Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

893.00/3–145

Memorandum by Mr. Everett F. Drumright of the Division of Chinese Affairs²⁰

[Washington,] March 2, 1945.

American Policy With Respect to China

Objective. The American Government’s long-range policy with respect to China has as one of its main objectives a strong, stable, united and peaceful China with a government that is democratic in character and representative of the wishes of the Chinese people.

The American Government’s short-range policy with respect to China may be said to be directed to the mobilization of China’s military and economic power to the fullest possible extent in the prosecution of the war. In pursuance of this policy the United States is endeavoring to strengthen China’s fighting forces, develop Sino-American military cooperation and promote internal unity in China.

Barrier to attainment of objectives. The most formidable barrier to the achievement of American policy with respect to China lies in the continuation of political and military disunity in China. The early solution of this problem is a prerequisite to the achievement of both our shortand long-range policies in China. Internal unity is essential if China is to put its maximum effort into the war and if internecine strife and grave international complications are to be avoided.

Reasons for failure to achieve internal unity. The failure of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party to attain internal unity, even in the course of a war threatening the very existence of the country, stems basically from the struggle between the two groups for political and military control of China. The relations of the contending groups are marked by an absence of mutual trust, faith and confidence. The Communists fear that Kuomintang policy is directed toward their subordination, if not complete liquidation. The Kuomintang fears that Communist policy is directed toward Communist control of China. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party desire the defeat of Japan, but this abiding fear of one for the other transcends their common fear of Japan.

In its negotiations with the Communists the Kuomintang has as a general principle insisted on Communist recognition of the Kuomintang-controlled government as the sovereign power. In pursuance of this object the Kuomintang has consistently demanded subordination of Communist administrative and military organizations to the will of the National Government. Rejecting these demands as incompatible with their aspirations for survival, the Communists have countered with proposals for the abolition of the Kuomintang one-party government, the establishment in its stead of a “democratic coalition government”, the creation of a “united high command”, and the formation of an “inter-party conference”. In an apparent endeavor to reach a settlement with the Communists, the Kuomintang has recently consented to convoke a conference of representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and certain nonpartisan leaders to “consider interim measures for political and military unification” pending convocation of the National Congress. In so far as is known, the Communists have not yet made a reply to this latest proposal of the Kuomintang.

Prerequisite to political and military unification. A major prerequisite to the unification of China is the establishment of a government broadly representative of and responsible to the people of China, a government of liberal principles dedicated to the promotion of the welfare of the people of China and the protection of their liberties, rights and interests. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party have as their avowed aim the establishment of such a system of government in accordance with the principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. But the delay of the Kuomintang in relinquishing one-party government, which that Party has ascribed to the exigencies of Japanese aggression, has given rise to the belief that the Kuomintang is intent on perpetuating itself in power. A commitment on the part of the Kuomintang to relinquish one-party government at an early date would, it is believed, contribute materially to the attainment of internal unity.

Recent reports from China are to the effect that the Sixth Kuomintang Congress is to meet at Chungking in May 1945 to consider proposals for the convocation of the people’s assembly (possibly to be held in November 1945), the enactment of a permanent Chinese constitution, and the revision of the organic laws, platform and policy of the Kuomintang. The passage of such measures would presumably result in the relinquishment of one-party government and fulfill the wishes of the Chinese people for representative and responsive government through democratic processes, as well as meet the avowed demands of the Chinese Communist Party. It would at the same time afford the Kuomintang an opportunity to revise its organic laws and institute reforms to cope with the changed conditions it will face if constitutional government is established.

Suggested measures for implementation of American policy.

1. With respect to short-range policy.

a. With a view to attainment of the most effective prosecution of the war, we should continue to advocate the unification or at least the coordination of all military forces in China. To attain this objective, we should urge (1) the establishment of a military body in the nature of a supreme war council in which the Communists and perhaps other selected non-Kuomintang military groups would have fair representation and responsibility for the formulation and execution of a coordinated war program, and (2) the incorporation of Communist and other selected non-Kuomintang forces into the National Government army under the command of American officers designated by the Generalissimo on the recommendation of the American Commander in the China Theater.

b. The United States should also encourage the Kuomintang to carry out its contemplated plan to convoke a conference of the representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other parties, as well as certain non-party leaders to consider interim measures for political and military unity pending convocation of the projected People’s Assembly. Such a step would be a token of the Kuomintang’s good faith and intentions and would ensure continuance of negotiations. It would avoid giving the appearance of an utter breakdown of negotiations and would divest the Communists of a pretext for delaying negotiations.

2. With respect to long-range policy.

a. To the extent that Chiang Kai-shek is sincerely willing (1) to accept American counsel, (2) to cooperate wholeheartedly with the United States in bringing about the defeat of Japan, and (3) to carry out measures designed to achieve internal reform and the promotion of national unity, it would appear to be in the interests of the United States to support him and his Kuomintang-sponsored government. But it is clear that it would be in the American interest to maintain a flexible policy in this respect vis-à-vis Chiang for two reasons: first, the United States may wish to be in a position to withdraw support from Chiang in the event that his government and administration deteriorate to a point reaching impotence; and, second, the United States appears to possess, in its discretion to grant or to withhold support and assistance, a weapon which may be used to induce Chiang to cooperate, reform the administration of his government, and put China’s maximum effort into the prosecution of the war.

b. The United States should use the opportunity of the holding of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Congress to impress on Chiang and other Kuomintang leaders the need for (1) Party reforms, (2) the early establishment of broadly representative, constitutional government, and (3) Kuomintang advocacy of the enactment of a permanent constitution that is liberal and democratic in character and safeguards the rights of racial and political groups and individuals. It seems clear that the reform of the Kuomintang on the lines indicated is necessary if that Party is to be capable of facing the changed conditions confronting it and of meeting the aspirations of the Chinese people for representative and responsive government.

The substance of the foregoing should be communicated at the highest level to the Generalissimo at an early date and he should be frankly informed that because of the vital importance of the vigorous prosecution of the war we may find it necessary to give military assistance not only to his forces but to other groups who in the opinion of our military authorities can be effectively used in specific military operations against the Japanese.

c. With respect to the Communists and other groups. The United States should use every means at its disposal to impress upon the Communists and other non-Kuomintang political groups the urgent need for political and military unification in order to further the Chinese war effort. It should be pointed out to those groups that the United States has been urging upon the Kuomintang the adoption of policies calculated to further internal unity in China and that we look equally to non-Kuomintang groups to take measures looking to the same end.

With particular regard to the Chinese Communists, it is believed that the United States would be justified in urging upon them the adoption of a more conciliatory attitude than they appear recently to have displayed toward the matter of reaching an agreement with the Kuomintang. It would seem desirable for the United States to urge the Communists to continue negotiations with the Kuomintang and to send delegates to participate in the multi-party conference which the Kuomintang proposes to hold in Chungking to consider interim measures for political and military unity. It might also be desirable to urge the Communists to refrain from intemperate criticism of the Kuomintang in the interests of internal unity, as well as from military activities, particularly in the regions south of the Yangtze River, which are likely to result in clashes with Kuomintang forces.

We should constantly bear in mind the possibility that Allied forces may land on the China coast, and that we may find it essential in the conduct of our military operations in such areas to cooperate with and grant assistance to such Chinese military forces, including Communist and other non-Kuomintang forces, as may be present there.

d. With respect to the other powers. It would seem advisable that the United States should cease to be the main link between China and the United Nations. Great Britain and Russia are vitally concerned with developments in China. We should make clear to Great Britain and the Soviet Union the nature of our policy and objectives in China and we should solicit the cooperation of those powers in carrying out those objectives in as much as the emergence of a peaceful, united prosperous China is as vital to those Powers as it is to the United States. We should endeavor to promote harmony and friendship between China and Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and all the other United Nations. We should particularly strive to make perfectly clear to the Soviet Government our policy vis-à-vis China. It may be anticipated that Russia, by virtue of her vital interests in central and northeastern Asia, will evince a growing interest in Chinese developments following the conclusion of the war in Europe. The possibility exists that the Soviet Union will participate in the Far Eastern conflict and perhaps invade Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

In the event that Russia enters the Far Eastern conflict and commits Soviet troops to battle, it seems inevitable that they will link up with Chinese Communist troops which are now strongly entrenched in North China. For this reason it is obvious that an agreement is needed between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party for internal unity and a unified military command. An American-Russian understanding vis-à-vis China would, it is believed, contribute materially to a solution of the Kuomintang–Communist impasse and to the future peace of East Asia and the world.

20. “With contributions by Messrs. Stanton and Vincent”; Edwin F. Stanton was Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.