Subject: U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement
and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept in Regard to Outer
Mongolia and Manchuria
The attached memorandum entitled “U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta
Agreement2 and Terms Which China Might Appropriately
Accept in Regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria”, has been prepared
in pursuance to the suggestion contained in Ambassador Harriman’s 081800 and your request
sent through Admiral Leahy
(MR–in–19).3
There is in the Department no copy of the Yalta Agreement or of any
records of conversations relating thereto. The attached memorandum
has therefore been prepared on the basis of our recollection of its
contents.
You may wish to give special attention to the portions of the
memorandum which have been marked in red.4
[Attachment]
top secret
U. S. Interpretation of the
Yalta Agreement and Terms Which China Might Appropriately
Accept in Regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria
Outer Mongolia. With regard to the
interpretation of this Government of the term “status quo” as applied to Outer Mongolia the following
facts are pertinent.
The Chinese Government claims all of Mongolia, including the area
occupied by the Mongolian People’s Republic, as part of the
Republic of China. The present Chinese Provisional Constitution
for the Period of Political Tutelage (1931) states that the
territory of the Republic consists of the several provinces and
Mongolia and Tibet. Although China lost control over Outer
Mongolia in 1911, the Chinese Government has never ceased to
claim it as an integral part of the Republic, and in the
treaties which it concluded with imperial Russia respecting Outer Mongolia
and with Outer Mongolia itself China gained from both of them
recognition of this claim. (See the note attached to the
Sino-Russian Declaration, November 5, 1913;5 Article
II of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Kiakhta, June 7, 1915,6 and Article V of the
Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles of May 31,
1924.7)
China, having gained recognition of its claim to sovereignty from
the U. S. S. R., contends that it is the sole government legally
competent to regulate the affairs of Outer Mongolia, and it has
protested against any agreements made by the U. S. S. R., with
or concerning Outer Mongolia. Thus when the Soviet-Mongolian
Mutual Assistance Pact of March 12, 19368 was signed, the
Chinese Government protested to the Soviet Union that Outer
Mongolia was an integral part of the Republic, and that no
foreign state might conclude treaties or agreements with it. The
Soviet Foreign Office in reply reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s
recognition of Chinese sovereignty.
[Page 866]
China also protested against the Declaration attached to the
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 19419 which stated in part:
“… the U. S. S. R. pledges to respect the territorial
integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to respect
the territorial integrity and inviolability of the
Mongolian People’s Republic.”
The following day the Chinese Foreign Minister10 issued a statement
in which he declared:
“The four Northeastern Provinces and Outer Mongolia are
an integral part of the Republic and will always remain
Chinese territory. The Chinese Government and people
cannot recognize any engagements entered into between
third parties which are derogatory to China’s
territorial and administrative integrity.”*
The substance of this statement was communicated to the Soviet
Foreign Office in the form of a protest to which the latter
answered that the Soviet-Japanese Pact was solely to insure the
security of the Soviet Union and had no bearing on Soviet
relations with China.
The U. S. S. R. has not claimed the territory of the Mongolian
People’s Republic, and it has repeatedly informed the Chinese
that it respects Chinese sovereignty therein. In statements by
Soviet officials the view is held that the Government of the
Mongolian People’s Republic is autonomous, and able to enter
into independent treaty relations. Izvestia, the semi-official Soviet newspaper, in its
issue of March 6, 1925 quoted Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
as declaring: “(the U. S. S. R.) recognizes Mongolia as [a] part
of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so
far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with its
internal affairs and to permit the establishment of independent
relations by Mongolia”. (Quoted by Louis
Nemzer, “The Status of Outer Mongolia in
International Law”, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 33, 1939, p. 461.) Statements
by other Soviet officials so far as they are available all
emphasize the autonomy of the region.
The representative of the Mongolian People’s Republic in
Moscow11 does not bear one of the usual
diplomatic titles but is called a “Delegate Plenipotentiary and
Commercial Representative”, indicating that the Mongolian
People’s Republic is not regarded as a fully independent state.
When Vice President Wallace visited Ulan Bator
[Page 867]
in the summer of 1944 no Mongol
visa or other Mongol, Chinese or Soviet document was necessary,
although the visit was made with the advance knowledge of the U.
S. S. R. and China. Notwithstanding the special consideration
doubtless shown to the Vice President of the United States, this
is nevertheless an indication of the anomalous status of the
Mongolian People’s Republic vis-á-vis the
Soviet Union and China.
In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual
Assistance Pact, the British Prime Minister12 was asked in Parliament whether
Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People’s Republic) was an independent
state or a part of China. He declared that: “His Majesty’s
Government continue to regard Outer Mongolia as under Chinese
sovereignty; and since the conclusion of the Protocol of the
12th of March, the Soviet Government have declared that in their
view the Sino-Soviet Treaty of May 1924 in which Outer Mongolia
was recognized as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, is
not infringed by the Protocol and retains its force.” (Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons
Official Report, Vol. 312, p. 5, May 11, 1936.)
No statement has been issued by the United States Government in
regard to Mongolia, or the Mongolian People’s Republic. By the
terms of the Nine-Power Treaty of 192213 to which it is a
signatory, the United States has agreed to respect the
territorial and administrative integrity of China (Article I)
and it has been at pains to refrain from any indication that it
considered the outlying dependencies of China such as Mongolia
in a different status from the remainder of China.
It would thus appear that while de jure
China has sovereignty over Outer
Mongolia, de facto sovereignty has
not been exercised since 1911.
If the future status of Outer Mongolia is
decided on the basis of the principle of
sub-determination [self-determination?] of peoples, then there is little doubt that
that territory would separate itself from China, and as an
independent nation or otherwise, enter the Soviet orbit.
Mongolians have been traditionally antipathetic to the
Chinese and, so far as can be judged, have been willing
adherents to Soviet ideologies and influence. In the light
of realities of the situation it is believed that the
Chinese Government would be well advised to give formal
recognition to a situation which has long existed in fact
and at the same time endeavor to capitalize upon the
good-will of the Soviet [Union]
thereby gained to obtain firm commitments
from the Soviet Government which will confirm and strengthen
the Chinese position in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.
[Page 868]
Such a disposition would not materially affect
any substantial American interest.
Manchuria. The Yalta Agreement contains a
general provision for the reversion to the Soviet Union of
rights in Manchuria formerly possessed by Czarist Russia prior to the
Russo-Japanese War. Under sub-headings to this main provision
there are certain specific provisions dealing inter alia with the “internationalization” of Dairen
and joint Sino-Soviet operation of Manchurian railroads. It is
not clear to what extent the specific provisions are to be
construed as explanatory to the main provision and to what
extent they represent modifications of or limitations on the
main provision.
The principal rights enjoyed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese
War may be summarized as follows:
Leases of Port Arthur and
Talienwan (Dairen)
(Russo-Chinese Convention of March 27, 1898.14) Lease
for 25 years (expiring in 1923), subject to renewal by
mutual consent, to the Russian Government of Port Arthur
and Dairen. The lease “in no way to violate the
sovereign rights of the Chinese Emperor to the leased
territory”. Russia
to have complete and exclusive enjoyment of the whole
area, including the entire military command and supreme
civil administration with no Chinese land forces
permitted in the leased area. Port Arthur to be used
solely by Chinese and Russian vessels. Dairen, with the
exception of one of the river bays set apart for the use
of Russian and Chinese fleets, to be open to foreign
commerce with free entry granted to the merchant vessels
of all countries. The Russian Government at its own
expense to erect fortification buildings and
lighthouses, to maintain garrisons and take steps for
defense.
Railways. The Chinese Eastern Railway,
constructed in 1897–1901, by the Chinese Eastern Railway
Company, was nominally a Russo-Chinese institution but actually
almost exclusively, if not entirely Russian, which Company was
granted by the Chinese Government exclusive rights of operation.
It was provided that 80 years from the date of completion the
line would pass free of charge to the Chinese Government, and
further that after 36 years from the date of completion the
Chinese Government would|have\the right to buy it back.
The Chinese Eastern Railway extended from Manchuli Station in the
west across Manchuria to Pogranichnaya on the Ussuri Railway,
with a southern branch extending from Harbin to Dairen (Dalny)
and Port Arthur. That portion of the southern branch from
Changchun (Hsinking) southward was transferred to Japan by the Russo-Japanese
[Page 869]
Treaty of Peace of
1905.15 The remainder of the Chinese Eastern
Railway was transferred to “Manchukuo” in 1936.
The Russians assumed civil administration of the railway zone
until 1920. Under the agreement of September 8, 1896, between
the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank,16 lands necessary to the construction, operation
and protection of the railway were ceded to the Chinese Eastern
Railway Company, and, according to the Russian (French) text,
the company was given le droit absolu et
exclusif de l’administration (the absolute and
exclusive right of administration or
management). The Chinese text of the treaty, however,
does not contain this stipulation. On the basis of the French
text, interpreting administration to mean
administration in the full English sense rather than mere
management, the Russians organized within the railway zone, (an
irregular strip of land extending for some distance on either
side of the railway and embracing Harbin and other cities which
developed along the railway), their own civil administration,
including courts of justice, police, schools, etc. The
Government of the United States has considered that this
procedure was an encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty and
impaired the extraterritorial rights of American citizens.
The statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company17 provide for a board of management (or board of
directors), to consist of nine members elected by the
shareholders. The chairman of the board was appointed by the
Chinese Government. The vice chairman was chosen by the members
of the board from among themselves. Shareholding was limited to
Russian and Chinese subjects. It is understood that nearly all
of the shares were purchased by the Russian Government. The
Chinese were, at the most, allowed an amount of stock sufficient
only to afford a right to participate in the election of the
directorate. Prior to 1917 the board of directors sat in St.
Petersburg. The actual operation of the railway was confided to
a manager, who was assisted, and to an extent controlled with
respect to important matters, by a council of administration
consisting of the manager and his principal assistants. The
manager was also | civil governor of the railway zone and as
such possessed the most extended powers.
The provisions of the proposed agreements in
regard to the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and in regard
to railways, as described in Moscow’s 081750Z,18
are clearly more advantageous to China than
would
[Page 870]
be terms calling for the complete restoration
of the rights possessed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the
Russo-Japanese war.
On the other hand, the provisions of the
proposed agreements are less advantageous to China than
would be terms based upon a normal construction, taken by
themselves, of the somewhat ambiguous and vaguely worded
terms of the specific sub-headings of the main provision
calling for the recovery by the Soviet Union of its former
rights in Manchuria. For example, the term
“internationalization” of Dairen could not of itself warrant
the interpretation placed upon it by the Soviet Government
in the draft agreement, calling for Soviet predominance in
administration, nor would the provisions in regard to the
joint Sino-Soviet operation of the railways call for an
implementation whereby Russia would have sole ownership and
superiority of authority over the Chinese in the management
of the railway.
There is an undoubted inconsistency between a
Soviet commitment to respect Chinese sovereignty and
proposals under which for even a limited period of years
Russia would
exercise virtual control over the main railways of Manchuria
and enjoy predominant administrative rights in Dairen and
exclusive administrative rights in Port Arthur. For reasons
set forth below, it is believed that there are less
disadvantages to be seen in the proposal in regard to Port
Arthur than in the rest of the draft agreements which, if
carried out in full, would represent a reversion to a
situation which was one of the most pernicious foci of
imperialism and which we had hoped might be eliminated once
and for all, and is therefore disappointing from the point
of view of American interests, policy and ideals.
Accordingly, if it should be possible for this Government,
either singly or in conjunction with Great Britain, to
influence the Soviet Government toward a modification in
favor of China (and of other
countries) of the terms relating to
Dairen and the railways, it is believed that we should make
the effort. There would seem warrant for such an approach to
the Soviet Government on the ground that it was not our
understanding of the Yalta Agreement that
“internationalization” of Dairen meant transfer of
predominant administrative rights to the Soviet Union or
that joint operation of the railways called for transfer of
exclusive ownership to the Soviet Union and for vesting
Russia with a
predominant position in management. If through such an
approach the Soviet Union could be influenced to make
substantial modification in these proposals it would be very
welcome from our point of view. At the same time the fact
cannot be lost sight of that the National Government of
China stands to gain much by Russian participation in the
war against Japan and
by Russian agreement not to support the Chinese Communists.
For these benefits China must be prepared to make reasonable
concessions and we should not support Chinese objections to
such otherwise reasonable concessions
[Page 871]
vs are not inimical to American interests or
in contradiction of American policy.
The United States has, of course, an important
practical interest in trade and commerce in Manchuria which
should be safeguarded. In respect to any arrangements which
may be made between the Soviet and Chinese Governments
regarding Manchuria we should obtain explicit commitments
from both governments that the principle of
nondiscrimination in international intercourse will be
respected in all areas and operations which may be the
subject of agreement. We should expect that application of
this principle would cover the right of equality of access
by the United States to the port facilities of Dairen, the
privilege of leasing and purchasing land there for business
and residential purposes (a right
which was generally denied in practice during the Japanese
regime) and the right of free and
full use of traffic facilities of the railways.
With regard to the proposed arrangement for
Port Arthur, it is believed that the Chinese could afford
and would be well advised to grant to the Russians
privileges at least no less liberal than those granted to us
by Great Britain in connection with the lease of certain
naval and air bases in British territory in the Western
Hemisphere. For example, in the master agreement comprised
in an exchange of notes between the British Embassy and the
Department of September 2, 1940,19
it is provided that:
“His Majesty’s Government, in the leases to be agreed
upon, will grant to the United States for the period of
the leases all the rights, power, and authority within
the bases leased, and within the limits of the
territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the
vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to
and defense of such bases, and appropriate provisions
for their control.”
In the Anglo-American Agreement of March 27, 194120
for the lease of air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica,
St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana Article IV
specifically grants jurisdiction to United States courts over
members of the United States forces, United States nationals,
persons not British subjects, and British subjects charged with
having committed, either within or without the leased areas,
offenses of a military nature punishable under American law
including but not restricted to treason, offenses relating to
sabotage or espionage, and any other offenses relating to the
security and protection of United States bases, establishments,
equipment or other property or to operations of the Government
of the United States in the territory. While the proposed
arrangement for Port Arthur envisages that the port will be
under “Soviet administration”,
[Page 872]
there would not, in the light of all the
circumstances, seem to be ground for putting forth objection on
our part if the Chinese grant the Soviet Government exclusive
jurisdiction within the port area of Port Arthur, whereas the
proposals relating to Dairen and the railways as they now stand
are open to legitimate objection on the part of the United
States and other of the United Nations.
