Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 58

Minutes of the Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Wednesday, May 30, 1945, 9:05 a.m.

San Francisco, May 30, 1945, 9:05 a.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of persons (35) present at meeting.]

After a photograph of the Delegation had been taken by a Secretariat photographer, The Secretary called the meeting to order at 9:05 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of procedural matters (meetings, seats in open session, leaks to the press, and the delegation’s report to President Truman).]

Problem of Inviting Denmark

The Secretary asked Mr. Dunn whether he would inform the Delegation of the situation with respect to the invitation of Denmark to the Conference which had been discussed by the Delegation on the previous day. Mr. Dunn reported that the Norwegian Ambassador⁷¹ was proceeding with his proposal and had asked that a Steering Committee meeting be held as soon as possible … Russia and the United Kingdom had expressed their willingness to accept the proposal, but the position of the Chinese on this matter was extremely uncertain. Mr. Dulles remarked that the Chinese might ask for an invitation for Korea⁷² if the question of Denmark were brought up. The Secretary observed that the question of Korea was an extremely private matter and should not be mentioned outside the Delegation meeting. Mr. Dunn commented that the situation with respect to Korea was somewhat different because there was no recognized Korean Government. The invitation of Denmark was a Norwegian project and the Norwegians intended to go ahead with it no matter what the danger.

At this point Mr. Hiss remarked that the problem of Iceland⁷³ might be brought up, too, and possibly Poland⁷⁴ as well. Several other members of the Delegation commented that an invitation to Albania⁷⁵ might be suggested, and Mr. Rockefeller stated that Mexico had prepared both a speech and a resolution opposing extending an invitation to Franco Spain. The Secretary declared that he hated the prospect of starting another “three-ring circus”.…

. . . . . . .

Representative Bloom declared that if the question of inviting some of these other nations were raised, he himself would suggest admitting Palestine. Mr. Rockefeller thought that a Subcommittee of the Steering Committee should be charged with the responsibility of considering all applications and passing on them. The Secretary remarked that the Executive Committee would be the appropriate body and Mr. Rockefeller agreed. Senator Connally observed that in his opinion the question was what any other states invited could possibly add to the Conference at this late date. Commander Stassen agreed with this position and declared that the primary objective must be to formulate a Charter. These subsidiary questions should not be discussed at this time. Commander Stassen suggested that it might be possible to invite the other nations in time for them to become initial signatories of the document. Mr. Hickerson declared that every effort had been made to keep the door closed. However, even though it was too late for any nations invited at this time to make any contribution to the work of the Conference, Mr. Hickerson was of the opinion that they should be allowed to become original signatories to the Charter. He declared that the United States had been “plowed under” on this question. Commander Stassen declared the United States could not be plowed under without its approval, but Mr. Hickerson declared the matter was completely out of hand. The United States could, he declared, if it so desired, vote against the admission of Denmark but this Delegation could not really adopt that position because the United States was the friend of Denmark. He suggested that the United States vote for the admission of Denmark and if any other nations were proposed for admission, should refer the matter to a Subcommittee of the Steering Committee and have the meeting of the Steering Committee adjourned. The Secretary declared that he would favor referring action on all other proposals for invitations to the Executive Committee. Mr. Hickerson remarked that he had no idea of what might happen when Denmark was raised in the Steering Committee but, in any event, Mr. Hickerson was of the opinion that the United States could not vote against the admission of Denmark.

In reply to a question, Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he did not know whether Ambassador Gromyko would raise the question of Poland. He thought that the Russian Delegate might have learned his lesson. Commander Stassen suggested that the Big Five meet to discuss the matter before the question was raised in the full Steering Committee. First, it should be determined whether the other four powers would accept the admission of Denmark to the Conference. Secondly, they should be asked whether they intended to propose the admission of other states in addition to Denmark. The Secretary thought that this was an excellent suggestion. Mr. Hickerson remarked that a meeting would not necessarily have to be held but that the other four powers could be questioned individually, but Commander Stassen thought that it would be a good idea for the five powers to get together in order to acquaint each other with their views.

Representative Bloom asked whether the smaller powers could propose nations for admission, and The Secretary replied that any member of the United Nations could make any suggestion it chose. However, The Secretary was of the opinion that preliminary discussions among the Big Five would have the advantage of establishing a Five-Power position.

Mr. Rockefeller urged that the Delegation establish a position in advance, in case Italy were proposed for membership.⁷⁶ It would be easier, he said, to decide in advance than to establish a position during the course of the meeting. Mr. Stevenson urged that if Italy were proposed, the United States could not possibly oppose its admission to the Conference in view of the unfavorable reaction such a position would provoke on the part of the American people. Representative Bloom agreed with Mr. Stevenson’s remarks and declared that Congress would react unfavorably to opposition by this Delegation to the extension of an invitation to Italy. Representative Bloom declared that if possible the Delegation did not want to raise any obstacles to approval of the Charter by the Senate. Mr. Hickerson was of the opinion that no matter what decision were to be reached by the Big Five, the question of inviting Italy would be brought up once the problem of inviting Denmark were brought before the Conference. The Secretary suggested that the Big Five should be brought to agreement that the admission of Denmark should be delayed until the last possible moment. Mr. Hickerson remarked that even that would not solve the problem because the Italian question would be raised at that time. The Secretary asked whether politically the United States could afford to accept an invitation to Italy.

Mr. Dulles asked whether someone could inform him what the legal procedure would be for a state to become a signatory to the Charter after it had been ratified, and Mr. Hackworth replied that a special procedure would have to be established. Mr. Hiss remarked that this consideration did not apply with respect to Poland because Poland had been invited to the Conference initially but was not in attendance because of the fact that there was no recognized government. Mr. Hiss was of the opinion that the Conference would agree to leave a space in the protocol of ratification for Poland’s signature. The other nations, however, posed a different problem.

Representative Bloom commented that he did not think Mr. Morgenstierne would act in opposition to a decision by the Big Five. Mr. Rockefeller urged that the United States declare, in a meeting of the Big Five, that it would vote in favor of inviting Denmark. Then he suggested that this Government propose five or six other states for invitation at the last moment in order that they might become original signatories to the Charter. The Secretary declared that in his opinion it would be impossible to adopt this procedure. Mr. Rockefeller replied that if there should be a leak, it would become known that the United States had declared in favor of accepting all or none of the states it had proposed for admission. The Secretary, however, reminded Mr. Rockefeller that from this point on there would be no more leaks.

. . . . . . .

The Secretary asked whether the Delegation was in agreement that it needed more time to consider the Danish question and there was unanimous agreement with the Secretary’s suggestion.

Raw Materials

. . . . . . .

Commander Stassen remarked that it was necessary for the Delegation to agree on the question of a French amendment concerning equal access to raw materials.⁷⁷ Commander Stassen referred the Delegation to the paper entitled Outstanding Economic and Social Questions, US Gen 198.⁷⁸ Commander Stassen declared that Committee had agreed in principle to a proposal making broad provision for calling of conferences to consider specific problems. The French, however, had proposed an amendment “insuring access, in equal terms, to trade, raw materials, and to capital goods.” Commander Stassen remarked that a question which had initially been one of broad machinery had been transformed by the French into a matter of the principle of free access. The United States, he thought, could be maneuvered into a difficult situation by this French proposal. The Secretary declared that this question of equal access could not legitimately be presented to the present Conference which was considering only the question of establishing machinery. However, Commander Stassen declared that the French had based their argument on the inclusion in the Atlantic Charter of provision for equal access to raw materials. Mr. Dulles took the position that the United States should counter this French proposal by insisting that only the original wording of the Atlantic Charter should be incorporated in the Charter for the United Nations Organization. Commander Stassen declared that that had been his position. He had argued that no single problem should be specifically referred to. He had urged in the Committee that the economic and social problems of the world could not be solved by singling out one specific question. In addition, Commander Stassen had argued in the Committee that Germany had started her aggrandizement by a quest for raw materials and he had stated that the position of the United States was that this Government was willing to stand by the Atlantic Charter but would accept it only in its entirety.

The Secretary asked whether there was much pressure in the Committee supporting the French proposal, and The Commander replied that there seemed to be a great deal of support for the amendment and that there had been a great deal of oratory. The Secretary asked whether the Commander had any recommendation to offer to the Delegation and the latter suggested that the United States stand by the position he had taken that the whole Atlantic Charter should be referred to rather than any specific part of that document. Dr. Bowman remarked that the importance of following the exact language of the Atlantic Charter lay in the context within which it was included. Dr. Bowman pointed to the sixth point of the Atlantic Charter which read: “After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny …” This, he said, eliminated the possibility of granting equal access to the enemy nations at the present time since the Nazi tyranny had not been completely destroyed.

Mr. Pasvolsky observed that question (b) referred to in US Gen 198, the inclusion in the Charter of “equality of access to raw materials, trade and capital goods” would undoubtedly cause a great deal of difficulty in Congress. Mr. Stinebower provided some further background information for the Delegation. He declared that at Mexico City two explicit references had been made to freedom of access to raw materials and capital goods.⁷⁹ He thought that the Latin-American countries would not support a United States position opposing the principle of equal access although they would probably vote with this Government against a specific Organization within the structure of the United Nations Organization. Mr. Stinebower thought that there was an inconsistency in the French amendment with the traditional policy of the United States. If there was to be included reference and principle to equality of access, there should also be established, he thought, freedom of foreign trade. Mr. Rockefeller cautioned that the analogy drawn between Mexico City and the present Charter was not completely valid because of the fact that the Mexico City Act merely set up objectives. Mr. Stinebower declared he was in agreement with the position taken by Commander Stassen but he urged that it would be impossible to stand on the whole. Atlantic Charter because of the commitments made at Mexico City. The Secretary asked whether any mention was made of the method of financing with respect to equality of access to capital goods.

Senator Vandenberg declared that the revisions adopted recently were causing the Economic and Social Council to look like the draft which had been proposed in Washington by Mr. Charles Taft and which had been rejected by the Delegation. The Secretary agreed that the functions of the Economic and Social Council were growing, and he remarked that this Conference was not writing a constitution. Commander Stassen was of the opinion that the United States had started to slow down the avalanche of radical suggestions made with respect to the Economic and Social Council. There would still be a fight, he thought, and he asked the Delegation on what basis the fight should be carried on. The Secretary indicated that he was willing to accept Commander Stassen’s recommendation with the proviso that attention should be paid to Mr. Stinebower’s remarks on the impossibility of the Atlantic Charter being accepted in toto. Mr. Hickerson urged that if it were found to be necessary to alter the Atlantic Charter wording, the words, “with due regard to existing obligations” should be dropped. Mr. Hickerson declared that these words had been included upon the insistence of Prime Minister Churchill who was attempting to maintain British preferences. Representative Eaton asked whether the United States was not in favor of upholding its obligations.

The Delegation agreed on Commander’s Stassen’s position.

Compulsory Jurisdiction

Senator Connally reported to the Delegation that in the meeting the previous evening of Subcommittee IV/1/D the United States’ position in opposition to compulsory jurisdiction for the court had been upheld.

French Treaty Amendment

Mr. Dunn reported to the Delegation that the French were still very disturbed about the amendment they had proposed to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. Mr. Dunn referred the Delegation to the document, Proposed Change in Sponsoring Governments’ Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, draft of May 23, 1945.⁸¹

… In a conversation with Mr. Dejean, the latter had declared to Mr. Dunn that there was a very tense political situation in France with respect to this provision. The French people, he said, were extremely interested in the outcome of the controversy and Mr. Dejean had indicated that no French government could withstand the pressure from the people if the Franco-Russian treaty and the other bilateral agreements which were designated to prevent further German aggression, were to be affected in such a way that they might at some time in the future be cancelled. Mr. Dejean declared that he understood that the provision as it existed would protect the French treaty relationships but he declared that the French people wanted this matter made crystal clear. Mr. Dejean had indicated that he could accept the language of the draft of May 23, and he declared that this language would have the additional advantage of strengthening the role of the international organization by making it clear that the Organization would definitely be charged with the responsibility for “preventing further aggression by a state enemy of the United Nations in this war.” Mr. Dejean had voiced the opinion that the new wording would not involve a change in meaning but that it would change the political and psychological effect. Mr. Dunn said that it was certain that the French would not receive any change in instructions and he declared that Mr. Dejean had indicated his regret at having had to take the lead in the Committee discussion, inasmuch as he was not the chief delegate.…

Secretary Stettinius asked Mr. Dunn what course of action he would recommend to the Delegation. Mr. Dunn replied that he favored accepting the language of May 23. He declared that he had favored accepting the change of only the one word, “consent”, for which the French had substituted “request” in their draft, because this procedure would rule out the possibility of reopening the whole paragraph. However, Mr. Dunn declared that he had been satisfied by the discussion of the previous day that the paragraph would not be reopened if the French suggestion were to be accepted. The Secretary declared that he would make a deal with Mr. Dunn and would support the French proposal if the French would agree to drop their amendment on the question of raw materials. Commander Stassen remarked, however, that the French were not the only government pressing on the latter question. He indicated that he was opposed to accepting the French language because he was afraid it would open up the entire regional question. Furthermore, Commander Stassen thought that the French argument, to which Mr. Dunn had referred, that Communist elements in France would make trouble for the government unless the change were accepted was not a valid argument inasmuch as the original Four-Power amendment had been proposed by the Russians.⁸²

Senator Vandenberg asked Mr. Dulles for his opinion on this question. The latter replied that he was not opposed to the French suggestion which, in his opinion, did not involve any real change in meaning. Mr. Dulles indicated that he had been afraid of reopening the entire paragraph. However, Mr. Dulles was inclined to agree with Mr. Dunn, as a result of the discussion of the previous day, that it would be possible to have the five powers accept the French wording without suggesting any additional changes. Senator Vandenberg remarked that this could be made part of the agreement and Secretary Stettinius remarked that it was clear from the discussion of the previous day that no additional changes would be proposed. Mr. Dulles repeated that he had been opposed to making any change because of the possibility that the question would be reopened. However, he declared that the previous day’s discussion had dissipated that fear.

The Secretary remarked that he was very sorry that Commander Stassen had not been at the meeting the previous day so that he might have heard the discussion which might have dispelled the Commander’s fears. Commander Stassen pointed out that in his opinion this paragraph was the place where freedom of action would be granted in Europe. The French amendment was trying to establish that regional pacts would fall outside the scope of the Organization and would not be under its control. This problem, he thought, was clearly shown in the new language. Senator Vandenberg declared that he could not see this danger and he referred to the May 23rd draft with the wording “the authorization of the Security Council …” Commander Stassen declared that the new wording would omit the original phrase “until such time as the Organization may …” and would substitute the wording referred to by Senator Vandenberg. Under the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, Commander Stassen thought the authorization for regional arrangements was necessary immediately. Now, he declared, this became a matter for a future agreement. Mr. Dulles pointed out, however, that the four powers had agreed to this change originally when they sponsored the four power amendment. Commander Stassen replied that to omit the phraseology of the original amendment, “until such time … would be interpreted as granting full freedom of action in Europe. Senator Connally declared that in reality a free hand was not being granted because it would apply only to “enemy states.” The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky to remark on this problem.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the exemption embodied in Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2 was based on the proposition that there existed an area which was legitimately outside the purview of the Organization. This area consisted of the prevention of aggression by the present enemy states. This had already been agreed to, he declared, in paragraph 2 of Chapter XII. This exemption did not, he thought, alter the basis of the Charter because the area exempted had never fallen under the scope of the Charter. When this area should be incorporated under the Charter, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, the exemption would disappear. After incorporation, this area would become subject to the procedure implied in Chapter XII and would no longer be subject to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.

Mr. Pasvolsky urged that the new wording was better than the original amendment. The phraseology “until the …” had been proposed by the British with the end in view of making certain that the two individual areas would be amalgamated eventually. The new wording, he declared, presented this desire positively, whereas the original amendment had been negative.

The argument over the situation had been initiated, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, by the French. The French were definitely worried over whether their bilateral arrangements would be superseded. The new wording declared positively that the request of the parties to the arrangements would be required for the authority of the Organization to become operative.

Mr. Pasvolsky expressed the opinion that Commander Stassen’s original objection had been adequately taken care of. He himself was satisfied that the matter of regional arrangements would not be reopened. Senator Vandenberg urged once more that a definite agreement be reached on this point and Mr. Pasvolsky declared that such an agreement could be obtained but was not necessary, in his opinion. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that Ambassador Gromyko had declared in the Committee meeting on the previous day that he would accept the wording as it stood.

Secretary Stettinius asked whether the military representatives of the Delegation would care to express their opinions on this matter. Admiral Hepburn declared that this was essentially a political problem on which the military members had no definite opinion, and General Embick agreed with Admiral Hepburn.

Senator Vandenberg urged that there would be grave danger of the question being reopened if it were to be left “hanging around” without being finally settled. Senator Vandenberg urged that the matter be closed promptly if the Delegation did not want the entire paragraph reopened.

Mr. Armstrong remarked that he had always been opposed to the change of initiative implied in the substitution of the word “request” for “consent”. Mr. Armstrong remarked that if it were necessary, he would accept the change. Mr. Armstrong reported that a luncheon conversation with Lord Halifax the previous day had revealed that despite the long discussion in the Committee session, Lord Halifax could see no difference between the two words. After the discussion, with Mr. Armstrong, Lord Halifax remarked that he then saw the question in an entirely different light. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that since France would have a veto power on the Security Council anyhow there was actually, in the final analysis, no difference between the two wordings. Commander Stassen asked why, if there was no difference between the two wordings, the French were so anxious to make a revision. Commander Stassen urged that the French proposition be made public in order to gain the reaction of the American public and the other nations present at the Conference. Commander Stassen declared that he was irrevocably opposed to the change at this point and could be brought around only by a public mandate.

Senator Connally said that in his opinion there was no substantive difference between the two wordings and he favored accepting the French proposal provided that it were certain that the matter would be ended by this action, and that the paragraph would not be reopened to other general propositions.

Commander Stassen disagreed with Senator Connally and declared that the new wording carried the implication that the United States would be backing out of Europe, and Senator Connally replied that this referred only to the enemy states.

Commander Stassen remarked that he was opposed even to that. Under the Dumbarton Oaks wording the United States had been one of the responsible powers, but under this new wording which recognized the mutual assistance pacts, the United States could not possibly be a party. Mr. Dulles asked whether Commander Stassen could think of any action which the French might take under their new draft which they could not have taken under the old draft. Commander Stassen replied that under the original wording the Organization had the responsibility for taking enforcement actions, and that only the individual right of self-defense was recognized. However, the new draft carried the implication that authority would never be turned over to the Organization with respect to enemy states. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out to the Delegation that the United States had the right to conclude a pact similar to the Franco-Russian pact with any European state and would thus fall under this provision. However, Mr. Pasvolsky was of the opinion that even this was not necessary because of the provisions of Chapter XII, paragraph 2.

Commander Stassen agreed it would be logical to rely on mutual assistance pacts if the United States were going to back out of the Organization with respect to Europe. Mr. Pasvolsky referred once again to paragraph 2 of Chapter XII under which the rights of the United States were reserved with respect to enemy states. No pacts would be necessary, he declared; and Mr. Dunn agreed that the United States could act without concluding any arrangements. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that this Delegation seemed to think that the change was foolish and did not accomplish anything. The European states seemed to think that the change was necessary.

Commander Stassen declared he would make a compromise with Mr. Pasvolsky. The Commander declared he would accept the change if Mr. Pasvolsky could have the words “a state enemy of the United Nations in this war” defined as to refer specifically to Germany, and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this would be impossible. Commander Stassen remarked that the change, in his opinion, granted broader freedom of action to the European countries and he wanted this broader wording narrowed down so that it would refer only to Germany.

The Secretary asked what action the Delegation wished to take. He thought that everyone must thoroughly understand Commander Stassen’s position by this time. Senator Vandenberg urged that it would be dangerous to leave the question open any longer and The Secretary asked Commander Stassen whether he would agree to reach a decision on the question during that meeting. Commander Stassen agreed to this suggestion. Representative Bloom urged that an agreement should be reached with the other members of the Big Five that the rest of the paragraph should not be reopened as a result of the consideration of the French amendment. He was of the opinion that the discussion in the Committee did not constitute an adequate guarantee. Senator Vandenberg declared that this was part of the proposal on which the Delegation was acting. Mr. Dunn declared that that was the agreement—that the United States would support the amendment if it was clear that no other changes would be made. Representative Bloom declared that he favored this position and Representative Eaton indicated that he would go along with “Senator” Bloom.

The Secretary remarked that he hated to reach the decision on this important position in view of Commander Stassen’s strong opposition. The latter declared that the matter was entirely up to the decision of the Delegation but that he would have to dissent. The Four Powers, he declared, had reached an agreement in conformity with the original position of the military representatives. This wording, he thought, should not be amended at all. Representative Bloom recommended that in view of the fact that the Delegation had been able to achieve unanimity on all questions thus far, and with consideration for Commander Stassen’s strong feelings on the subject, the final decision of this question be postponed until the following meeting. Senator Connally declared that unless the matter were decided soon, it would become a “festering sore”, but Representative Bloom urged that it would not fester in 24 hours. Senator Vandenberg thought that the matter was festering fast and he declared that at a luncheon the previous day the Latin-American delegates had pressed him upon what had happened to the proposal on regional agreements. They wondered why the Big Five had been unable to reach a conclusion. Commander Stassen asked whether it was thought the Latin-American countries would agree to this change and Senator Vandenberg ventured the opinion that they would agree to anything which the United States proposed. Commander Stassen thought that that was a broad statement but Mr. Rockefeller agreed with Senator Vandenberg that the Latin-American countries would accept any position which the United States pressed. Commander Stassen declared that if the public and the Latin-American countries approved of this amendment, he would agree. However, he declared it would be impossible for him to consent otherwise. The road to his consent, he said, lay through public discussion. Commander Stassen declared that he could not allow the presumption to exist that he had agreed to this position.

At this point, 10:20 a.m., Congressman Bloom announced that he had to leave the meeting since he was going to “perform at the Opera House.”⁸⁵

Procedure on Agreements for Supply of Forces

Senator Connally presented to the Delegation the May 29, 1945 draft of “Proposed Change in Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5.”⁸⁶ This embodied, he declared, the Australian amendment which would make possible the conclusion of agreements for the supply of forces with the Security Council as well as among the member states. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out to the Delegation that its clearance was required prior to the meeting of Committee III/3 that evening.⁸⁷ Senator Connally pointed out that this draft provided for the initiative of the Security Council in the conclusion of these agreements. Senator Connally thought that it provided greater elasticity than the previous draft and it definitely granted the initiative to the Security Council. The new wording was:” … on the initiative of the Security Council … between the member states or between the Security Council and the member states. All such agreements should be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes and, in the case of agreements to be concluded between the member states, should also be subject to approval by the Security Council.” The other amendments proposed were that the words “concluded among themselves” should be omitted, and that for the words “facilities and” preceding the word “assistance” should be substituted the words and facilities including rights of passage” to follow the word “assistance”. The Australians had also proposed the addition of the words “their degree of readiness and general location” to follow the words “types of forces” in the second sentence.

Senator Connally remarked that these other amendments affected facilities and the rights of passage.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that from the point of view of the decision taken by the Delegation at a previous meeting, this draft was acceptable because it carried out completely the position taken by the Delegation. Senator Connally was in agreement that this met the requirements of the United States, and the Delegation agreed unanimously. Mr. Pasvolsky declared he would take up this paragraph with the Subcommittee of Five.

The Secretary reiterated that the question of the French treaty would be carried over and he urged that Commander Stassen talk the matter over with the other members of the Delegation. The question should be adjourned for the present so that the Delegation might achieve unanimity. The Secretary appealed to the Delegation that there should be no announcement that there was a split. He declared that the Delegation was continuing to study the matter and he remarked that it would be most damaging if someone were to whisper to the press that there was dissension.

Amendment Procedure

The Secretary called on Mr. Notter who had an urgent matter to discuss.

Mr. Notter reported that there was pressure in Representative Eaton’s committee, all of which had not shown up as yet.⁸⁹ Mr. Notter thought that the full pressure would reveal itself at the meeting that evening.⁹⁰ Mr. Notter declared that the United States had been defeated 19 to 12 on the question of referring the amendment proposed by New Zealand and Australia to the Subcommittee.⁹¹ Mr. Notter was of the opinion that the question of the amendment itself could be handled. Mr. Notter foresaw for the near future the question of a revisionary convention. Mr. Notter thought that the United States would probably have to compromise on the matter of the Tote necessary to call such a convention and would probably have to accept a two-thirds vote instead of a three-fourths vote as was the position at present. This was not too important in Mr. Notter’s mind, because it represented the difference between 39 and 35 votes.

The difficulty he thought, would arise with respect to the New Zealand amendment designed to tie the matter down to make certain that a convention would be held. Mr. Notter revealed that he had had a conversation with Mr. Pearson of Canada and he had asked Mr. Pearson whether such a provision would not make the Organization merely a provisional Organization, and Mr. Pearson had agreed with this position and had also agreed that this possiblity must be avoided. Mr. Notter suggested that if it seemed necessary to accept a provision for a specific conference that the words “in any event” be used. Mr. Notter also held the opinion that if the United States wanted to retain the unanimity rule with respect to amendment procedure, it would probably be necessary to compromise by accepting the principle of a revisionary convention.

Mr. Armstrong explained to the Delegation that the real purpose behind the proposal for a revisionary convention was to make possible a change in the number of permanent members of the Security Council who could veto amendments proposed by the General Assembly. This was indicated, he thought, by Prime Minister Fraser’s statement in the Committee to the effect that “one of the permanent members of the Security Council may wither on the branch but might still retain a dead hand on amendment procedure.” Mr. Fraser had expressed the opinion that this would be setting up a dictatorship of the big powers and he had asked why the permanent members of the Security Council were not willing to accept a majority vote among themselves. Mr. Armstrong declared that he had replied that a majority of the big powers had not been sufficient to win the present war. Mr. Rockefeller remarked that in his opinion Mr. Notter had not overestimated the danger of the situation. The smaller powers, he declared, would be willing to accept the veto power with respect to any number of questions but the small-states were afraid that when the time came to study the Charter under peaceful world conditions the “withering” of one of the great powers would not be compensated for by the loss of the veto power. Specifically, this applied to France and China and Mr. Rockefeller declared that the French delegate had made a stupid speech in the Committee to the effect that originally he had been opposed to the veto power but now that it had been granted to France he would go along with the Big Five. Mr. Rockefeller urged that this was the chance to satisfy the small powers of the future status of the Organization.

Mr. Armstrong urged that the questions of expulsion and suspension would arise once more in this connection. The small powers, he thought, would take the position that unless amendment were possible without filial Big Power veto control, they should be able to expel those major powers which “withered on the vine.”

The Secretary declared that it was obvious that this matter could not be settled in the short time remaining to the Delegation. He urged that the members of the Delegation discuss the matter among themselves and that the Delegation should consider it again on the following day. Mr. Pasvolsky urged on the other hand that there was really nothing to discuss with respect to the revisionary convention. The only way this matter could be discussed, he thought, was to consider depriving China and France of their permanent status on the Security Council. Obviously this could not be discussed. It then became a problem of whether the United States would permit amendment of the Organization without its consent. This, he declared, was also impossible and therefore there was no reason to discuss the matter.

The Secretary instructed Mr. Notter to bring in a recommendation to be considered by the Delegation the following day.

Secretary General

At this point, Mr. Hickerson announced that he had just received a phone call from Ambassador Gromyko who was very agitated. Ambassador Gromyko had just noticed that the question of the election of the Secretary General had been included on the agenda for the open session of Commission II.⁹² The Russians felt that this matter should be deferred until the question of voting procedure in the Security Council was settled. The Secretary asked if there were any objections in the Delegation to postponing discussion of this issue. The Delegation agreed unanimously.

. . . . . . .

The meeting was adjourned at 10:35 a.m.

71. Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador in the United States; Acting Chairman of the Norwegian delegation.
72. A message from Tjo So-wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the “Korean Provisional Government”, was transmitted to the Secretary of State in telegram 396, March 10, from Chungking (500.CC/3–1045), in which he noted that Korea was directly concerned “in upholding the peace of the Far East as well as of the entire world” and requested consideration of “the rightful desire of 26 million Koreans” to participate in the United Nations Conference. In response, Acting Secretary Grew instructed the Ambassador in China, in telegram 473, March 20, 7 p.m., to inform Tjo So-wang as follows: “That by agreement among the sponsoring powers invitations to the San Francisco Conference were extended only to those nations which were United Nations on March 1, 1945. Provision is not being made for observers from other nations.” (895.01/3–145) Mr. Grew transmitted the above message to President Roosevelt in his memorandum of March 20 and informed him. of the Department’s instruction of that date to the Embassy in, Chungking (500.CC/3–2045).
73. See telegram 75, May 7, 7 p.m., to Reykjavik, p. 640.
74. For resolution on participation of Poland in the Conference, adopted in plenary session, April 27, see Doc. 20, P/6, UNCIO Documents, vol. 1, p. 168.
75. See telegram 307, April 7, 7 p.m., to Caserta, p. 207.
76. See note from the Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador, April 7, p. 206.
77. Doc. 684, II/3/38, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 128.
78. Not printed.
79. See Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, in Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico February 21–March 8, 1945 (Department of State publication No. 2497), pp. 118 and 122; also, 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1831, or Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1543.
81. Not printed.
82. Text of proposed Four-Power amendment of chapter VIII, C, 2, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 688 (Doc. 288, G/38, May 14); for Soviet proposal, see ibid., p. 601 (Doc. 2, G/14 (w) (1), May 8); United States proposal, ibid., p. 598 (Doc. 2, G/14(v), May 6). For Soviet acceptance of text proposed by the United States, see minutes of the Five-Power meeting, May 7, 3 p.m., p. 628.
85. For verbatim minutes of the first meeting of Commission II, May 30, 10:30 a.m., see Doc. 719, II/8, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 8, p. 27.
86. Not printed.
87. Doc. 704, III/3/36, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 400; the amendments to chapter XII were considered at that meeting.
89. For summary report on consideration of chapter XI (Amendments) in Committee I/2 on May 29, 3:45 p.m., see Doc. 683, I/2/48, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 154.
90. Record of meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, May 30, 8:30 p.m., not printed. For list of recommendations on chapter XI, see WD 26, I/2/36, May 24, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 138.
91. Ibid., p. 155.
92. See Doc. 719, II/8, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 8, p. 31.