Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

63. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy’s Special Assistant (Correa) to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal⁰

Washington, December 27, 1945.

Today with Admiral Souers I attended a meeting at the War Department to discuss the subject of a Central Intelligence Agency. Present were Generals Craig, Fortier, Brownell and Irwin representing the War Department and Messrs. Alfred McCormack and L.L. Montagne representing the State Department.

General Fortier introduced in the meeting the annexed papers headed respectively, “Proposed Functions” and “Organization.”¹ There was considerable discussion as to the proposed functions of the central intelligence body. The discussion was in the main general. Insofar as it can be summarized in specific terms, it may be said that Mr. McCormack placed particular emphasis upon the planning functions of the proposed agency and, while he conceded that it might ultimately be found desirable as a result of the agency planning to give it certain operating functions, he did not feel that the initial charter of the agency should specify any operating functions for it. The War Department representatives, on the other hand, with the concurrence of the Navy representatives, felt that the agency should be given an operating mission as well as a planning and coordinating mission ab initio.

There was some discussion of the organization of the proposed agency although the discussion was not had with reference to the annexed War Department outline. The War Department representatives made the point that while they preferred a plan under which the Central Intelligence Agency would be independent of any of the Executive Departments, they would be inclined to compromise on a plan that would place the agency under the State Department, provided that the Executive Secretary who would direct the agency would have no other functions within the State Department, and particularly would not be the executive head of the State Department’s own intelligence agency. Mr. McCormack indicated that such a provision would be unacceptable to him. On behalf of the Navy it was stated that the Navy favored an independent Central Intelligence Agency whose director would not be identified with any of the departments concerned. It was pointed out that the Navy recognizes the undesirability of an independent appropriation for such an agency, but felt that this would not overcome the disadvantage of having the coordinating agency identified with one of the interested departments. It was further pointed out by the Navy representatives that under the applicable law an independent agency could be set up for a year without being required to receive its operating funds from an independent appropriation fund.

Mr. McCormack indicated that he was not prepared to accept either the Navy’s suggestion that an independent central agency be set up or the Army’s proposal that the agency be set up within the State Department but that its director have no other duties. Mr. McCormack further indicated that he felt matters were at an impasse, and that he felt the question would have to be decided by the three Secretaries and by the President.

Respectfully,

M.F. Correa ²

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Records of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 1940–1947, General Correspondence 1944–1947, Box 129, 80–1–19. No classification marking.
1. Not attached and not found.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.