Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

893.00/3–645

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)

[Washington,] March 6, 1945.

General Hurley telephoned me to say that, as he had a few things to do, he would not come to see us today and expressed a desire to have a further talk tomorrow. He referred to his conversation with us yesterday³⁰ in which he had taken strong exception to the contents of a telegram from George Atcheson of February 28³¹ which we had shown him. He asked me whether we had understood his point of view in regard to the telegram. I said that we had, but that we would like to have a further talk in regard to the matter as we felt that he had read into it implications which did not accord with our interpretation of the telegram. I said I did not see how Atcheson’s recommendations, if adopted, involved recognition of the Communists as armed belligerents or were inconsistent with our recognition of the National Government as the government of China. He then went over the ground again with me. He said that he regarded the sending of the telegram as an act of disloyalty to him on the part of his staff, that it reopened a question which he had thought had already been decided, that it revived the question of the recognition of the Communists as armed belligerents, and that it was over that issue that General Stilwell had been recalled. He said that in China he had talked with the Communists and that he had broken the deadlock between the Communists and the Kuomintang. He said that neither Gauss³² nor Atcheson had ever seen the Communists and that they had never brought the Communists and the Kuomintang together. He felt that the sending of the telegram made it necessary for him to fight all over again with the State Department, the War Department, and the White House the issues raised in that telegram. He said he did not mind that, but he thought it was too bad when there were so many other things to do, including the discussion of what our future policy was to be, to be obliged to fight all over again an issue that had been decided.

I tried my best but without success to cause him to take a different attitude by expressing my view that Atcheson had done his duty in giving his estimate of most recent developments and of the thought of the Embassy in that connection. Ambassador Hurley said that the Army opposition to his policy had been eliminated by getting the die-hards transferred, but it seemed to him that he still had to contend with the State Department career officers who were upholding each other and who resented Ambassador Hurley’s policies. He said that the net effect of the telegram was to undermine his efforts, as the Communists would not be conciliatory if they thought that they were going to get supplies from us. I asked General Hurley if he had read Chiang Kai-shek’s manifesto of March 1,³³ in which he had publicly taken a position which might make agreement more difficult with the Communists. He said that he had, that he had understood Chiang Kai-shek’s position perfectly and that he thought it very natural that Chiang Kai-shek should take a stronger line as his position became more solid.

Ambassador Hurley said that he would go over the ground with us tomorrow,³⁴ and I said that we would be glad to do so but that any decisions that were taken would have to be taken at a very high level and that he should by all means see Mr. Dunn³⁵ and Mr. Grew. He said he would do so.

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]

30. No record found in Department files.
31. No. 324, February 28, 1 p.m., p. 242.
32. Clarence E. Gauss, former Ambassador to China.
33. See telegram No. 343, March 2, from the Chargé in China, p. 254.
34. No record of conversation of March 7 found in Department files.
35. James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.