69. Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Smith)0
White House conference on intelligence activities (10:00 am)
(Summary statement)
On Friday, January 4, 1946, Colonel Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, in Charge of Research and Intelligence, telephoned the Director and indicated that he was making progress with the Navy on intelligence matters, but not with the Army, and he asked if the Director had gotten in touch with Secretary of State Byrnes on “our local problem.” The Director had not had an opportunity to see Byrnes, but said that he would try to do so.
On Monday, January 7, 1946, the Director had a brief appointment with Secretary Byrnes just before Byrnes left for London. The Secretary apparently told the Director about a proposed Executive Order disposing of the matter of the organization of intelligence activities in the Government. Upon returning to the office, the Director talked to Hoelscher and Schwarzwalder (Administrative Management), who gave him a copy of the proposed Order.
On Tuesday, January 8, 1946, the Director telephoned Matt Connelly (Secretary to the President) and asked him to tell the President not to sign the Executive Order.
On Wednesday morning, January 9, 1946, Connelly telephoned the Director to say that a meeting on intelligence, called by the President, was about to be held, so the Director immediately left the office for the White House. In addition to the President and the Director, participants in the meeting were Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy; Judge Samuel I. Rosenman; Brig. General Vaughan, Military Aide to the President; James K. Vardaman, Naval Aide to the President; and several persons from the [Page 171] Navy Department. The War Department and the State Department were not represented. The implication of most of the statements made at the meeting was that intelligence could not be handled in the State Department because that department was too weak.
The Director, who took the part of the devil’s advocate, said that when he had added together the figures on Army and Navy intelligence officers, plus the F.B.I. in South America during the war, he found that we had people falling all over themselves in the field of intelligence. He pointed out that while we might put up with this kind of situation during a war, we could not do so as a practical matter while carrying on a continuing basis a 25-billion-dollar budget during peacetime. When Leahy made some comment about the Director’s thinking in terms of the budget, Mr. Smith replied that he was not thinking in terms of dollars but rather in terms of organization. Leahy admitted that intelligence had been handled in a disgraceful way, and he said that he could not get any intelligence out of the Army, the Navy or the State Department during the war.
The Director made two points with the President. First, he stated that it is easy to ignore a thing as being only a “little matter of administration” and therefore not too important; but often that “little matter of administration” is the key to the problem in question, and whether or not it is properly handled makes the difference between success and failure in solving the problem. Second, the Director stated that when a subject is left to three departments to divide up among themselves, the worst possible compromise results, and that the President himself must decide how he wants intelligence activities organized.
The Director commented further that he had listened to a good many discussions on the organization of intelligence activities and that personally he was much interested in the subject because he feels that it has a great bearing on our enlarged role in international affairs. He pointed out, however, that he was concerned about the fact that in all that he had heard on the subject there did not seem to be even a clear understanding of what kind of intelligence was being discussed, and he declared that there was certainly need for some definitions. He remarked, “I am not so sure that we are not approaching the subject of intelligence in the most unintelligent fashion.”
- Source: Roosevelt Library, Papers of Harold Smith, Box 4, Conferences with President Truman, 1946. No classification marking. The time on the source text is 10 p.m., but the “p.m.” has been crossed out and inserted by hand is “a.m.?” Although written in the third person, this is part of the series of memoranda often referred to as the “Smith Diary.” The only other known contemporary account of this meeting by a participant is Admiral Leahy’s short diary entry, which simply notes the fact of the meeting and comments: “The Director of the Budget offered many objections that evidently were instigated by the Department of State.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Leahy Diaries, January 9, 1946) President Truman’s brief account, which may refer either to this meeting or to a follow-up session on January 12, is in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 57.↩