Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 23, 1945, noon

Moscow, December 23, 1945, noon

Present:29
Secretary Byrnes	Mr. Molotov	Mr. Bevin
Mr. Cohen	Mr. Vyshinski	Sir A. Cadogan
Ambassador Harriman	Mr. Gusev	Sir A. Clark Kerr
Dr. Conant	Mr. Pavlov	Mr. Dixon
Mr. Bohlen		Mr. Rumboldt

Subjects:	Atomic Energy
	Kattegat Straits
	North China

1. Atomic Energy

The Secretary said that he had examined the Soviet amendments to the United S.tates proposal regarding the Commission to consider atomic energy and had a number of suggestions to make.³⁰ He said they were prepared to accept the Soviet suggestion that the Commission report to the Security Council but suggested that the last sentence of the Soviet redraft of Article I be dropped. He said he felt that the Terms of Reference as set forth in Article V laid down the basis for the Commission’s work and that it would be a mistake to place it under the direction of the Security Council. He further suggested that in paragraph 3 there be included reference to the fact that the rules of procedure of the Commission should be approved by the Security Council as a procedural matter. He also suggested in Article V the addition of a statement to the effect that the recommendations and reports of the Commission should be made public by the Security Council. He added further that the additional statement concerning the work of the Commission by staffs which he had submitted subsequent to the original proposal be included in the draft agreements. He explained that this statement was taken from the public declaration of the President, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister King.

Mr. Molotov said that was a new suggestion and he would have to consider it. He continued that in his opinion the Soviet suggestion concerning direction by the Security Council should be left since the Council was charged with primary responsibility in matters affecting security which was the most important aspect of atomic energy.

The Secretary repeated that we had recognized this in accepting the Soviet proposal that the Commission report to the Council rather than to the Assembly. He said he was afraid that if a Commission of 11 representatives were set up and made responsible to the Council composed of 11 representatives of the same states it would only impede the work of the Commission. Under the Soviet proposal misunderstandings might arise and it might be argued that the Commission could not proceed with its work except on the basis of positive directives from the Security Council.

Mr. Molotov said that any possibility of misunderstanding which might occur should be removed and it could be made clear that no special instructions would be required from the Council but merely that the Commission would work under its guidance. He read Article 24 of the Charter which placed the responsibility on the Council for matters relating to security and the maintenance of peace to illustrate his point that it would not be understood why the Security Council had been by-passed in a matter so directly related to security.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that in addition to the security angle atomic energy affected industrial and economic questions and that this phase could not be ignored. To make the Commission solely responsible to the Security Council would create the impression that its work would deal only with the security aspects of atomic energy.

The Secretary pointed out that in any event the Terms of Reference of the Commission limit its activities to the making of recommendations and reports which in deference to the Soviet wish would be submitted to the Council, which would then decide what use should be made of them.

Mr. Molotov repeated that the security aspect was the one that aroused the most interest and therefore should be dealt with on a clear-cut basis and it would be impossible to answer before the forthcoming Assembly meeting questions as to why the Security Council had been by-passed. He said the Soviet draft provides for the submission of reports of the Commission in appropriate cases to the General Assembly and to the Social and Economic Council and that Mr. Byrnes had suggested a provision for publication. Thus, the economic and industrial aspects of the question were fully taken care of. He said that we all shared a common desire to see that atomic energy was used only for peaceful and humanitarian aims. He said the intention of the United Nations Organization was focussed on this central problem; namely, that atomic energy should be used only for these purposes and not against security and peace. He added that the Soviet Delegation had accepted the United States proposal that the Commission should be set up by the General Assembly and he felt that this fully met any rights or privileges of the General Assembly. He said the fact that there were the same number of representatives on the Commission as on the Council would not in his opinion adversely affect its work, since this might be true of many subsidiary organs of the United Nations. On these subsidiary organs the representatives would be from the same countries as the principal organs of the organization. In air cases members should be selected on the basis of suitability.

The Secretary explained that the difficulty arose from the words “work under the direction of the Security Council”. He thought this was unnecessary in the case of the Commission which could not take any action but merely make recommendations and reports.

Mr. Bevin again emphasized the industrial and economic aspects of the problem of atomic energy and repeated that he feared that the public would consider that in turning the Commission over to the Security Council these aspects would be ignored. In England many people felt that the Commission should be responsible only to the Assembly and as it was he might have difficulty in explaining his agreement to have it report to the Security Council. He said, however, that in a desire to reach an agreement would it not be possible to add in Section II or wherever appropriate the following phrase: “The Security Council is authorized in appropriate cases to send special instructions to the Commission on matters affecting security.” He inquired whether this would satisfy the Soviet Delegation.

The Secretary said he was prepared to accept Mr. Bevin’s proposal.

Mr. Molotov said he would consider this proposal but that the Soviet Delegation felt that it should be clear to all that the Security Council was not being by-passed. He thought the best method was to place the Commission under the direction of the Council. He added that there was no question of any monopoly by the Security Council since provision was made in both drafts for the Council to submit the reports of the Commission to both the Assembly and to the Social and Economic Council. He said he referred to the provision of Section II. He said the main task of the Charter as stated in the first Article was the preservation of peace and that this responsibility was placed on the Security Council. He again repeated his opinion that in view of the language of the Charter it would be misunderstood if the Security Council were by-passed in regard to the work of the Commission. He said not only did the Charter place this responsibility explicitly on the Council but it was the primary duty and responsibility of the Council. He inquired whether all were in agreement that the Council was primarily responsible for security questions.

Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin agreed with this and pointed out that this responsibility was expressly recognized in Mr. Bevin’s proposed amendment and that furthermore the Commission would report to the Council.

Mr. Molotov stated that it was not a matter of reports but who would direct the work of the Commission. He feared that unless this responsibility was conferred on the Security Council it would be difficult to answer questions at the forthcoming meeting. He said if all were agreed that the primary responsibility rested on the Council it would be easy to find a formula. If not, it was a different matter.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that his suggestion was made for the purpose of recognizing this responsibility.

The Secretary pointed out that it might be difficult to get the General Assembly to accept the proposal for the establishment of a Commission which would be responsible only to the Security Council. Members of the Assembly might feel that their rights were being ignored. He said that he would feel that the Soviet point had been fully met by Mr. Bevin’s suggestion plus the agreement to have the Commission report to the Council.

There was a prolonged discussion during which Mr. Molotov repeated his main thesis that the Security Council was primarily responsible for security, that security was the chief factor in the atomic question and that therefore the Commission on Atomic Energy should work under the direction of the Council. It was finally agreed to postpone further consideration of the question until a subsequent meeting.

2. Kattegat Straits

Mr. Molotov asked if they could discuss the question of the straits covering the approaches to the Baltic Sea.

The Secretary replied that he had no information on this subject nor did he have any record with him of President Roosevelt’s discussion with Marshal Stalin on this point.^30a

Mr. Molotov said the important point was who controlled the passage of ships through these straits and he asked Mr. Bevin if he had any information to convey to him on this subject.

Mr. Bevin replied that the only information they had was to the effect that Great Britain was now engaged in mine-sweeping operations in these straits in conformity with an agreed plan to which the Soviet Government was a party. He said that except for these trawlers there were no British naval vessels in these waters and that there was no direct British naval control nor indirect control through the Danish authorities in regard to these straits. The position remains as it was before the war; namely, that the riparian states control it but that in a practical sense there was no control over the movement of ships through these straits.

Mr. Molotov replied that the war had shown that the question was more complicated than mere control by the riparian states.

Mr. Bevin said he could not discuss this question at this meeting as he had not expected it to be brought up.

3. North China

Mr. Molotov asked the Secretary if he had anything further to say on north China in the light of the Soviet memorandum of December 21.³¹

The Secretary said that he had discussed this question three times with Mr. Molotov and he had submitted a paper on the subject and also sent Mr. Molotov a copy of the President’s statement. He felt he had nothing to add. He did note, however, that the Soviet memorandum to which Mr. Molotov referred revealed that his statements both in writing and orally had not cleared up Soviet misunderstandings. For example, it was stated in the Soviet memorandum that American troops would remain in China in order to restore stability in that country. This was not true since the American troops would be removed as soon as the problem of the disarming of the Japanese had been settled. He had explained in great detail why this was a complicated question and might take some time, but the United States felt that it was its duty to carry out this task and to help Chiang effect a surrender of these Japanese forces. He pointed out that the Japanese surrender had placed the responsibility upon the Soviet Union for the surrender of Japanese troops in Manchuria and on the Chinese Government for those in north China. Chiang Kai-shek had asked for patience and more time in order to carry out his responsibility and the United States Government was prepared to be patient with a friendly and Allied government. He said that in the last analysis if the Chinese Government was unable to do this it would then devolve upon the United States to do it with their own forces. He had also explained to Mr. Molotov the difficulty in regard to shipping and the efforts we were making to expedite the evacuation of the Japanese. He said the United States was doing all it could and he had explained everything in detail to Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Molotov said that they were interested in a fixed date for simultaneous evacuation of both Soviet and United States forces from China.

The Secretary stated that he could not agree on a fixed date since it was not at all certain how much time would be required to complete the task of disarming the Japanese. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had admittedly on China’s request already postponed twice the date of the evacuation of Soviet forces from Manchuria. He did not wish on behalf of the United States to fix a date and then subsequently have to change it. He said that if the date were fixed in the middle of January as the Soviet Delegation proposed it would mean that our troops would leave China while there were still over 200,000 armed Japanese in the area. This should be clear to Mr. Molotov since he had explained that we could only move 3,000 Japanese a day. He said that when Mr. Molotov had explained to him the reasons why Soviet forces were still remaining in Manchuria he had accepted these explanations in full faith and he must request Mr. Molotov to accept in like manner the explanations of the United States.

Mr. Molotov said that he was asking merely for a time limit on the disarming of the Japanese and not for their evacuation to Japan. That admittedly would take a longer time. He said that forces of both countries were there by Chinese request but that what he was interested in was an agreement for simultaneous withdrawal within a fixed period. He said they wished to get their troops back as soon as possible and not leave them unnecessarily in Manchuria.

The Secretary replied that if the Soviet Union were remaining in Manchuria to disarm the Japanese there would be no question of the necessity of their remaining there until this was completed, but it was a different matter when they were remaining there solely by request of the Chinese. He repeated that we did not desire to interfere in Chinese affairs and for that reason our Marines had not gone into the interior, which would have involved them in the fighting between the two Chinese factions. He repeated that the United States could not reject the request of its friend to be granted more time in order to arrange for the disarming of these Japanese troops by the forces of the Central Government.

Mr. Molotov asserted that the Japanese were not resisting disarming and that the Soviet Government felt that the disarming of these Japanese forces could not be delayed. The question of evacuation was a definite question which would obviously take longer. He said their information was that there were 500,000 Japanese troops in north China.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the presence of American forces in north China was a new development and one which had not been contemplated when the Soviet Government signed its agreement with China.

The Secretary replied that he did not see what the presence of the United States troops in China had to do with the Soviet-Chinese agreement.

Mr. Molotov again suggested that they agree on a date for simultaneous withdrawal, if not the middle of January, then some later date. He said that he felt that the task of disarming the Japanese was [not?] as complicated as the Chinese claimed.

The Secretary said that he believed that Mr. Molotov was asking these questions merely because he liked the sound of his (Mr. Byrnes’) voice.

Mr. Molotov replied that he found Mr. Byrnes’ voice very pleasant but even more pleasant would be an agreement for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops.

The Secretary said that he had explained in great detail and at length the position of the United States Government. He said that we were supporting the Central Government and so was the Soviet Union and it would, therefore, not be in accordance with our common policy to do anything which would place the Central Government in a more difficult position. He said that it was our desire to see a unified China and he hoped that the Soviet Government would cooperate in the furtherance of that aim.

Mr. Molotov replied that the aim of the Soviet Union was identical with that of the United States Government on this question.

29. According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, Ambassador Malik was also present with the Soviet delegation and Major General Jacob, Mr. Ward and Mr. McAfee were present with the United Kingdom delegation.
30. For the Soviet proposal regarding a commission on atomic energy, see enclosure 1 to the minutes of the Sixth Formal Session of the Conference, December 22, p. 740.
31. See footnote 96, p. 718.
31. For the Soviet memorandum regarding American armed forces in China, see enclosure 1 to the minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 21, 2:30 p.m., p. 719.