57. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Nimitz) to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal0

SUBJECT

  • National Intelligence Authority
1.
After careful analysis of the State Department Plan, it is my opinion that it is unsatisfactory in many respects and that the proposed plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is more likely to assure sound national intelligence and should prove more satisfactory to the Navy.
2.
The strength of the JCS plan is the proposed Central Intelligence Agency. Such an agency is needed and when functioning properly should eliminate much unnecessary duplication through the pooling of personnel from the participating departments. It should provide the same intelligence estimates directly to the President and the three Secretaries to enable them to be uniformly informed. It should also supply the participating departments with intelligence of common interest which they require. The product of this agency would reflect the best judgment of the experts from all participating departments and would not be dominated by any one department.
3.
I think it desirable that the N.I.A. nominate and the President appoint the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is recommended, however, that the Director be an Army, Naval or Marine officer for the following reasons:
(a)
This will assure a non-political administration of the intelligence effort with unbiased and objective intelligence estimates.
(b)
He will be subject to military discipline, continuing after retirement. He can be required to avoid publicity which is undesirable in the conduct of an intelligence activity.
The term of office should be for four years to assure continuity.
4.
The State Department plan is objectionable for the following reasons:
(a)
The national intelligence estimates would be made by the State Department. The Secretaries of War and the Navy might not be informed with respect to the intelligence furnished the President by the State Department.
(b)
It does not provide a real central intelligence agency and therefore duplication can not be reduced without impairment of departmental intelligence agencies. No economy of effort will result.
(c)
The complex committee structure will actually result in wasted effort of key personnel.
5.
In a spirit of compromise it may be necessary to confine the membership of the N.I.A. to the three Secretaries as provided in the State Department Plan. I see no serious objection to the elimination of the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Authority. It may be necessary to agree on a few committees. This would be satisfactory if the number of committees is held to a minimum.
6.
I recommend you continue to support the J.C.S. Plan subject only to the concessions indicated above.1
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–135. Top Secret. The handwritten words “Nimitz letter” at the end of the source text identify the author. Nimitz became Chief of Naval Operations on December 15, 1945.
  2. Printed from an unsigned copy.