372. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for
Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Secretary of State Acheson0
Washington, March 3, 1949.
SUBJECT
- Comments on the Dulles
Committee Report and Recommended Action for the NSC
Discussion.
- 1.
- There are attached:
- (a)
- A proposed action paper for the NSC on the Report (Tab A).
- (b)
- The comments of the Department on the several recommendations
of the Report (Tab B).1
- (c)
- A briefing of the Report and Summary (Tab C).
- (d)
- The Dulles Committee
Report (Tab D).2
- 2.
- The Department strongly endorses the Report and believes it desirable
to propose to the NSC a positive course
of action to carry out certain of the recommendations.
- 3.
- The Director of Central Intelligence expresses disagreement with
important parts of the Report on grounds of undesirability,
unworkability, etc.; he states that a number of the Report’s
recommendations have already been effected.
- 4.
- The Navy takes the position that the Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC) should be constituted as a
“board of directors” over the Director, thus assuming more the status of
a sub-committee of the NSC on
intelligence matters, in contrast to its present function of a
coordinating element in conjunction with, and advisory to, the Director.
Its position is based on the theory that the Dulles Report tends to give the IAC responsibility without comparable authority. The
Department believes that such a concept is in contravention of the
National Security Act, which places the Director immediately under the
NSC.
- 5.
- The NSC will almost certainly be
confronted with a diversity of views on the implementation of the Report
which it cannot itself take the time to reconcile. For the resolution of
such differences, the Staff of the NSC
would hardly be the most competent body in the face of the technical
[Page 948]
character of the subject. If
an ad hoc sub-committee of the NSC is
appointed to review the several comments and views of the agencies, it
should not include the Director as a number of the conclusions and
recommendations bear upon his position and person. The same
consideration applies to a referral to the IAC, of which the Director is chairman.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That the attached letter be sent to the NSC enclosing:
- (a)
- A paper for the consideration and action of the Council,
and
- (b)
- The comments of the Department in accordance with the request
of the Executive Secretary.
- 2.
- That in order to resolve the differences of views submitted to the
NSC, you suggest that the Council
constitute a representative each of the Secretaries of State and Defense
and possibly a representative of the JCS
as an ad hoc subcommittee to review the proposals of the Department in
the light of the comments from the several agencies and to recommend
further action to the Council.
Tab A3
FOR NSC CONSIDERATION
Problem:
To take the necessary action to implement the recommendations of the
Dulles Report.
Analysis:
- 1.
- The Dulles Committee has
performed an extremely useful service in producing, after diligent
study and analysis, a comprehensive report on the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the organization for national
intelligence.
- 2.
- Certain of the conclusions and recommendations can and should be
the subject of immediate implementation. Other recommendations will
require further study and their implementation will take some
time.
- 3.
- The all important conclusion reached by the Report is that if we
are to have an effective Central Intelligence Agency continuity of
tenure
[Page 949]
of the Director is
essential and that to achieve this the Director of Central
Intelligence should be a civilian. Although the ultimate objectives
of the Report cannot be reached until such time as a properly
qualified civilian assumes responsibilities as Director of Central
Intelligence, immediate steps should be taken to implement as far as
possible those recommendations of the Report as can be effected
promptly.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
- 1.
- That the Executive Secretary be directed to commend, in the name
of the Security Council, the members of the Dulles Committee and its staff for
the extremely able and objective study and report, on which the
Security Council is taking immediate action.
- 2.
- That the President give consideration to the early selection of a
highly qualified civilian as Director of Central
Intelligence.
- 3.
- That the Director of Central Intelligence be instructed to take
the necessary steps immediately to effect changes in accordance with
the following recommendations of the Dulles Committee Report, and to report on a monthly
basis to the Council, with the Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC) the progress made:
(Note: The recommendations of the
Dulles Committee
are summarized by chapters for identification only, and in
no sense as an interpretation.)
Chapter III—Organization and Administration
of CIA:
- (3)
- The Director should refer to NSC questions of
compliance with requests for disclosure of
information.
- (4)
- CIA should accent role as coordinator rather than
as organization for secret activities.
Chapter IV—Responsibility of CIA for
Coordination:
- (5)
- The IAC is soundly
conceived, but should participate more actively with
the Director in continuing coordination of
intelligence activities.
- (7)
- The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff should be reconstituted as a staff responsible
only to the Director with task of developing plans
for coordination.
- (8)
- Responsibilities of Office of Collection and
Dissemination (OCD)
re collection and dissemination should be carried
out under a new Coordination Division.
Chapter V—Responsibility of CIA for
National Intelligence Estimates:
- (3)
- There should be a small Estimates Division in CIA
to prepare coordinated national intelligence
estimates (draw upon specialized intelligence
product of the agencies).
- (4)
- Under the Director these estimates should be
discussed and approved by the IAC, whose members should
be collectively responsible.
- (5)
- Provision should be made to handle crisis
situations.
[Page 950]
Chapter VI—Services of Common Concern,
Intelligence Research and Reports:
- (1)
- A Research and Reports Division in ORE should accomplish
research in and coordinate production of
intelligence in fields of common interest. Staff
should include representatives from State and the
Services.
- (2)
- The Coordinating Division (reconstituted
Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff)
should be responsible for studying the scope of the
Research and Reports Division and for recommending
the services of common concern which should be
performed centrally.
- (4)
- Various reports, studies and summaries which are
not national intelligence or recognized services of
common concern should be discontinued.
Chapter VII—Services of Common Concern,
Overt Intelligence:
- (3)
- The Director and IAC should take steps for more active
coordination of efforts to exploit intelligence from
foreign nationality groups and individuals in
U.S.
- (4)
- The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part
of proposed Research and Reports Division.
- (5)
- If retained in the CIA, the Foreign Broadcast
Information Branch should be administered by the new
Operations Division, but its product should be
available for analysis in the new Research and
Reports Division.
Chapter VIII—Services of Common Concern,
Secret Intelligence:
- (1)
- Covert operations of the Office of Special
Operations (OSO),
the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and the activities
of the Contacts Branch of the Office of Operations
(OO) should be
integrated under the single direction of an
Operations Division.
- (3)
- CIA should seek methods for better coordination in
handling defectors [from] intelligence agencies
abroad and in the continental U.S.
- (5)
- Cover policies of OSO in field should be reviewed and
tightened. Consideration should be given to
increasing use of non-official cover as demands for
diplomatic or military cover are reduced.
- (6)
- Counter-espionage of OSO should be increased and closer
liaisons established with the FBI.
- (7)
- Relations between departmental agencies should be
brought closer and the guidance which OSO receives from the
intelligence consumers should be
strengthened.
- (8)
- The Director should assure that OSO is receiving adequate
information on current and strategic intelligence
needs of the Government. Closer relations might be
established with the Secretaries of State and
Defense.
Chapter IX—Services of Common Concern,
Secret Operations:
- (2)
- OPC should be
integrated with OSO
and Contacts Branch of the CIA, all under single
direction of an Operations Division.
- 4.
- That in accordance with Chapter IV,
Recommendation 6, the FBI
be added to the IAC, but that the
AEC and JIG be retained on the
IAC, which revisions appear
acceptable to the other IAC
members.
- 5.
- That the Director of Central Intelligence be directed to begin the
necessary steps and to plan for the implementation of the following
other recommendations of the Dulles Report which will require a longer time to
accomplish and to report monthly to the NSC, with the IAC, on
progress:
Chapter III—Organization and Administration
of CIA:
- (5)
- Large percentage of military personnel in CIA key
positions discourages competent civilian personnel
from looking to employment in CIA as a
career.
Chapter VIII—Services of Common Concern,
Secret Intelligence:
- (4)
- OSO (or new OP
Div) should give primary attention to building a
corps of trained personnel for operations
abroad.
- 6.
- That the Director of Central Intelligence be directed to review,
in conjunction with the IAC, such
recommendations and conclusions other than those listed above, with
a view to implementation where desirable, and to recommend further
action to the Security Council when appropriate.
Tab C4
Washington, February 9, 1949.
Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Research and
Intelligence (Armstrong) to
Secretary of State Acheson
SUBJECT
- Report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee to the National Security Council
entitled “The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization
for Intelligence”
Discussion:
- 1.
- The Report was made by a committee comprised of Allen Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, on the authority
of the National Security Council (NSC) dated February 13, 1949. It consists of 163 pages,
with a concise summary of 13 pages at the beginning. The State
Department figures in the Report throughout, essentially in its
relations
[Page 952]
on intelligence
matters with CIA, the military services, and the intelligence
functions of the Department itself. A very condensed summary5 of the Report
is attached hereto.
- 2.
- The NSC Secretariat has asked for
the comments of each agency, including the CIA.
- 3.
- The exhaustive character of the Report, including sections on
certain very sensitive activities, presents a security problem in
distribution even beyond its Top Secret classification,
necessitating a handling on the basis of “need to know,” rather than
simply “Top Secret clearance.”
- 4.
- Particular attention is drawn to the following sections which have
a direct bearing on the Department, aside from the specific
organization of intelligence:
- The Intelligence Problem (Chapter I)
- The Relation of Coordinated National Intelligence to
Policy Formulation and to the NSC (pp. 55, 68, 69, 72, 73, 79)
- Current Intelligence Summaries (p. 84)
- Domestic (FBI) vs. Foreign
Intelligence (pp. 56–58; 98, 99)
- Department and Secret Intelligence, particularly field
representation (pp. 117–119; 122–124; 127)
- Department and Secret Operations (p. 131)
- 5.
- It is of particular importance to realize the budgetary
significance of the CIA and therefore its position in the
governmental organization. At a rough estimate, the total budget for
all government foreign intelligence is approximately $82,500,000. Of
this, the State Department budget is approximately 2–1/2 million,
the CIA, including Secret Operations (OPC), 50 million, and the other services combined, 30
million. This budgetary predominance, when viewed in the light of
the central and coordinating position which the CIA holds in the
intelligence field, indicates the overwhelming significance of any
determination of CIA function and operation.
- 6.
- Since the Report is rather strongly condemnatory of the direction
of CIA and of the CIA’s present effectiveness, it raises an
embarrassing problem for the Director of CIA in making appropriate
comments upon it. It may be anticipated, however, that the reaction
to the Report by the Director of CIA will, on the whole, be
belittling of its significance. He has already indicated the view
that the Report is (a) academic, (b) non-professional, in the sense
that it was written by a staff not expert in intelligence matters,
and (c) inconsequential, because its recommendations are only
slightly at variance with present conditions and
organization.
- 7.
- The Department, on the other hand, would strongly concur in the
Report and most of the recommendations therein. The Department
believes the Report to be penetrating and objective, the result of
exhaustive
[Page 953]
study by the
Committee and its staff members, all of whom in one way or another
have excellent background both in intelligence matters and
governmental organization. The Department furthermore believes that
the recommendations represent a drastic change in the concept and
organization of Central Intelligence and are by no means
inconsequential. Finally, the Department believes that the Report
may well serve as a strong incentive toward effecting sorely-needed
changes in CIA and its relations with the other agencies, and
particularly the Department.
- 8.
- The attitude of other agencies—specifically the military
services—toward the report is as yet unknown, but it can be
anticipated that they will endorse the report in general, and
possibly most of its recommendations, although with less interest
and force than the Department.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That, on the basis of “need to know,” this report be circulated,
at the outset, only to the following (aside from the Secretary and
Under Secretary):
- S/S—Messrs. Humelsine, McWilliams,
Barnes
- S/P—Messrs. Kennan,
Davies, Joyce
- A—Messrs. Peurifoy
and Hulten
- EUR—Messrs.
Hickerson and
Thompson
- FE—Messrs.
Butterworth and
Allison
- NEA—Messrs. Satterthwaite and
Hare
- ARA—Messrs. Daniels and
Woodward
- 2.
- That R prepare, in collaboration
with S/P and with the concurrence of the appropriate offices of the
Department, a paper for the Secretary to submit to the NSC, which will include
- (a)
- The Department’s comments in accordance with the request
of the NSC Secretary
- (b)
- An action paper for the consideration of NSC, recommending directives
for immediate implementation of certain recommendations in
the Report, and eventual implementation of others.
