402. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Howe) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Sheppard)0
The agenda, as I understand it, for the meeting with Mr. Webb and Hilly tomorrow afternoon, is concerned with the plans for cooperation with NAP countries. If this includes intelligence, as I understand it does, as well as OPC work, I think that both you and Mr. Webb should be aware that it is a new departure for these meetings. They have in the past been confined to OPC work.
As I have also discussed with you, Park and I would welcome the broadening of the scope of these meetings, so that they include the overall guidance through discussions on OSO (intelligence) as well as OPC. We feel this for two basic reasons:
- 1.
- The organizational set up, both within CIA and within the Department, and the personality situation within CIA, has led us, over the past few months, to raising to Mr. Webb’s level and specifically at these meetings, the general solution to CIA-State problems and the discussion of plans. This would have equally beneficial results for intelligence as for OPC.
- 2.
- Probably more important is the fact that while the objectives of intelligence and operations may be different and even conflicting, the method and procedures are so much alike and so much in common that the guidance and direction given to one should be with the full knowledge of the other, at least at the top level. This is somewhat achieved in the single person of Hilly. It is not, however, achieved in the Department to date, except in the person of Mr. Webb. Thus, Messrs. Kennan and Joyce are not able to be kept as fully informed on intelligence matters pertaining to CIA as they must be to handle the operational liaison with CIA and conversely we in R have not been able to handle as efficiently as perhaps we might, the intelligence matters, for lack of information on OPC.
I can think of examples, both substantive and procedural, which bear this out. Our lack of knowledge of any efforts in Albania has, I think, limited our usefulness, whereas we have been useful and will undoubtedly be more so with respect to China as a result of these meetings. Procedurally we are not able to deal in the full interest of the Department with the OSO cover policies when we are wholly unfamiliar with the OPC cover policy.
[Page 1020]In sum then, I would want you to be aware that the meeting tomorrow apparently will deal with intelligence for the first time, rather than simply OPC operations, and that R welcomes this innovation.
If you agree with the above, I suggest that you and Mr. Webb give consideration to asking Admiral Hillenkoetter to bring Colonel Schow, Director of OSO, to the meeting tomorrow, as well as Mr. Wisner.
P.S. I think an excellent example of where intelligence and operations must be carried on with the full knowledge of each other, namely in our policies of cooperation and collaboration with the British. It is my understanding that the cooperative arrangements with the British have been worked out almost entirely under the auspices of the Department, whereas no attempt has been made to give the intelligence effort of CIA guidance on this matter. S/P and R are apparently unfamiliar with the policies of the Department with respect to these two phases of a very similar problem.