Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

368. Memorandum From Daniel DeBardeleben to the Acting Deputy Assistant Director for Special Operations, Central Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, February 17, 1949.

SUBJECT

• The Dulles Report

Below are listed my comments on certain passages in the body of Chapter VIII, “The Collection of Secret Intelligence,” and my remarks concerning the conclusions and recommendations which appear at the end of the chapter.

1. It is recommended that representatives of State, War and Navy be assigned to ICS in order more effectively to direct our activities in the collection of intelligence and more helpfully to evaluate the information which we collect. Both in direction and evaluation we can reasonably expect to receive greater assistance from the user agencies. Several schemes have been tried in the past to stimulate more detailed direction and more conscientious evaluation. Regrettably there still remains much to be desired and this proposal may be the answer to the problem. British MI-6 has for a long time followed such a general principle with, I understand, gratifying results. Certainly this possibility should be explored to the fullest.

2. It is recommended that administrative services be an integral part of the OSO organization for several obvious reasons. I agree.

3. It is true that no plan for rotation of personnel on a world-wide basis has yet been worked out. It is doubtful whether this organization should ever attempt wholesale rotation of operating personnel between continental areas except in those unusual cases where individuals have equal qualifications for work in more than one area. Our present rotation plan of encouraging our people to remain at their present posts as long as possible, consistent with cover, is entirely sound during this formative stage of our existence. Consistent with cover, the longer an individual can remain in his area of assignment, the more valuable he becomes to us. This fact will be more greatly emphasized as we succeed in placing our representatives under unofficial cover where they can remain as a part of the community for indefinite lengths of time without arousing curiosity and suspicion. Rotation in OSO must be very carefully considered to the end that we will not deprive ourselves of the knowledge and experience of our representatives concerning various areas simply to adopt an appealing policy of world-wide rotation. The latter would require starting from scratch in new jobs which would greatly retard the accomplishments of this organization.

4. It is recommended that OSO, OPC and Contacts Branch, all covert activities, be combined in one covert office and placed under a responsible head. There seems to be much to recommend such an organization provided the peculiar demands of these three offices be provided for and no attempt be made to perform centrally certain functions for the three offices which are in no sense common to them.

5. It is recommended that closer coordination be effected in occupied areas between OSO and to clandestine operations of the occupying authority. Such coordination is highly desirable and I believe is gradually improving. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

6. It is recommended that procedures for handling defectors be worked out with the concurrence of the interested agencies. Such a procedure is very important and is now in the process of being determined through the work of two committees—one dealing with the problem of defectors abroad, the other considering the handling of defectors in the United States. The work of these two committees will eventually be drawn together and overall policy and procedures will result.

7. It is pointed out that contact between agents and our official representatives abroad should be avoided. Such avoidance is OSO policy and steps are continuously being taken to observe and follow strictly such policy; however, there will always be certain cases where this policy must be violated and a calculated risk taken. There is no way in which the conduct of espionage can be made entirely safe. It should be our endeavor to avoid unnecessary risks.

8. It is pointed out that cover for OSO, CIA here in Washington is unsatisfactory. The conditions as to housing and the admission by employees of OSO that they are CIA are undesirable, but there appears to be no immediate solution. When the activities of OSO were placed in a separate office in CIA it was assumed that CIA would provide cover for OSO. This assumption seemed reasonable at the time because it was expected that CIA would be recognized by the public and the other departments of the Government as primarily a research organization performing centrally an overt function for the Government; however, because of unfortunate publicity, CIA is rather recognized as a clandestine organization with the result that OSO is regrettably providing cover for the overt activities of CIA. It does seem desirable to have OSO quartered in a large building where other activities are conducted and where OSO personnel are not singled out. Further, it would be advantageous to adopt some cover name for OSO and its allied activities which would not bring to mind espionage and clandestine activity.

9. It is recommended that the CE activities of OSO be expanded and that closer cooperation with FBI be realized. This is an entirely sound recommendation and every possible effort will be made to accomplish such ends.

Conclusions and Recommendations¹

(1) Referred to above.

(2) Referred to above.

(3) Referred to above.

(4) In process.

(5) Every effort is presently being made to increase the use of unofficial cover for our representatives abroad. [13 lines of source text not declassified]

(6) Referred to above.

(7) Referred to above.

(8) No comment.

(9) Agree. It seems reasonable that OSO should enjoy the privilege of disseminating its product in a fashion comparable to the procedures followed by other collectors.

(10) Accomplished.

(11) Agree—highly important.

DDeB

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Top Secret. The addressee has not been further identified.
1. This refers to the Conclusions and Recommendations of Chapter VIII of the Dulles Report. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 1555) See the Supplement.