Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 54

Minutes of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 26, 1946, 9:03 a.m.

San Francisco, May 26, 1946, 9:03 a.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of persons (37) present at meeting.]

The Secretary convened the meeting at 9:03 a.m.

Australian Amendment

The Secretary called on Dean Gildersleeve to present to the Delegation the problem with which she was faced.

Dean Gildersleeve reported that the Australians had proposed an amendment obligating all the members of the Organization to take separate and joint action to support the principles established in Chapter IX, Section A, paragraph 1. This amendment had been adopted in principle by the full Committee and was now before the Drafting Committee.⁹ Dean Gildersleeve stated that she had reserved the position of the United States and had refrained from voting. Aside from the abstention of the United States, the voting had been unanimous. Dean Gildersleeve expressed the opinion that the United States would be opposed to the pledge to take separate action. It was ridiculous, she declared, to have to undertake a definite commitment on these matters which we wanted to achieve anyhow. However, the United States would be in a most difficult position if it were to stand up and oppose this amendment. The Secretary asked why it was that the other powers did not see the fallacy of this provision and Dean Gildersleeve replied that they had received it enthusiastically.

Mr. Stinebower observed that in the Subcommittee the Canadians had supported our position, but that in the full Committee, they had been unwilling to come out in opposition to the amendment. Secretary Stettinius asked what the position of the European countries was and remarked that anyone who applied his mind to this problem could understand the danger involved in the amendment. Dean Gildersleeve repeated that it would be most difficult for the United States to take a stand opposing the Australian proposal and she also expressed the opinion that if it came to a vote, the United States would be defeated in the Committee.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the Australian amendment wasn’t out of order. After all, he stated, the Conference was attempting to set up an Organization; why should a proposal pledging the individual nations to take separate action be introduced? Dean Gildersleeve pointed out that the phraseology was “separate and joint” action. Senator Connally ventured the opinion that this was an attempt to compensate for the United States position regarding the application of the “domestic jurisdiction” clause to the provision for full employment. Mr. Stinebower declared that this amendment appeared in the document, U.S. Gen 174, which had been presented to the Committee on the previous day. The amendment applied to Chapter IX, Section A, paragraph 1. The location of the new paragraph, he declared, had not been determined as yet. The Australian amendment read: “All members pledge themselves to take separate and joint action and to cooperate with the Organization and with each other to achieve these purposes.”

Representative Bloom observed that, in view of the wording “to achieve these purposes”, this provision would probably have to be placed at this point in Chapter IX. Mr. Stinebower replied, however, that the wording did not rule out its being placed later on in the paragraph. The British, he reported, had proposed an additional amendment eliminating the words, “joint action”.

Mr. Dulles proposed that Dean Gildersleeve attempt to have this clause ruled out of order because it constituted, in effect, a multilateral agreement—a pledge to take individual action. This, he declared, was not within the scope of the present Conference, nor could it legitimately be included in the United Nations Charter. Secretary Stettinius remarked that this provision was dangerous, even moré so than the “full employment” clause which had been under discussion when he left for Washington. Commander Stassen remarked that this clause, as it was proposed, would require action on the part of the International Organization, and Mr. Dulles remarked that the Negro question in this country might become the subject of investigation or other action by the Organization. The Secretary asked why the United States was the only nation which objected to this clause, and Mr. Pasvolsky said that there was what amounted to a stampede under way. The smaller powers, he declared, attached themselves to slogans which were presented. The United States received no support from the other large powers; the Russians did not particularly care; the United Kingdom was embarrassed by its domestic situation. This situation, he thought, pointed to the need for greater political liaison outside the Committee meetings. Mr. Pasvolsky had talked with representatives of the various Dominions and the indication was that there would be no support from the British on this question. Secretary Stettinius asked how the European nations would act on this amendment. Mr. Dulles replied that he thought that we would be unable to obtain much support from this quarter because of forthcoming elections in most of these countries which necessitated their supporting what they interpreted to be a liberal position. Commander Stassen suggested that the solution might be to propose a countermove, embodying wording which would make it clear that each nation was free to have its own system. He cited previous experiences in which such an action had caused the sponsoring nation to drop its amendment. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the matter might profitably be referred to the Steering Committee for decision, in view of the obvious difficulty in defeating the measure in Committee. Mr. Dunn agreed that this would be the proper course to take. The Secretary, however, thought that the Executive Committee would be a better place to refer the measure, inasmuch as the deliberations of the Steering Committee were public. He also expressed the view that the United States should not raise the issue, if possible. But Mr. Stinebower remarked that in the Committee, where the question had been raised several times, we were the only nation opposing the amendment. Representative Bloom thought that it might be possible to undertake personal conversations with the Australian Delegates. Mr. Dunn replied that we would have to state our position flatly and Congressman Bloom said that it would be better to be flat and win than to lose while being circumspect. Mr. Rockefeller supported Commander Stassen’s suggestion of a counterproposal.

Commander Stassen implemented his proposition by stating that the United States ought to suggest that the United Nations move toward the objectives established in Chapter IX, Section A, paragraph 1, with each member having the right to choose its own system of economy and guaranteeing the greatest possible freedom to each individual, and with each nation cooperating with the Organization.

Senator Connally agreed with the point made by Mr. Dulles that the amendment was really out of order, and thought that this was the line we should pursue if the Executive Committee would support it. Mr. Dulles reiterated that this amendment was beyond the scope of the Organization. However, Congressman Bloom remarked that the proposals referred to had already been accepted and that this amendment was germane to the task of the Organization. Mr. Dulles voiced the opinion, however, that any proposal for separate action on the part of the states members of the Organization was not germane to the work of this Conference. Mr. Bloom replied that the rest of the amendment had already been accepted and was there. Mr. Dulles, referring to paragraph 1 of Section A, Chapter IX which stated that “The Organization shall promote.…” agreed that a great deal of the amendment had already been accepted but stated that the question was whether the Conference could consider any amendment proposing a multilateral agreement to take individual action.

The Secretary asked whether there was any urgency with respect to time on this question and Dean Gildersleeve replied the Drafting Committee was to meet in the afternoon, and that the full Committee was scheduled to consider the question in the evening.

Mr. Stinebower remarked that the Drafting Committee dealing with this question had very limited terms of reference. The full Committee had agreed in principle to this amendment, with the exception of the United States. The Chairman of the Drafting Committee, he stated, would oppose the elimination of this amendment on separate action. Commander Stassen suggested that if the United States were defeated on this measure, it should reserve its position in order that the question might be referred to the Executive Committee. Secretary Stettinius indicated that he supported Commander Stassen’s suggestion; if necessary, he declared, the matter would be brought up before the Executive Committee. Dean Gildersleeve warned against the bad publicity which would result if the United States were to take a definite stand opposing this amendment. Mr. Bloom proposed that the United States take its stand on the question of the authority of the Conference to consider the question, and Mr. Notter agreed that such a position would kill the bad publicity which might result. Mr. Armstrong thought that it would be best not to take up this matter in the Executive Committee because that was composed of the heads of the Delegations who were not aware of the implications of the measure.

Secretary Stettinius agreed that Mr. Armstrong’s suggestion was valid and proposed that the matter be first discussed among the interested heads of Delegations in a special meeting to be held in the penthouse. He charged Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Dunn with selecting the appropriate heads of Delegations. Mr. Rockefeller urged that it would be best to consider this question before it got out of the Drafting Committee. Secretary Stettinius remarked that this was a political question and reiterated that Mr. Dunn and Mr. Rockefeller should get the appropriate Delegation Chairmen together for a meeting. He declared that he was ready to meet with them at any time they decided upon.

NAACP Telegram

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Difficult Committee Situation

Mr. Notter asked for the attention of the Delegation for several minutes to consider the situation in Committee I/2, which had become “impossible”. The previous night the Chairman had insulted Ambassador Gromyko.¹¹ The Commission had become a scene of confusion and chaos and personal recriminations had ensued. In the past two four-hour meetings, only one vote had been taken in each, and both were invalid. The Chairman of the Committee was Bonilla Lara of Costa Rica. Secretary Stettinius asked whether Mr. Rockefeller knew this gentleman. Mr. Notter stated that Ambassador Gromyko had indicated that he was going to make an issue of the poor handling of the Committee. Secretary Stettinius declared that he would handle the matter. He proposed that the Delegation next discuss the matter of voting procedure.

[Here follows discussion of newspaper stories on the question of voting procedure, apparently based upon leaks to the press relative to discussions within an executive session of the delegation.]

Secretary Stettinius emphasized that the meeting was an Executive Session and he appealed to all those present to be very careful not to reveal what took place. Senator Connally thought that all people present ought to turn in their papers. Mr. Sandifer observed that the room was carefully policed after each meeting.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that no other Delegation had this paper under consideration. It had been placed before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Five and had been altered there. The redraft had been considered by several members of the United States Delegation the previous evening but the paper now before the Committee was not in the hands of the other Delegations. Mr. Pasvolsky wanted to find out if the Delegation would approve the submission of this paper to the meeting of the Deputies of the Committee of Five at 11 a.m. Fundamentally, it was the paper that had been approved on the previous day with only verbal changes. Secretary Stettinius asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky thought the Deputies would approve this draft, and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that there might be changes in phraseology, but that he would present the final draft to the Delegation. Secretary Stettinius asked whether the Delegation would favor this procedure and Senator Connally, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hackworth, Mr. Armstrong, Dr. Bowman, and Mr. Pasvolsky announced themselves as being in agreement. Secretary Stettinius asked that the Delegation read the statement through carefully, but it was suggested that the paper be read aloud and the Secretary instructed Mr. Sandifer to read it.

Secretary Stettinius urged that the Yalta formula should be upheld. He asked Mr. Dunn whether the present draft covered the suggestion he had made yesterday concerning rearranging the order of the paragraphs in Section A, Chapter VIII. Mr. Dunn replied that this would provide an adequate basis for rearranging the paragraphs. The order under his proposal would be paragraph 2, paragraph 3, then the new paragraph 1, all of which involved voluntary action on the part of the member states, to be followed by the old paragraph 1, which provided for investigation and constituted the first major political decision made by the Security Council.

Mr. Hackworth observed that in considering amendment of the Statute of the Court, Committee IV/1 had agreed that the decision should be taken by an absolute majority which meant six votes instead of seven, as provided for in the Yalta Agreement. Mr. Hackworth suggested that this matter be taken up in the Coordinating Committee. At this point, Mr. Johnson distributed the paper suggested by Mr. Dunn, entitled Suggested Rearrangement in Charter Language of Chapter VIII, Section A, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals As Altered by Four Power Amendments.¹² Senator Connally asked whether it was thought that acceptance could be gained for this rearranged wording. He asked whether it changed substantially the wording of the original proposals. Mr. Dunn replied that there was no change in meaning. Secretary Stettinius asked why any change should be made in the wording if it was unnecessary. Mr. Dunn remarked that the rearrangement would serve the purpose of relieving the tension existing with respect to the distinction between matters subject to the unanimity rule and those questions which were not subject to it. Representative Bloom asked what happened to Mr. Hackworth’s question of a few minutes previously and Secretary Stettinius said that this matter would be straightened out in the Coordinating Committee. Representative Bloom asked whether the matter Mr. Hackworth had brought up was subject to change in conformity with motions that already had been passed and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the Coordinating Committee would iron out any inconsistencies in the Charter.

Senator Connally observed that, in his opinion, the wording “which may lead to international friction” appearing in paragraph 1, Section A, Chapter VIII, had the effect of limiting the jurisdiction of the Security Council unless the matter was thought to make possible a dispute. Mr. Dulles replied that he thought the phraseology was desirable because it eliminated all except important matters from coming to the attention of the Security Council. He thought it would be undesirable to have trivia being imposed upon the Council. The only change in wording was the result of the change in the order of the paragraphs. Mr. Dunn agreed with Mr. Dulles that it was undesirable to have unimportant matters come before the Security Council. Senator Connally remarked that unimportant matters would plague the Security Council anyhow, but he withdrew his objection.

Mr. Pasvolsky announced that the Russians had indicated their willingness to accept the new position of the amended paragraph 1, as submitted by the Four Powers. He remarked that paragraph 3 in Mr. Dunn’s draft should be paragraphs, because political action by the Security Council did not start until after the present paragraph 2.

Mr. Hackworth asked what was implied in the reference to nonmembers in paragraph 1. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that this had been a Chinese proposal which the Secretariat had reworded slightly. The Chinese had objected to the change in wording which had resulted in ambiguity. There was a dispute as to whether “non-member” referred to a state not a member of the Organization, which was party to a dispute, or whether it referred to a non-member which brought a question before the Organization. This question, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, must be clarified in the Coordinating Committee. However, that body was not working on the question at present because the proposal had been accepted only in principle and the wording was not definitive as yet.

Senator Connally asked whether the Committee concerned with the matter would accept the rearrangement of the paragraphs. Commander Stassen replied that since the new set-up was more liberal, it would be quite easy to get it through the Committee. It had been difficult to hold this Committee down, he declared. Senator Connally emphasized that the rearrangement involved no real change in the document and Mr. Dunn agreed and declared that the change was really psychological. Secretary Stettinius asked whether the Advisers had any comments to make. Commander Stassen remarked that he did not approve of some thing[s]. Mr. Dulles stated that he, too, did not approve of the Four Power Statement in its entirety, but commented that, since this was to be an international rather than a single power statement, it would be impossible to meet all the objections that might be raised.

Commander Stassen declared that in the last sentence of paragraph 3, he was of the opinion that the words “any member of” should be deleted so that the phraseology would read “cannot prevent the Council from reminding. …” Mr. Pasvolsky replied that it would be impossible to obtain this revision, but Commander Stassen replied that the United States should at least try. Secretary Stettinius remarked that, according to the record of the meeting, the United States did try to make this change. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this wording had one advantage; that under the phraseology as it existed, it would be impossible to cut off any member which wished to raise an issue.

The Secretary asked whether the Delegation would have another chance to see this document after it went through the Committee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky responded that the Delegation would have to see the document, and added that he was not certain the changes would be accepted by the Committee of Five.

Commander Stassen declared that he was opposed to paragraph 5 which was, in his view, a reactionary paragraph. He suggested that the first sentence be changed to read “formal investigation”. Mr. Dulles remarked that Commander Stassen gave the impression of having been in the drafting meeting the previous meeting when all the same points were raised. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that it would be impossible to make a change of that nature because of the opposition of the other members of the Committee of Five. Commander Stassen urged that a United States position be established. Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether Commander Stassen was in favor of a United States position or a Five Power position and the latter replied that we should start with the United States taking a definite position on the issues involved, and that we should end up with a Big Power stand. Senator Connally stated that the only way to face this question was to “hit them in the nose”. The small powers favored a liberal interpretation of the Yalta formula. The United States was obliged to adhere to the formula as it existed because of the commitment involved, but we must make a liberal interpretation of the existing phraseology. This paper was a liberal interpretation. Commander Stassen agreed that this paper was a great improvement over the statement of the previous day.

Commander Stassen observed that the other powers would probably be opposed to changing this draft because the act of investigation was thought to be a definite action by the Security Council.

Commander Stassen said that he was opposed to paragraph 10 as it stood. He declared that he did not believe in the Yalta formula, as was stated in paragraph 10, although he remarked that the United States must accept this formula because of the need for Big Five unanimity. Mr. Pasvolsky asked Commander Stassen to read paragraph 10 in conjunction with paragraph 9. Senator Connally urged that the United States must be aggressive in order to put this thing over. Commander Stassen insisted that the formula must be sold on the basis that it was the best formula that could be obtained. Commander Stassen cited his position concerning the admission of the two Russian representatives and Argentina to the Conference—he had supported their admittance on the grounds of political necessity although he had not believed that they should be allowed to participate in the Conference. His opposition to this draft was that it established the belief of the sponsoring governments in the Yalta formula. Commander Stassen thought that a justification should have been made on the grounds of necessity.

Mr. Dulles observed once more that all the points raised by Commander Stassen had been discussed the previous evening. The question was, he thought, whether the United States position should be fought out at higher level than Mr. Pasvolsky’s Committee.

Commander Stassen reiterated that there should be a distinct United States position on this question. The statement should declare that it would be impossible to achieve the real objectives of the United States and should indicate clearly that the Yalta formula represented the maximum that could be obtained in the direction in which the United States was going. Secretary Stettinius asked whether minutes were kept by the Committee of Five, with the implication that the United States position might have been adequately stated in the record of the Committee meetings. Commander Stassen declared that there had never been an official United States position which had been approved by the Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky replied, however, that he thought he had understood the United States position, especially with respect to the insertion of the word “formal” as regarding investigation. Representative Bloom asked Mr. Pasvolsky Where he had obtained that position, and the latter replied that he had inferred it from the proceedings of the Delegation’s meeting the previous morning. Senator Connally asked what point there was in establishing a United States position if it was going to be necessary to retreat from that stand and accept a compromise. Commander Stassen pointed out that unless the United States had established a strong position on the Connally and Vandenberg Resolutions,¹⁴ these proposals would not have been incorporated in the Charter. Senator Connally replied that the two Resolutions constituted a unique situation, in that there had been no previous agreement among the Big Powers. He declared that if we were going to stand by the Yalta Agreement, we should not place any obstructions in its way. Commander Stassen reiterated that there should be established a United States interpretation of the Yalta formula. Senator Connally objected that this would only add to the confusion, but Commander Stassen replied that the United States interpretation would not be for publication, but only for the Conference records.

Secretary Stettinius remarked that he thought there had been á paper presented to the Committee of Five stating the United States position. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that there could not possibly have been any such document covering all the points of the Yalta formula. He had thought that he had been given broad powers of negotiation and thought that he had been able to glean indications of the Delegation’s position. Now, however, he was willing to hand over the entire question to the Delegation and he was of the opinion that this should be done anyhow. He suggested that at the meeting of the Heads of the Delegations, another attempt should be made to incorporate Commander Stassen’s views. He, himself, was satisfied that he had gone as far as it was possible to go. Commander Stassen declared that he was indeed appreciative of Mr. Pasvolsky’s efforts. Mr. Pasvolsky, he thought, had done very well—no one could have done any better—but, Commander Stassen reiterated, the Delegation had never taken any clear position on this issue. Mr. Hartley pointed out that both the late President Roosevelt and Mr. Stettinius had issued statements¹⁵ presenting the United States interpretation of the Yalta formula and these statements had been included in the first book of background documents presented to the Delegation. Commander Stassen declared, however, that these statements did not represent a decision by the Delegation.

The Secretary asked that the Delegation reach a decision on this matter shortly, because both Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Pasvolsky had urgent matters to present to the Delegation.

Senator Connally asked whether it was agreed that Mr. Pasvolsky should go as far as he could and that the question would then be presented at a meeting of the heads of Delegations.

The Secretary reported that he had spoken to Ambassador Gromyko recently and that the latter had been instructed definitely not to depart from the Yalta formula. The Secretary was of the opinion that there was nothing to be accomplished by taking up the matter with Ambassador Gromyko here in San Francisco. He declared that it would be necessary to wire Foreign Commissar Molotov, or to have President Truman send a wire to Premier Stalin. He asked if Mr. Pasvolsky was in agreement.

Mr. Pasvolsky indicated his approval of the Secretary’s statement and remarked that the Russians had looked at the statement in order to determine if it fit in with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the Yalta decision, and the Four Power Amendments. Anything that did not conform with these previously achieved agreements had to be submitted to Moscow. Mr. Pasvolsky cited the attempt to insert the word “formal”. The Russian position had been that since this word was not in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, or the subsequently agreed upon additions thereto, the matter would have to be submitted to Moscow for decision. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that he had attempted to draw a distinction between “formal action” by the Security Council and the mere act of “reminding” the members of their obligations. This matter, it had been thought, would have to go to Moscow for final decision. Commander Stassen remarked that the matter would probably have to be considered at Moscow anyhow.

Representative Bloom urged that the statement include merely interpretation and just give an idea of what was meant by the Yalta Agreement. There would have to be an agreement reached some time, he stated, and the matter should be brought back to the Delegation for its decision as to how the United States interpreted the Yalta formula.

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the only question before the Delegation at this time was whether or not it was in agreement with the statement up for consideration.

Commander Stassen remarked that it had been rumored that the British had declared that the United States would not accept Sir Alexander Cadogan’s interpretation of the formula.¹⁶ As a matter of fact, the truth was that the Delegation would have accepted the Cadogan interpretation if Russia had approved. Commander Stassen pointed out that it was this constant jockeying to place the United States in a reactionary position that we must be on the lookout for and he warned against it. He thought that the United States Delegation ought to approve a definitive statement of the United States position. Representative Bloom agreed and declared that it would be better to have no interpretation than that outlined in the Four Power Statement. This statement would foreclose all other arguments which might be presented before the United States Senate. There should be a distinct United States interpretation.

Senator Connally declared that we must come to an agreement among the Big Five as to the meaning of this formula. It would be impossible to change the agreement itself. China was opposed to any change as was Great Britain. Senator Connally ventured that the formula would not be changed. He thought that the United States ought to “hit it in the nose” and indicate that we are definitely in favor of Yalta.

Secretary Stettinius asked what steps should be taken by the Delegation. He wondered whether he was right in supposing that there would be a meeting that morning at which Mr. Pasvolsky could obtain the other reactions of the other Delegations which could be reportedly Mr. Pasvolsky to the Delegation in the immediate future. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the question be brought up before the Heads of the Five Delegations. After it was considered by the Committee of Five, it could be returned again before the Delegation to see if it was in agreement.

Senator Connally thought that the Delegation had lost sight of the purpose of this paper. The object was to quiet the fears of those who expressed opposition to the Yalta formula. This was an argument to justify the ultimate position. Commander Stassen declared once again that a United States position must be established and Mr. Dulles agreed and declared that this position must be established at the present time.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether the Delegation had any instructions with respect to the 11 a.m. meeting of the Committee of Five. Mr. Dulles said that the existing draft could be “marked up” in a period of ten or fifteen minutes to establish the United States position according to the desires that had been expressed in the meeting thus far. He stated that Commander Stassen had made the same objections as had been raised the previous evening in the drafting session. The objections had been waived the previous evening because Mr. Pasvolsky had declared that it would be impossible to achieve agreement on the phraseologies suggested by those present.

Dr. Bowman indicated that he was in agreement with Mr. Dulles. If the Delegation was willing to turn over to a small committee the abstraction of those parts of the statement which conformed to the position of the Delegation, to which would be added the official statements made previously, this committee could lay before the Heads of Delegations the draft representing the United States position at the same time as Mr. Pasvolsky would present the results of the meeting of the Committee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that it would be embarrassing to have to reopen the question and start all over again. He asked whether he would be instructed to reopen the question or to indicate that he favored submitting the matter to the Big Five. Dr. Bowman declared that the question should be reopened only for the purpose of meeting Commander Stassen’s point—that the United States had not established a definite position on the question of voting. Secretary Stettinius declared that the United States position was formally on the record as the result of the previous day’s meeting. However, he instructed Mr. Dulles, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Pasvolsky, Dr. Bowman, Mr. Armstrong, and Mr. Hackworth to get together for the purpose of assembling a document encompassing the United States position. Commander Stassen declared that he wanted to make it clear that this was not only a matter of form—of presenting a position for the sake of the record—but it was also a matter of substance. There was, he declared, a portion of the statement under consideration which he could not accept. He was not prepared to accept paragraphs 5 and 10, and there were other paragraphs which he thought should be improved. Mr. Pasvolsky asked how he was to be instructed with respect to paragraphs 5 and 10. What, he asked, did Commander Stassen propose?

Senator Connally asked what the Delegation would do with a position once it had been, established. Representative Eaton replied that we should probably abandon it. Senator Connally declared, once more, that the United States should not take a position which was not in agreement with the other Powers. The Big, Five must stand together, he said. Commander Stassen agreed.

Senator Connally declared that it seemed to him that the situation was that the Big Five wanted to stand together, but the United States Delegation seemed to want to take a position different from the others. Commander Stassen said that we did not want to have in our document anything with which we did not agree. The eventual result, he thought, would be a compromise between the United States position and the present draft.

Mr. Dulles expressed the opinion that since the statement, in its existing form, had not been accepted by the Committee of Five, it would not be possible to send Mr. Pasvolsky back to negotiate on it. He thought that the subject had been milked dry at this level. He thought that the rest of the discussion should take place on the level of the Heads of Delegations. Then, the statement could be redrafted and presented to the Delegation for its approval. Mr. Pasvolsky said that this would probably result in the various Delegations taking the statement home, studying it, and then starting all over again. Secretary Stettinius said that he had assumed that the United States position had been established by the previous discussions. Commander Stassen said that the position of the Delegation should not be someone’s abstraction, but must be the presentation of the Delegation. Senator Vandenberg declared that he favored a paper presenting the views of all the powers. If the United States’ views were to be presented, we would have to declare that the whole formula was unacceptable. Senator Vandenberg was of the opinion that he could not subscribe to anything but would accept it as the best that could be achieved.

Commander Stassen asked whether Senator Vandenberg agreed to the present paragraph 10, and The Secretary remarked that this paragraph could probably be revised. Senator Connally indicated that he thought that Senator Vandenberg agreed with his proposition that, since we were going to vote with the Big Five in the final analysis nothing of a divergent nature should be presented by the Delegation. Senator Vandenberg said that he was not quite in agreement with this statement, Senator Vandenberg said that he was not prepared to indicate his belief in anything in which he did not actually believe. The United States, he said, had reached a position where it could not have its own way. To accept this fact, he urged, would be the best way to present what we did not believe in.

The Secretary asked Commander Stassen whether he was content to have a discussion at the 11 o’clock meeting of the Committee of Five, and have a meeting of the Big Five in the evening. The members of the Delegation who were interested in the question were free to appear with him to present their views.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether Commander Stassen would care to present his ideas as to the appropriate wording of paragraph 10. Secretary Stettinius asked that this matter be postponed. He wanted to straighten out the situation with respect to the United States position on this question. Commander Stassen declared that he could never accept paragraphs 5 and 10 and would urge that they be left out. Paragraph 4, he declared, would be much better with the inclusion of the word “formal”. Secretary Stettinius suggested that Mr. Pasvolsky go to the Committee of Five meeting and attend a Delegation meeting after that. There would be a meeting of the Big Five in the evening.

Senator Connally declared that there was to be a Committee meeting on the question of voting arrangements. He declared that unless he were instructed, he would vote for the Yalta formula and use his own reasons, plus the Statement as it appeared at that time. Secretary Stettinius declared that Mr. Pasvolsky would attend the Committee of Five meeting and that there would be a Delegation meeting afterwards—the Big Five meeting to be held in the evening. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that there was need for a Big Five meeting anyhow. The Secretary suggested that, the Delegation meet at 3 p.m. in the penthouse, but Representative Bloom pointed out that a number of Committee meetings were scheduled for 3:30 p.m. The Secretary asked whether the Delegation would favor a meeting at 2:30 p.m. in the penthouse and there was final agreement on this suggestion.

Then The Secretary asked what time the Big Five meeting should be held. Mr. Armstrong urged that no invitations be issued until after the meeting of the Delegation.

The Secretary urged again that the members remember the request for secrecy regarding the deliberations undertaken in this meeting. He requested that the Delegation be able to have a private discussion without the results of that discussion appearing in the newspapers. No background material could be given to the press, he said. Mr. Stevenson asked whether this should apply to the transactions of the entire meeting. At the start of the meeting he pointed out, the Delegation had discussed Committee meetings of the previous evening and the newspaper people were certain to know of these Committee meetings and would press for information. The Secretary reiterated that there should be no comment whatsoever on anything that had occurred in this meeting. Commander Stassen stated that if a draft were to leak out, he was going to say that no position had been taken. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that that was the factual situation—no position had been taken.

Respect for Treaties

Mr. Rockefeller asked that the Delegation consider a problem which was going to arise in the 10:30 meeting of his Committee.¹⁷ The question as to whether a provision concerning respect for treaties should be included in the Chapter on Principles or in the Preamble, was going to be voted on at 10:30. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that it had been agreed in the Committee of Five that the words “respect for treaties” should appear in the Preamble. The Secretary asked what difference it would make—if the proposal were to appear in the Preamble, why was there insistence that it should appear in the Principles?

Mr. Rockefeller replied that the problem arose because of the legal interpretation that the incorporation of the proposal in the Preamble would not be binding. Dean Gildersleeve reported that the Latin Americans were pressing for inclusion of this provision in the Chapter on Principles, and The Secretary asked what opposition there was to the acceptance of such a position Mr. Dulles replied that if this provision were included in the Principles, the United States would be bound to respect all treaties. Senator Vandenberg asked whether the United States did not have the intention of respecting all treaties. Mr. Dulles asked, in return, whether this country was actually anxious to insure respect for the treaty of Russia with Japan. Mr. Vandenberg replied that our respect for a treaty should continue unless it were changed under the terms of the treaty.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the United States could not take an independent position on this matter unless it first consulted with the other members of the Big Five. After considerable debate, the French had agreed to withdraw from their original position and had agreed that the proposals should be incorporated in the Preamble. Mr. Rockefeller declared that the proposal had originated with Chile and Colombia,¹⁸ but added that all the South American states seemed to be in favor of it.

Mr. Notter declared that the two-thirds vote requirement was the cause of our difficulty and that this would need adjustment soon. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that the South American countries had adopted an obstructionist position—but not on this issue. He declared that there had been disagreement among the Latin American countries on this question in Washington before the Conference started.

Mr. Rockefeller asked where the Delegation would stand on a matter which was related, namely, the introduction of wording in Chapter V, to bind the General Assembly to adhere to the principles of the Organization established in Chapters I and II.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether these amendments had been definitely proposed as amendments, or whether they were merely in the speculative stage. If they had not been proposed definitely, he was of the opinion that this should be done before consideration be given to them. Mr. Rockefeller answered that there was no point in proposing amendments if the United States Delegation was going to oppose them. Secretary Stetttinius asked whether the Delegation would be satisfied with incorporating this proposal in the Preamble, but Dean Gildersleeve remarked that she did not believe we could hold that position. Representative Bloom thought that the only place for this proposal was in the Preamble. Senator Vandenberg remarked that he would favor the incorporation of the proposal in the Principles, but would accept the Preamble. Representative Eaton said that he favored the Preamble, while Commander Stassen said that either was acceptable to him.

Mr. Notter expressed the view that the United States was being victimized because of the two-thirds rule, but Mr. Rockefeller said that that was not the case because the United States had not taken a position. Once the position of the United States¹⁹ was established, Mr. Rockefeller was certain that he could handle the South American countries.

Mr. Armstrong declared that it would be difficult to tell the United States people that the United States Delegation did not support respect for treaties.

Mr. Dulles declared that the proposal was a scheme to nullify Senator Vandenberg’s Resolution. This proposal would pervert Senator Vandenberg’s proposal—instead of making possible the revision of treaties as they became inconsistent with the objectives of the Organization, it would establish the sanctity of all treaties. Mr. Rockefeller indicated that he favored establishing respect for treaties in the Preamble. He asked, however, if it would be acceptable to the Delegation to insert the words concerning the obligation of the General Assembly to adhere to the principles established in Chapters I and II. Mr. Armstrong declared that the Vandenberg proposal was, in effect, asking the Latin American countries to give up their territorial integrity; if he were in their position, he said, he would not accept such a proposal. Secretary Stettinius declared that the Delegation seemed to indicate a preference for inclusion of this proposal in the Preamble. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he could handle the situation and observed that if the other words were inserted in the Chapter, it would aid psychologically in insuring acceptance of the Charter by the Legislatures of the South American countries.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked where it was intended to insert these provisions—in paragraph 6 or paragraph 1 of Chapter V. It was, he declared, preposterous for the Assembly to be bound in such a manner and Mr. Dulles agreed and declared that the Assembly could only recommend and did not have any greater powers. The Secretary remarked that this provision did not seem to have any real meaning. Mr. Rockefeller suggested that if the proposal was not definitely objectionable, it should be adopted if only to assist the South American countries in their domestic situations.

The Secretary asked why, if the proposal did not have any real meaning, the South American countries pressed it. Mr. Rockefeller replied that they had just emerged from an era of border disputes and wanted to preserve their gains by a statement that the Organization would respect existing treaties.

Secretary Stettinius suggested that Mr. Rockefeller discuss this question with the Delegation’s Advisers and prepare a recommendation to be presented at the 2:30 p.m. meeting in the penthouse.

French Treaty Question

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that this matter was the only question outstanding before Senator Vandenberg’s Committee.²⁰ The suggestion was to include new language in Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the instructions of the Delegation were not clear. He was of the opinion that the Delegation was in favor of deleting the word “enforcement”. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the French were in favor of using the word “request” instead of “consent”; they wanted to go home and say that they had proposed a change in the wording of this Chapter which had been accepted. The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky what his opinion was and the latter indicated that he would accept it. Mr. Dunn also supported the change. Dr. Bowman asked what support the French had. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the British, who had been the authors of the original phraseology, had indicated a willingness to accept a new terminology as being superior. Mr. Armstrong declared that he favored “by consent”, as originally agreed upon, and Mr. Dulles agreed, declaring that it would be dangerous for the Big Four to open up possibility of further change in this provision. He said he would favor the change if it was certain that this would be the last one proposed, but Mr. Dulles was fearful that if reopening of the clause Were permitted, Russia might try to “weasel out”. The Russians were of the opinion that the United States had the advantage of this situation, in view of the regional set-up, and Mr. Dulles was in agreement with the Russian position on that point. This pointed to the possibility that the Russians might be using the French as an opening wedge to reopen the whole paragraph.

Representative Bloom asked whether it would be possible to use both words “consent” and “request”. Mr. Dulles declared that the main question at issue was whether or not the paragraph should be reopened and Representative Bloom agreed to his contention. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked, however, that the only suggestion received from the USSR was to drop the whole clause. Secretary Stettinius remarked that this would seem to indicate that it would be a mistake to reopen the question. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the French were of the opinion that they could return with the wording “by request”, and he went on to say that the French had behaved admirably throughout the Conference. Secretary Stettinius was of the opinion that the United States had been better to them than they had been to us, and Mr. Dunn remarked that the Secretary had been better to the French than he had expected. Commander Stassen declared that the Delegation ought to stand by the Four Power agreement. To open up the paragraph would be unfortunate, he thought.

Representative Bloom asked whether the Delegation was willing to agree even to this one change. He thought it was a question of yes or no, Black or White. The Sectary declared that the sentiment of the Delegation seemed to be that no change should be made.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared, however, that he thought that the matter ought to go before the Big Five. The French had brought the matter up and there had been no recommendation from the Subcommittee in which three states had favored the proposal, one nation had opposed it, and one was undecided. It would be difficult to get the French to withdraw their proposal. Perhaps the matter could best be discussed outside the Committee.

Mr. Dunn was of the opinion that no procedure would work. No French Government could stand, he declared, unless it was certain that the existing treaty structure would be preserved. This was essentially a domestic political situation. The French had to feel that they had a guarantee against the Germans in addition to the guarantee provided by the United Nations Organization. The French, he declared, would not change their position and Mr. Dunn could see no reason for the United States pressing the matter.

The Secretary asked whether the other three members of the Big Four would vote with us on this question. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that we would undoubtedly have to vote the French down on the matter. The Secretary asked what reason we could offer, and Commander Stassen said that we could argue that by accepting the amendment the paragraph would be opened up to future change. Mr. Dunn added, as a possible further argument, that the United States was of the opinion that the French were adequately protected by the existing provision. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he thought the Delegation was making a mistake. The French proposal would not weaken the document and the French argument was that the result would be the same no matter what the phraseology was. Mr. Dunn said that he would like to have it arranged so that the United States was not the only nation opposing the French.

The Secretary asked whether the Russians had taken any position on this question and Mr. Pasvolsky expressed the opinion that the USSR would go along with us. Mr. Dunn declared that the other nations were waiting for the United States to reconsider and Mr. Armstrong observed that the change would be advantageous to the USSR. The Secretary suggested that the United States would have to stall on this issue but Senator Vandenberg pointed out that there could not be much more stalling.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the matter be taken up in the Big Five meeting and The Secretary agreed that that would be the best solution.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:03 a.m.

9. Doc. 599,II/3/31, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 99.
11. For summary report of meeting of May 25, 8:45 p.m., see Doc. 604, I/2/42, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 113.
12. Not printed.
14. For the Vandenberg Resolution, introduced July 2, 1943, see Congressional Record, vol. 89, pt. 5, p. 6898; for the Connally Resolution, adopted November 5. 1943, see ibid., vol. 89, pt. 7, p. 9222.
15. Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1945, p. 324, and ibid., March 11, 1945, p. 395.
16. Exclusion of application of veto from paragraphs 1 and 3 of chapter VIII, section A.
17. Subcommittee I/1/A agreed at its tenth meeting, May 26, 10:30 a.m., Without dissent, to the inclusion in the Charter of a statement On “respect for treaties”; the decision whether the statement should be included in the preamble or the body of the Charter was to be taken up at the next meeting (US T/1/A Doc. 10, May 26, not printed).
18. Doc. 215, I/1/10, May 11, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, pp. 528 and 586.
19. U.S. Gen. 216 and 217 on respect for treaties (letter from Mr. Armstrong to the Secretary, and memorandum from Mr. Dulles to the Secretary) neither printed.
20. Committee III/4 (Regional Arrangements).