40. Memorandum From James S. Lay, Jr., of the Office of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (McCormack)0
Washington, November 2, 1945.
SUBJECT
- Comparison of Bureau of the Budget and Joint Chiefs of Staff Plans for Coordination of Intelligence Activities
- 1.
- General. Basically, the “Report on the
Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government” by the Bureau of
the Budget, dated September 20, 1945, differs in the following
particulars from the proposed Memorandum for the President in which the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the establishment of a National
Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Agency.
- a.
- Scope of Intelligence. The Budget Plan covers intelligence required both for protecting our national interests (i.e., national security) and for furthering those interests. This concept is much broader than that envisaged by the JCS, which is confined to the “intelligence mission related to the national security.” The Budget Plan’s distinction between “intelligence” and “security intelligence” also is lacking in the JCS Plan. These differences make the Budget Plan broader in scope, more positive in its concept of the intelligence mission, inclusive of wider interests and more agencies, and more precise in its consideration of types of intelligence.
- b.
- Approach to the Problem. The Budget Plan is concerned first and foremost with improving and coordinating the intelligence activities of the existing departmental agencies, leaving the need for centralized production of intelligence and centralized operations for decision if and when improved departmental facilities are still judged inadequate. Conversely, the JCS Plan assumes the need for and authorizes the immediate establishment of such centralized services, regardless of the eventual adequacy of improved departmental activities under effective State Department leadership. Therefore, the Budget Plan, while anticipating the possible need for additional facilities outside the existing departmental structure, provides a more orderly, effective and economical approach by concentrating urgently on overcoming inadequacies at the levels where decisions are being made and high-level policies formulated.
- 2.
- Basic Similarity of Objectives. Subject to the above fundamental differences, the two plans have a common objective and many similar [Page 96] provisions. Both lodge the authority for decisions with, rather than separate from the responsible officials of the departments primarily interested in and affected by such decisions. Both recognize the immediate need for coordinating departmental intelligence activities. Both provide that the interdepartmental authority may and should utilize the skilled personnel and specialized facilities of all agencies. Both are designed to ensure that national intelligence requirements are met, while at the same time departmental requirements are fully and promptly recognized and fulfilled.
- 3.
- Desirable Features. Means and methods of
achieving the common objective, however, differ considerably in the two
plans. The features considered desirable in both plans, additional to
those already identified, are discussed below:
- a.
- Recognition of Responsible Officials. The JCS Plan contains two desirable features. First, authority for decisions rests directly with the Secretaries of the interested departments, rather than with Assistant Secretaries. Thus, decisions carry the full weight of the top official in each department and should therefore receive more effective implementation. This, however, does not preclude each Secretary from delegating that authority as he deems fit. Second, the establishment of an Intelligence Advisory Board provides definite machinery through which the operating head of the coordinating body may confer with the heads of the departmental intelligence agencies, thus encouraging mutual understanding, confidence and cooperation.
- b.
- Representation of All Interests. The Budget Plan, through its broader concept, provides for the participation and contribution of all departments and agencies and thus represents a more comprehensive mobilization of intelligence resources.
- c.
- Elimination of Unnecessary Duplication. The Budget Plan recognizes that no single department can possibly or should attempt to secure or produce the intelligence it needs without utilizing other facilities. This plan therefore guards against unnecessary duplication that would inevitably occur under the JCS Plan which states that existing intelligence agencies, subject to coordination by the national authority, “shall continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize and disseminate … that intelligence required by the several departments and independent agencies for the performance of their proper functions.”
- d.
- Recognition of State Department Leadership in Foreign Affairs. The Budget Plan recognizes and provides for the “leading role of the State Department as a staff agency to the President” by placing representatives of that department in the leading position at all levels, especially on the Planning Staff and the Joint Secretariat. This is considered essential to ensure that intelligence operations are geared to and consistent with overall foreign policy. The JCS Plan, by separating the operating head [Page 97] from any department, does not provide for such direct sensitivity to foreign policy.
- e.
- Effective Administration. The Budget Plan, by providing that the State Department shall be primarily responsible for all administrative services, offers more simplified, consistent and effective administration. Procurement of appropriations will also be facilitated. Dispersal of the responsibility for such services, as provided in the JCS Plan, will inevitably result in bickering, compromise, confusion and lack of continuity. Moreover, such dispersal places the administrative operations of the coordinating body at the mercy of three separate masters.
James S. Lay, Jr.
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