
Upon the Memorandum of November 28
U. S. Policy Towards China
The Government of the U. S. holds that peace and prosperity of the world
in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the
sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United
Nations organization.
It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, peaceful, united
and effective China is of the utmost importance to the success of this
United Nations organization and for world peace. A China, disorganized
and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the
Japanese, or by violent internal strife is an undermining influence to
world stability and peace, now and in the future. The U. S. Government
has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal
affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations.
Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace
anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is
thus in the most vital interest of the U. S. and all the sovereign
nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their
internal differences without resort to violence.
Therefore, the Government of the U. S. respectfully urges:
- (1)
- That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies
of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other
dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the
return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the
immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces. The U. S. is
prepared, if so requested by the National Government of China,
to assist in arranging for necessary pledges and to request the
Governments of the U. K. and the U. S. S. E. to join in this
effort.
- (2)
- That a national conference of representatives of major
political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to
the present internal strife which will promote the unification
and stability of China.
The U. S. and the other United Nations have recognized the present
National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal
government in China. It appears to offer the only instrument able to
achieve the objective of a unified China, including Manchuria.
The U. S. and the U. K. by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the U. S. S.
R. by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration last August12
[Page 750]
and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty
and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of
China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These
agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of
China.
In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National
Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war in
consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove the possibility
of Japanese influence remaining in North China, the U. S. has a definite
obligation to assist the National Government in the disarmament and
evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly, the U. S. has been
assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the
Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of
Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The U. S. Marines are in North
China for that purpose. For the same reason the U. S. will continue to
furnish military supplies and to assist the Chinese National Government
in the further transportation of Chinese troops so that it can
re-establish control over the liberated areas of North China and
Manchuria.
The U. S. has and will continue to recognize and support the National
Government of China in international affairs and specifically in
eliminating Japanese influence in China. There
are
bound
to
be Incidental effects of such assistance
upon any dissident Chinese elements will probably be unavoidable.
However, beyond these incidental effects U. S. support will not extend
to U. S. Military intervention having as its objective the resolution of
any Chinese internal strife.
The U. S. is cognizant that the present National Government in China is a
“one-party government” and believes that peace, unity and democratic
reform in China will be furthered if the basis of the Government is
broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the
U. S. strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives
of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which
would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the
Chinese National Government. It is recognized this would require the
modification of the one party “political tutelage” established as an
interim arrangement in the progress of the nation towards democracy by
the father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-Sen.
The
U.
S.
is
convinced
that The existence of autonomous armies
such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually
makes impossible, political unity in China, Concurrently with the
institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies
should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated
effectively into the Chinese National Government army.
[Page 751]
So long as the Chinese National Government of the Republic of China moves
towards peace and unity along the lines described above, the U. S. is
prepared to assist it in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the
country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a
military organization capable of discharging Chinese national and
international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order.
Specifically, the U. S. is prepared to establish an American military
advisory group in China, to dispatch such other advisors in the economic
and financial fields as the Chinese Government might need and which this
Government can supply, and to give favorable consideration to Chinese
requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects
which contribute towards the development of a healthy economy in
China.
It must be clearly recognized that the attainment of the objectives
herein stated will require an expenditure of resources by the U. S. and
the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval
forces in China. These expenditures, however, will be minute in
comparison to those which this nation has already been compelled to make
in the restoration of the peace which was broken by German and Japanese
aggression. They will be infinitesimal by comparison to a recurrence of
global warfare in which the new and terrible weapons that now exist
would certainly be employed. The purpose for which the United States
made a tremendous sacrifice of treasure and life must not be
jeopardized.
