Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 EW/5–745: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 7, 1945—2 p.m.
[Received 3:15 p.m.]

1487. I wish to invite attention to my several telegrams pointing out the markedly casual and inconspicuous treatment which the Soviet press has given to the surrenders of German forces in Italy and in the Western Theater and the general crumbling of German resistance there. News of these events has been made available to the Soviet public only in minor back page items in the daily press, has been accompanied by no editorial comment of any sort and has not been singled out in any way for the attention of the readers.

It is not possible to be sure of the motives dictating this extreme reserve in releasing news of victories which one might have thought would be highly gratifying to both the Soviet Government and public. The most likely explanation, in my opinion, is that the Soviet leaders, while not daring to withhold the news entirely are not happy over the fact that the big local surrenders have been exclusively to our forces and not to theirs; that they do not wish it to be suggested that the forces of the Western nations are less feared and hated that [than?] the Soviet forces among the peoples of central Europe and that they choose not to draw the attention of their public to the full extent of German disintegration until they are able to announce complete surrender and cessation of resistance on all fronts, including their own, and to attribute this primarily to the heroic efforts of the Red Army.⁸²

Sent Department as 1487, repeated to Paris for Reber and Murphy as 101.

Kennan

82. In telegram 1492, May 8, noon, from Moscow, Mr. Kennan commented further on the failure of the Soviet Government to announce the signature of the act of surrender and observed: “The official justification for this state of affairs would doubtless be that there was still resistance here and there against Soviet forces in Eastern Europe but I think the true explanation lies deeper. For Russia, peace, like everything else, can come only by ukase and the end of hostilities must be determined not by the true course of events but by decision of the Kremlin. Among the lesser injuries for which the Germans may have to answer to Russia, when the smoke has cleared away, perhaps not the least may be their willfulness in capitulating at a time and place which the Kremlin has not selected”. (740.00119 EW/5–845)

    Telegram 1519, May 9, noon, from Moscow, reported that the unconditional surrender of Germany was made known in Moscow via radio broadcast at 2 a.m., May 9 (740.00119 EW/5–945).