840.50/3–445: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
1776. For Hawkins. Following comments on the draft recommendations contained in your 2233, March 4 are made after discussion between interested agencies in Washington.
General terms of reference in section 3 of EEC draft could be interpreted as authorizing consideration of long term problems which became apparent during emergency period but whose solution was not required to meet immediate problems. Accordingly we would suggest that first three words of (a) be revised to read “economic questions requiring solution”.
Third sentence of section 4 in referring to “enemy countries” may carry implication that enemy nationals would be represented. Also question of Austria would not be clear. It is suggested that word “countries” be changed to “areas”.
Reference in paragraph 6 to “suitable reactions” means, we assume, “suitable relations”.
With regard to ECO document, it is not clear what is meant by section A (III). We would regret any tendency to have ECO closely involved in displaced persons problem66 or the problem of recruiting labor. If this section merely means to recite that priorities of rehabilitation may be affected by labor supply, it seems unobjectionable.
Section B (II) seems too broad. The importation of coal and mining machinery into northwest Europe can presumably be effected through national import program without SHAEF control and it seems unwise to overstate SHAEF authority.
We much prefer your draft of section C (I). No objection seen to including second sentence of other draft of C (I) omitting words “in general”. As stated above, we would greatly regret an attempt to give ECO executive powers. In practice any decisions reached must be carried out through national agencies and other authorities and the attempt to have such bodies bound by ECO decisions seems to raise unnecessary difficulties. If they accepted decision of ECO, they would act whether decision was advisory or recommendatory. [Page 1431] If they dissented from ECO decisions, it seems highly unlikely that they could be coerced into following them. Our experience with combined boards, whose action is through recommendations, indicates this method of operation is highly successful. Agreed recommendations have the force of decisions and yet there is avoided the problem of giving a foreign country power of decision. U.S. coal authorities would object to ECO purporting to make decisions involving quantity of supplies to be imported into Europe although they would not object to decisions as to destination of amounts previously determined by Combined Coal Committee to be available, subject to shipping considerations. If proposed phrase “within Europe” includes U.K. coal and equipment, decisions in ECO as to their distribution would be highly embarrassing in the operation of the Combined Coal Committee. You should strongly urge that ECO should operate through recommendations only. If power of decision is given to ECO, it is doubtful if U.S. would participate except by an observer.
Section C (II) raises two important problems. The first is the relationship between ECO and EEC. We feel strongly that ECO should be subordinate to EEC. If representation on ECO is kept at the technical level, as suggested by us, there should be a group to whom broader policy matters could be referred and EEC could fill this role. There may be other specialized organizations needed, for instance, fertilizer (see your 11403, December 2267) and power. We would consider it most unfortunate to have several specialized organizations operating independently without an established method of coordination. This would be particularly true in the relations between such specialized organizations and other bodies such as EITO, any reparations organization, UMA, et cetera. While we recognize the desirability of avoiding a complicated hierarchy, we agree that the relationship described in paragraph eleven of your 2232 of March 4 would provide a sensible method of operation. Relations between national and other coal authorities and ECO could proceed from day to day without reference to EEC except in those cases in which coordination with other agencies or groups was necessary or in which broader policy considerations arose.
The second point raised by C (II) relates to the last sentence. We are not clear what is proposed but feel that representation on ECO should be at the governmental level, each government undertaking to represent the various interests within its area. Again the analogy of the combined boards indicates that governmental representation is the most efficient. Representation of employers or employees separate from their governments would seem to lead inevitably to the injection [Page 1432] into ECO of matters far beyond its basic purpose. The interests of neutrals should be taken into account, but this seems a different problem, to be approached independently.
- For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1146 ff.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, p. 638.↩