356. Verbatim Minutes of Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee0
PARTICIPANTS
- Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the chair
- Members Present
- Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
- Major General Stafford L. Irwin, Director, General Staff, United States Army
- Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
- Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Air Force
- Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
- Colonel Wendell G. Johnson, acting for Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCS
- Also Present
- Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
- Colonel Merritt B. Booth, USA(R), Department of State
- Lieut. Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Department of the Army
- Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
- Major W.C. Baird, Department of Air
- Mr. William C. Trueheart, Atomic Energy Commission
- Mr. Shane MacCarthy, Central Intelligence Agency
- Colonel Charles C. Blakeney, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. Fisher Howe, Department of State
- Lieut. Col. James H. Skinner, Department of the Army
- Lieut. Col. C.J. Stattler, Department of Air
Director: We do not have any formal things to take up. ICAPS is moving Monday up to the Administration Building and I am moving the following Monday. The telephone numbers will be the same. What is the status of the Scientific Attaché paper?1
Mr. Childs: It is going to the Security Council saying it has been reconsidered by the IAC and their staffs and the Research and Development Board and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The other one has been withdrawn and the new proposal is enclosed.
Adm. Inglis: Does the R&D Board and Secretary Forrestal’s Offices accept the changes?
Mr. Childs: As far as we know. They do not rate a formal voting slip from this group.
Col. Johnson: I saw Mr. Beckler yesterday and I asked him about it and he said they were going to. There were minor changes.
Director: Dr. Hafstad told me the same thing for the Research and Development Board. That should take care of Mr. Forrestal’s objections. Do we have anything else to bring up? Do you have anything, Park?
Mr. Armstrong: I haven’t anything very pressing. You might allude to the incorrect impression, I might call it, that the Department of Justice may have created about the Department of State’s position on the question of defectors in this country, when they sent around a memo2 to the Service Agencies saying the Department of State had seen and concurred in the proposal they presented. We have circulated to each of the agencies a copy of our correspondence to Justice on the subject and I hope that serves to correct the misunderstanding because we had never concurred in the proposal. That leaves me to wonder whether this Committee might discuss the question of refugees and defectors of all kinds as intelligence targets. I know this is a matter that the Army is concerned with and General Bolling has given his attention to it. I know it is in the hands of a working group under Kirkpatrick of your Office with representatives from each of the offices, including Justice Department. We have been speculating, or wondering, in our shop, as to whether that isn’t a problem that has the natural factors that would perhaps make it worthwhile [Page 894] to consider reviving the SANACC 395 Committee,3 since it has already dealt with some phases of that particular series of questions. We don’t have any question at all as to the working committee that is at present engaged on it, but wonder whether they are bringing into play all of the experience and considerations that developed during the SANACC 395 sessions; whether the membership of the present committee, at the working level, should not include for its purposes some of the members of the SANACC Committee which I don’t believe at present is the case. I have raised this question to see if anyone here wants to discuss it. If the feeling is that it should go on under the present group, that is entirely agreeable to us, but we feel that the problem is an urgent one requiring an early solution and that it is a very broad one and would like to see the greatest possible talent put to work on it.
Gen. Irwin: Is that the Committee General Bolling is on?
Mr. Armstrong: I think it is Mr. Todd of your organization.
Col. Treacy: That is right, and Lieut. Col. Edwin L. Clark is on the other.
Gen. Irwin: Is that about the questioning? That is an important one.
Mr. Armstrong: It is very important. It is not only a domestic problem of getting proper intelligence handling for foreign intelligence out of the defectors in this country, but it has been broadened to include the related problem of defectors abroad and refugees.
Director: I saw Kirkpatrick and the two FBI people and they claim they are practically finished with a solution everybody is agreed to, including the FBI. I think you had better wait to see that and if we don’t like that, refer it to the SANACC 395 Committee.
Mr. Armstrong: It is perfectly agreeable with me and it is not a reflection of the working committee, but to raise the question whether all past experience has been brought to bear on it.
Director: This tentative thing looks like it ought to be all right.
Mr. Armstrong: On the domestic only or also considering the foreign?
Director: The foreign too.
Adm. Inglis: Who is my man on that?
Director: You have one, but I don’t know who.
Adm. Inglis: Was the 395 series that on broad civil defense?
Mr. Armstrong: The refugees, displaced persons, and bringing in the Voice of America.
[Page 895]Director: This committee is so close to an answer we will see what they have before we drag in someone entirely new on it.
Mr. Armstrong: It is entirely agreeable to me.
Director: They ought to get the answer within a week or two unless Christmas interferes and we will get it after Christmas. Tommy, do you have anything?
Adm. Inglis: I don’t know whether anyone wants to discuss the intelligence about China or not, but it is of interest to us. We have seen General Barr’s (Chief JUSMAG) estimate of the situation in China and we are inclined to agree with that, but I would be reassured if I felt that the other members of the Committee had the same appraisal of his estimate. Have you seen that?
Mr. Armstrong: I don’t recognize it by that name.
Adm. Inglis: The gist of it is they think that the situation north of the Yangtze is hopeless and is just a matter of days or weeks before the whole thing folds up. What happens after that, of course, is a matter of terrible concern and conjecture. Do you feel that this Li that is Vice President is going to be successful in forming some kind of a coalition cabinet and if so just how much Communist influence will be exerted in that? My people say they have checked on the working level with Army, State and the rest and they say that they believe he will be successful and in the beginning the Communists will be in the minor position, but as time goes on will it grow as it did in Czechoslovakia.
Gen. Irwin: I am not particularly briefed on the problem, but from what you said I don’t think you would find a disagreement.
Gen. Cabell: I don’t think you will find a disagreement among us, except I personally am confident that Li will do that.
Adm. Inglis: We question that very closely. Do you think the Communists would be satisfied with what followed down from the Chiang regime? It might be the Communists would feel it to their advantage to set up a coalition Government because it would give them a certain prestige in international trade with the USA.
Director: I think our people got the same answer. They said the Communists would come into the government because they would be a recognized government in the United Nations and, as a purely personal thing, that the United States and the West could supply them with articles of trade that they couldn’t possibly get from Russia. They would want that for a while.
Adm. Inglis: The United States would be hard pressed for an excuse not to recognize it.
Gen. Irwin: You think the reason is they would not dominate with ease?
[Page 896]Director: I think they could. The opinion our people got from Barr’s report is that they are not going to force the issue now. Maybe in six months.
Mr. Armstrong: We can gain much more by moving slowly.
Adm. Inglis: Do you have any ideas on that?
Gen. Irwin: No. I think we could accept the Communists taking all to the North of the Yangtze, but I doubt whether they go South for some time.
Adm. Inglis: For some time?
Mr. Armstrong: Although they have the capability?
Gen. Irwin: Yes.
Adm. Inglis: One thing that puzzles us is the superiority and the strategic direction of the Chinese Communists and their ability to support themselves logistically and in communications. It just doesn’t seem Chinese.
Gen. Irwin: I don’t think it is.
Adm. Inglis: We wonder where the beans and bullets are coming from.
Director: I think a lot of that strategic direction is—the fact that they look so good—because they do not have any good fast opposition against them. But it does not explain the beans and bullets; probably the captured U.S. things that were turned over to the Nationalists. Perhaps you can justify the strategic direction by some Russian influence, but even so they would have to work through a lot of Chinese then. The thing certainly has me stopped.
Gen. Irwin: They must have good communications. There was a report that I saw today that said they were running rather low on supplies and that their morale was low.
Adm. Inglis: My people didn’t believe that particular report because it was in conflict with other reports.
Gen. Irwin: The Nationalists don’t have the will to fight.
Adm. Inglis: And another thing, turning our attention to the condition in Formosa. Does anyone know a strong man in Formosa who we would do well to back instead of carpet baggers from China or Chiang Kai-shek.
Gen. Irwin: Didn’t we have a report that the Formosans were very bitter against any movement of the Chinese? Someone must have fronted for them.
Adm. Inglis: Park, do you know of any Formosan who is capable of leadership?
Mr. Armstrong: No, the Formosans are quite leaderless.
Director: There was a name on this Formosan People’s Political Committee. That report said they didn’t want the Chinese there and intimated [Page 897] they might like the United States to come in and take over those people. They seem to have the thing in hand. But I don’t remember the name.
Adm. Inglis: You think you have some information?
Director: Yes. One thing I do remember is that this outfit, the Communists, did start some kind of violence and they put it down with a very heavy hand. It did not go to the grand jury, they just cut off their heads. It is the same outfit that wanted a free and independent Formosa under the United States. I know we have something on that.
Gen. Cabell: That would indicate some kind of strong leadership—that quick and positive degree of action.
Mr. Armstrong: Wasn’t that the Chinese Government?
Adm. Inglis: They assassinated the first person that came over.
Mr. Armstrong: The second one was run out.
Adm. Inglis: He wasn’t quite as brutal as the first one. He came over with a group of soldiers.
Gen. Irwin: There was some discussion about shipments to China, of diverting one to Formosa. That would head it up and put the stuff in the hands of the Chinese. Maybe we decided to do it for the benefit of the Chinese.
Adm. Inglis: That has been suspended for the time being.
Gen. Irwin: It was discussed.
Mr. Armstrong: Has the Chinese Navy moved over there yet?
Adm. Inglis: Some have moved over from Tsingtao and the naval training school is to go to Amoy. We had a report that the move was now in progress, but there was no indication of how long it would take.
Gen. Irwin: I wonder whether Chiang has surrendered yet?
Director: He hadn’t yesterday afternoon and when we got our message from there this morning.
Adm. Inglis: I had one other thing that has no connection with China. I guess the newspapers last night and this morning have been full of the Eberstadt subcommittee’s report. And another thing he mentioned was the lack of medical intelligence. We had a paper which was prepared currently by an ad hoc committee of the three Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that they had some idea of setting up a medical intelligence agency in the Armed Services separate from the present departmental agencies. We didn’t think much of that idea. I think it was stopped, but I was wondering if CIA was going to interest itself in medical intelligence.
Director: It has been under way since about the 10th. The new head of our Scientific Branch, Dr. Machle, has talked about that to some of the people in the Medical Corps in the Army and Navy. I don’t know [Page 898] whether it was Swanson or not. We got him through Dr. Compton and he talked to him about it—medical intelligence, BW intelligence and I think he will get around to that as soon as he gets settled down. Public Health is in on this too.
Adm. Inglis: I hope you will include the agencies which are represented by the members of the body here in the spade work. We didn’t know anything about this until we got this big thing. It was about cooked and ready to go.
Director: He would do that because he knows Henderson and some of those people that were working on it.
Gen. Cabell: I understand these medical people prepared it. My people are not very much in favor of it. The idea was suggested by somebody and it just grew to some length. We could see no sense to it.
Adm. Inglis: A great deal of unnecessary work could have been saved if they had just had a ten minute talk between the three of us respectively and those who produced this tremendous tome.
Gen. Irwin: You are currently getting medical intelligence from your medical people?
Adm. Inglis: Yes. Apparently they are unhappy about the quantity and the quality. I don’t know that they are unhappy, but I inferred they were unhappy or they wouldn’t have taken 400 pages to recommend something else.
Mr. Armstrong: The Foreign Service is a regular contributor to medical intelligence and is supposed to make an annual report on health and sanitation on its territories. Every foreign post has to send in quarterly reports on health, sanitation, diseases, and living conditions.
Gen. Irwin: We have medical and technical attaches. Speaking about the Eberstadt Committee statement, I don’t know what backs that statement. I have heard no growls about our medical intelligence.
Adm. Inglis: I hadn’t either until this paper confronted me. I have had some growls from the medicos on the Doctor over in Moscow. That is purely a personal affair.
Gen. Cabell: My medicos didn’t feel sufficiently strong on it when we non-concurred in it to come around and talk about it.
Adm. Inglis: That is all I had.
Director: Doctor Colby?
Dr. Colby: No.
Director: General Cabell?
Gen. Cabell: No.
Director: Colonel Johnson?
Col. Johnson: No.
Director: General Irwin?
[Page 899]Gen. Irwin: We are getting out a good deal of political stuff in our Weekly magazine. Things we think CIA or State Department ought to put out. A weekly for general theaters and things like that. Do you put any out?
Director: No.
Mr. Armstrong: We don’t either.
Gen. Irwin: It seems to me we are a little out of our field. If we could get the material—I don’t know how you would feel if that field were taken over by either State or CIA and we could confine ourselves to military intelligence. I know we are getting out a very expensive weekly digest which is not cultural reading and not enough intelligence in my opinion.
Mr. Armstrong: Is it classified?
Gen. Irwin: Yes, secret.
Director: Ours is secret.
Gen. Cabell: I wonder if we don’t have to put out such a publication. We put out one monthly which started within the last four months. We don’t produce the basic material, we go to the CIA publications and take some from yours (to DCI) and some from yours (to D/I, Army) but we try to tailor it to fit the recipient.
Gen. Irwin: I thought the Admiral would pay for it and we would buy him off.
Director: How many copies have you got?
Gen. Irwin: I will have to look that up.
Adm. Inglis: It seems to me that is a job for ICAPS. I have often wondered why ICAPS didn’t interest itself in more things of that kind.
Mr. Armstrong: I think it is a very important question.
Director: You let me know how many copies and we will see.
Col. Blakeney: Between 600 and 700 a week are put out.
Gen. Irwin: At about $1.50 a piece.
Director: It is on slick paper.
Gen. Cabell: Might we not do this—standardize a monthly publication and look to CIA to prepare section (a) of our respective publications so that in other words it would be a custom-built job for them for this purpose then we put in our section (b), or whatever section we had, for that publication?
Adm. Inglis: There are two things you have to worry about. One is the departmental intelligence, the other is the classification. We have a sufficient variety of publications to meet both of those requirements. It is rather complicated.
Gen. Cabell: We couldn’t turn over the job for preparing it. We still have a message to get across to our recipients.
[Page 900]Gen. Irwin: So have we.
Gen. Cabell: We could do it on a monthly basis and it would save us work and we could lean upon you (CIA) to prepare a certain section.
Adm. Inglis: Or perhaps have CIA put out a basic publication and each department come out with its own publication or call particular attention to that which is of general interest to all the departments.
Mr. Armstrong: Would that mean CIA would be putting out the political and economic, and sociological? That is in the bailiwick of the Department of State.
Adm. Inglis: I again say this is a job for ICAPS, we can’t settle the details.
Gen. Irwin: Then State would be the best person to put that out.
Adm. Inglis: If State wants to give us the dope through CIA at $1.50 a piece for 700 copies.
Mr. Armstrong: I am interested in getting at a method to solve this. It would cure one problem we have of overlap between CIA and ourselves, and we haven’t readily grappled with the problem yet. I would like to suggest that the Director assign that to ICAPS or any appropriate committee for study.
Director: It is assigned to ICAPS.
Gen. Irwin: It has a particular interest to our attaches and would be of interest if they got the State Department’s material as the basis.
Adm. Inglis: I don’t think our people, that is, the commanding officers of ships, and our naval attaches, the customers, are getting the information they would like to have and should have under the subjects that are State Department stuff.
Mr. Armstrong: We are not getting out a journal of any kind that can be distributed beyond the departmental borders.
Adm. Inglis: I think there is a little gap there which we try to fill in a very amateurish way, but it also seems to me that the material that CIA puts out should supply several different needs. The Top Secret business as it is now, it is all right, but the distribution is so limited that its usefulness is impaired. The Top Secret goes to 20 people, maybe 30. Another set of customers may include 200 people and maybe another set of customers 2,000 people. Adopt the classification for the size of the body. There seems to be a lack in the publications which is useful to a wider distribution.
Gen. Irwin: I would like something with this political section and then the military section.
Director: ICAPS, you have a job. You get that out every week?
Gen. Irwin: It is a weekly. It is a pretty expensive operation and for that they should get more. It ought to be the best we can furnish.
[Page 901]Mr. Childs: The Navy has a weekly too?
Adm. Inglis: We have a daily, weekly, and monthly. They are several different classifications.
Mr. Childs: I mean a similar publication to that.
Adm. Inglis: No, the only slick paper publication we get out is monthly and classified confidential.
Director: Well, we can go into that and see what we can do.
Adm. Inglis: We also get out a quarterly classified restricted for reserve officers on inactive duty. That is a quarterly.
Director: You get one out monthly?
Gen. Cabell: Yes.
Col. Treacy: Ours is the only one for distribution outside of the Division.
Gen. Cabell: It is pretty ambitious to have that weekly, isn’t it?
Gen. Irwin: By the time it is distributed and all it is a little on the cold side. Therefore, I would like to put more basic material in and the military items in it that are of interest to field people.
Mr. Childs: You would rather stick to the weekly?
Gen. Irwin: I would rather go into it more.
Director: A weekly comes around very quickly.
Adm. Inglis: We get out one, a dispatch, and I think you do too; and we get out a weekly mimeograph sheet of about eight pages.
Director: When you try to fill it up for the weekly you have to start padding.
Gen. Irwin: It could be cut back to monthly and have it mimeographed. It would be cheaper with the cooperation of State and so it could be more or less uniform on the State Department material.
Adm. Inglis: That sounds as though it is just what we are looking for.
Director: I think it should work out because in some of these you can see the boys have to fill out on some of it. You can’t help it when you do a weekly.
Gen. Irwin: I was a customer of this before I came here.
Director: We will go into that and see if we can’t do something about it.
Mr. Childs: There are several State publications.
Mr. Armstrong: We put out a weekly summary that is SECRET level, but is distributed only in the Department and to Ambassadors. Now, it is entirely possible that a lot of that material can be written more as an operational summary. It is entirely possible that a lot of that material can be readily adopted to be used by the Services. I am very anxious and glad to look into this.
[Page 902]Director: I think it would be a good idea to do it. Any other subjects?
Mr. Childs: The attaches see that which goes out to the field.
Mr. Armstrong: They probably do.
Mr. Childs: That which goes to the embassies.
Col. Johnson: They do some places.
Director: They do most places.
Mr. Armstrong: It depends on the Ambassador.
Gen. Irwin: They really should see them, shouldn’t they? It would be a means of getting the information into their hands.
Director: Anybody have anything else? I wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and we will see you after the first of the year.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-657. Secret. The meeting was held in the Federal Works Building.↩
- See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 355.↩
- Not found.↩
- SANACC 395 was a designation for papers on Soviet refugees prepared by a working group of the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee.↩