Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

375. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)⁰

Washington, March 18, 1949.

SUBJECT

• NSC Consideration of the Dulles Report; selection of special issues for consideration

1. Pursuant to one of the two instructions which you gave Carl Humelsine and myself at the conclusion of our conversation of last Thursday, March 17, I have had a further discussion with Carl and I am submitting to you in this memorandum a number of issues which Carl and I have agreed would be appropriate for presentation and disposition at an early meeting of the National Security Council. I understand that you may want to call a special meeting for this purpose and that you might deem it advisable to discuss these issues with Mr. Souers in advance of the meeting.

2. In the selection of these issues an effort has been made to avoid recommendations in the Dulles report which are both controversial and difficult to comprehend. Emphasis has been placed upon broad issues which are important and at the same time capable of being understood and decided upon without the necessity of extensive briefing or examination into the intricate workings of the Central Intelligence Agency. For your own information, I have included brief parenthetical explanations following the statement of each issue. By all odds the most important of the issues selected is that concerning the character of the Director and if this one could be decided and acted upon with reasonable expedition, all other aspects of the matter will fall into their proper places. I have not placed it at the head of the list for tactical reasons which I believe will be apparent to you.

3. I understand that in bringing these issues to the National Security Council, you and Mr. Souers may use the approach that the Dulles report raises so many detailed points that a full discussion of it by the National Security Council would be a very lengthy and tedious proceeding; and that in order to get underway with this very important matter, you have attempted to single out certain aspects of the report which you consider to be susceptible of relatively easy resolution.

4. The following are the recommended issues:

(a) That the Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in the governmental structure under the National Security Council. (This may appear self-evident but as it is one of the leading recommendations of the Dulles report, it would appear worthy of confirmation and reaffirmation in connection with any general consideration of the report.)

(b) That the Intelligence Advisory Council is soundly conceived and that its present advisory relationship to the Director of Central Intelligence is correct, but that the IAC should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities. (It would lead to the complete frustration of the centralizing and coordinating functions of the Director of Central Intelligence if he were to be made subordinate to the IAC. This in turn would defeat the purposes of the legislation which created the CIA. The IAC is comprised of the service intelligence chiefs and human nature and bureaucracy being what they are—and this is most applicable in the field of intelligence—it would not be long before the CIA would be largely defunctionalized and rendered both impotent and insignificant.)

(c) That in order to improve coordination in the overall intelligence and security field, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of the IAC. (It is impossible to draw a clear and satisfactory dividing line between foreign and domestic intelligence activities for the reason that there is an inevitable interplay and interaction between developments within the United States and developments overseas. In order to insure an overall coordinated effort and to reduce the possibilities of confusion, duplication of function and friction, it would be highly desirable for the Director of the FBI to become a member of the IAC. As matters now stand the foreign and domestic intelligence activities are dealing with each other at arm’s length and there is no satisfactory forum for the resolution of arguments and conflicts.)

(d) That in order to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his statutory duty in protecting intelligence sources and methods, he should, in cases where the disclosure of secret information is sought from him (for example by a member of the Congress) and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, refer the question to the National Security Council for a determination as to whether or not disclosure is in the public interest. (It would be a most helpful protection to the Director for the NSC, with all its authority and prestige, to act as a buffer between him and persons making demands for the disclosure of secret information. It would also aid him to have the benefit of the collective judgment of the NSC in questions of this character. Finally, it would provide necessary insurance against a duplication of the Bogota fiasco which ended up in a name-calling performance as between the Director for Central Intelligence and the State Department—Mr. Humelsine can supply the particulars.)

(e) That the Central Intelligence Agency be empowered and encouraged to establish through its Director a closer liaison with the two members of the NSC upon whom it chiefly depends, namely the Secretaries of State and Defense. (This might not seem necessary but it is believed to be advisable in view of the tendency which the CIA has developed toward establishing itself as an independent free-wheeling organization. Note in this connection the recent cable from Minister Jacobs in Praha complaining of an almost total lack of cooperation or mutual confidence as between himself and the CIA representative there. This same story has been told repeatedly by the chiefs of our missions throughout the world. This is evidence of unsound indoctrination of the OSO representatives. Distinctions can be drawn between operational matters which should be kept secret and policy matters which are primarily the concern of the State Department chiefs of mission.)

(f) That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be a civilian and that the President should be invited to give his early consideration to a person of considerable stature and prominence, possessing the requisite qualifications of experience and willingness to serve. (As stated above this is the crucial issue, for upon the determination of this depends the question whether the United States is or is not to have a sound and useful intelligence agency. Virtually every individual who has had occasion to deal with or look into the activities of the CIA has recognized that the system of rotating the Director and top staff personnel at frequent intervals has disastrous consequences, and that the status and reputation of the CIA can best and most quickly be revived by the appointment to the top position of a civilian director of outstanding qualifications. The appointment of such an individual would bring to the entire organization the leadership and inspiration which it so badly needs, and only in this manner can the organization be elevated from its state of low repute among the government agencies with which it must work closely in order to be successful. Continuity of direction is essential for the CIA not only for the reasons which make it desirable in any governmental department but because secret intelligence and secret operations are the most highly specialized undertakings and it is very harmful to be constantly educating a series of rapidly moving heads and their immediate staffs—especially when many of them regard their CIA assignment simply as an unwelcome stopgap to fill in between more desirable Army, Navy and Air Force commands.

With a military director, progress in the direction of real coordination of the national intelligence effort will be painfully slow. It is submitted that any military man, with his ingrained sense of awe in the presence of superior rank and his absolute dependence upon the good will of the top military hierarchy for his own future advancement, must be expected to make all of the “necessary compromises”.

If this principle is bypassed or compromised, all the rest of the effort to straighten out and improve the CIA becomes relatively meaningless. It is believed that the President would not be unfavorably disposed toward the appointment of a permanent civilian director if a means for accomplishing the changeover can be devised which would not have the appearance of a “vote of no confidence” in the existing management. The issue of a civilian as against a military director provides this means.

FGW

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50, Box 4207. Top Secret.