500.CC/4–2445
Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, April 24, 1945, 5:45 p.m.
| Present: | The Secretary of State |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Harriman | |
| Ambassador Gromyko | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
Mr. Molotov said: that he had come to see the Secretary to raise a number of points. His request was as representative of a sponsoring government that he be kept informed of all developments and arrangements affecting the Conference; that he did not wish to have to rely on rumors but wished to have first-hand information on all matters such as plans, arrangements, agenda, et cetera. He added that he designated Mr. Novikov of the Soviet Delegation to maintain contact with the U.S. Delegation.
The Secretary replied: that he intended to see that Mr. Molotov was kept fully informed about everything, and that Mr. Hiss, as temporary Secretary General had already made plans for the full dissemination of such information. He added that in so far as the U.S. Delegation was concerned, he had delegated Mr. Thompson, whom Mr. Molotov knew from Moscow, as our representative to maintain contact with the Soviet Delegation. He emphasized, however, the difference between the Secretariat headed by Mr. Hiss and the U. S. Delegation and suggested that Mr. Novikov be put in touch both with Mr. Hiss’ office and with Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Molotov agreed and expressed his satisfaction.
The Secretary then said that since there had been much speculation of the press in regard to the matter of the final amendments proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, at a press conference this afternoon, he had informed them that last night the four sponsoring powers had agreed that these amendments be placed before the Conference together with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He said he had tried to get in touch [Page 381] with the Soviet Delegation yesterday afternoon before the press conference but had been unable to do so.
Mr. Molotov said that he had no objection at all to the press statement which he felt was entirely satisfactory in view of last night’s decision.
Mr. Molotov then said that he wished to raise again the question of the four Chairmen of the Conference since his government felt that this would establish before the other nations the principle of equality of the sponsoring powers. He said the matter had not been fully explored last night and would like to clarify further the American position.
The Secretary explained that he had discussed this matter both with the late President Roosevelt and with President Truman and that his instructions were that we should support the view of one responsible Chairman for the conduct of the Conference’s position. He said, however, that he thought that possibly some halfway point or compromise could be found whereby all four nations would be honorary Chairmen and in the absence of the responsible Chairman they could each have an opportunity to preside over plenary session.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether this meant that the U. S. did not wish to reach agreement on this question.
The Secretary replied that, of course, we wished to reach an agreement but such were his instructions and that the matter would have to be decided at the first meeting of the Steering Committee.
Mr. Molotov said he would have to maintain the position of his government on this point.
After some discussion of the program of the plenary session tomorrow and the first meeting of the Steering Committee on Thursday, the 26th, Mr. Molotov said he had some other questions to raise.
He said that he had not had an opportunity to see the Secretary alone without representatives of other powers since he had arrived in the United States. He said he wished to speak first of the question of the Agreement at Yalta concerning the admission of White Russia and the Ukraine as initial members of the World Organization. (After some discussion, it was established that Mr. Molotov had in mind not a representation to the Conference which he said was the second phase of the question but the first phase, namely, of the execution of the Crimea Agreement regarding White Russia and the Ukraine).
He said that the discussions last night on this subject had been somewhat vague and he hoped to arrive at a more or less friendly understanding of the status of this matter. He said he must say frankly that the Soviet Government considered that the three governments who had made the Crimean decisions were responsible for its execution [Page 382] and that he wished to know whether there was any justification to believe that the three nations would be able to have their agreement carried into effect.
The Secretary said he thought he had made clear the position of the U.S. Government; namely, that he would live up to the agreement. He added that since Mr. Molotov had requested his personal opinion, he felt that the attitude of the Conference could not help but be affected by the failure of the three nations to reach an agreement on the Polish question. He added that this failure had cast doubt on the unity and collaboration between the three powers which was the corner stone of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and that as a friend he must state this view frankly to Mr. Molotov. He said that he was confident that if we could agree on the Polish question that the Conference would in all probability be willing to accept the Soviet proposal.
Mr. Molotov replied that he felt that a failure to carry out the Crimea agreement on the admission of White Russia and the Ukraine could only worsen the situation; that to add failure on this point to our inability to carry out the decision on Poland would be an even more serious indication of disagreement between us. He added that he felt that since Mr. Stettinius had met with the Latin American countries at Mexico City and that Mr. Eden had met with the Dominions in London they both should have some idea as to the attitude of those countries towards the proposal in regard to White Russia and the Ukraine and he, therefore, wished again to ask whether there was grounds for believing that the three nations would be able to carry out at the Conference this agreement.
The Secretary said, speaking quite frankly, that he could not tell Mr. Molotov that attitude of the Latin American countries; adding that he had not raised the question at Mexico City since he had not been authorized by President Roosevelt to do so, and in any event, the agreement had not been published.
Mr. Molotov remarked that the agreement had been published to which The Secretary replied that that was after Mexico City.
Mr. Molotov then said that he had some indications that the Dominions were prepared to support this proposal.
The Secretary again reported to Mr. Molotov his impression of the effect of failure to reach the agreement on Poland would have at the Conference.86 He said that he felt if we could only agree here on the plan of consultation with Polish leaders from within and without Poland and that the Commission could go back to Moscow to continue its work, the effect would be most beneficial. He added that he felt [Page 383] that the United Nations were firmly determined to create a World Organization; that they were prepared to make adjustments, but that they had come to look upon the Polish issue as a test case between the three powers. He concluded by saying that he was speaking as an individual and not as a representative of the U. S. at this Conference.
Mr. Molotov said that they had no objection to consultation but that he felt his position and that of his government of [on] the Polish matter had been made sufficiently clear. He then said that he expected to put the question of White Russia and the Ukraine at the first meeting of the Steering Committee on Thursday, April 26th, and that he would state that this was an agreement between the three powers at the Crimean Conference who bore the responsibility for its execution. He asked if he could expect that we would secure the maximum support for this proposal.
The Secretary replied that he felt it would be unwise to raise this question so early in the proceedings of the Conference.
Mr. Molotov answered that the matter had been settled between the three powers and that he did not feel it would be possible to support [suppress?] this question.
The Secretary said he thought it would be more logical to have the question come up when the composition of the assembly was under consideration rather than the other way around.
Mr. Molotov said that it could not be put off and that it was a question of membership in the Organization. He replied also that if the Soviet Government was confronted with the failure of the three powers to carry into effect the Crimea decision on the admission of White Russia and the Ukraine he would have to go home. He added that such a failure would be greeted with surprise and concern by the Soviet public opinion and that the consequences could not be good.
The Secretary reported that we were prepared to carry out our commitment but that he had only been here a few hours and Mr. Eden had not arrived, and that they should be given some time to discuss the matter with the Chairman of some of the other Delegations. Otherwise, there might be the serious risk that when Mr. Molotov put the proposal before the first meeting of the Steering Committee that only he and Mr. Eden would vote for it.
Mr. Molotov said he did not know but that this was a risk.
The Secretary again said that if we could only reach some agreement on Poland and announce that a list of leaders who were to be invited for consultation would have an enormous helpful effect on the attitude of the Conference towards the White Russia and the Ukrainian question.
[Page 384]Mr. Molotov said that in regard to Poland, his Government felt that instead of friendly support in the matter of the establishment of a Polish Government friendly to the Soviet Union, obstacles had been continually put in its path by the U.S. and Great Britain. He said this had created quite a difference in atmosphere than that at the Crimean Conference. He said that now attempts were being made to speak to the Soviet Union in the language of a dictator; that the Soviet Union was in the first rank of the powers and would not be pushed back into the second rank; that if the Soviet Union was treated as a partner, it would react as a cooperative partner along the lines of the Crimea Conference but that if attempts were made using the Polish situation as an excuse to dictate to the Soviet Union no good would come out of it.
The Secretary said that there had been no change in our attitude since the Crimea; that we maintained to carry out our agreements and that all we asked was that the Polish leaders suggested by us be accepted for consultation.
Mr. Molotov replied that Mr. Stettinius was aware of his position and that of his Government on this question. He concluded by saying that if the Soviet Government was forced to accept anything but a friendly government in Poland after all the Russian blood that had been shed for Polish liberation, any other solution would mean for them that this blood had been shed in vain and they had lost the war. He said that aggression had come to Russia through Poland twice in a generation and that they could not abandon the interest of their state. He said that at the Crimean Conference the atmosphere had been satisfactory but since then they had noticed a definite change and that obstacles were being placed in the way of a formation of a Polish Government friendly to the Soviet Union.
The Secretary denied that there had been any change in atmosphere on the part of the United States.
It was agreed that at 11 o’clock tomorrow morning if Dr. Soong and Mr. Eden were agreeable there would be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers to consider Conference arrangements and to begin the examination of amendments proposed by other countries to the Dumbarton Oaks document, and that this meeting would take place in Mr. Stettinius’ office.87
- See message of April 23 from President Truman to Marshal Stalin regarding the Polish question, vol. v, p. 258.↩
- See minutes of meeting, April 25, 11 a.m., p. 402.↩