Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

346. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Intelligence Survey Group (Blum) to Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson⁰

Washington, June 4, 1948.

SUBJECT

• Survey Group: Progress Report and Recommendations for Future Activities

1. We are in sight of the end of the first stage of the Survey Group’s work. This stage will be over with the completion of our first overall report on CIA. Our attention in the second stage will be concentrated on the other intelligence agencies, although we will certainly continue to follow CIA until the entire Survey has been completed, when it will probably be necessary to re-examine CIA and the whole intelligence picture as a result of all of our findings.

2. We have now about completed fairly detailed examination of the following parts of CIA: ICAPS, Executive for Administration and Management, Executive for Inspection and Security, Legal Counsel, Office of Reports and Estimates, Office of Collection and Dissemination, Office of Operations. Individual summary reports on these activities are being prepared. For security reasons survey of the Office of Special Operations and the Advisory Council has not been completed. We are also completing those contacts in the other intelligence services which seem necessary in order to clarify the relations between those services and CIA. More detailed examination of this question must await the survey of the other intelligence services.

3. In my opinion, our objective should now be to assemble and analyze the information and views we now have so that we can work toward establishing in the Survey Group a common understanding of the present organization and activities of CIA, the problems concerning them and the intelligence standards against which they should be measured. We can then decide on the type of report we will want to submit to the National Security Council. In deciding this, we must know more clearly the premises that underlie our work. For example, it now appears that even though it is generally recognized that Admiral Hillenkoetter is not entirely satisfactory as Director of Central Intelligence there is no readiness to replace him at present. On the other hand, there is a willingness approaching enthusiasm to dispense with the services of Wright (and presumably certain others with him) and Galloway. If this is the case, then we may want to work directly with Hillenkoetter in bringing about necessary reforms within CIA and in the relations between CIA and other agencies.

4. Whatever decision we take regarding the type of report we submit to the National Security Council, the first step, in my opinion, is to develop a common ground through the preparation of an overall draft report marking the end of this first phase of our work. This draft could be completed by about 15 July 1948, that is, after the members of the Survey Group have had time in Washington to study the material in our files, develop their contacts and direct the staff to complete further inquiries.

5. Such a draft report should include the following:

(a) A discussion of the elements of a sound central intelligence organization, including answers to the following questions: who should control the central agency; should coordination functions and collection functions be in the same agency; how should coordinated intelligence estimates be produced; what should be the relation between secret intelligence and secret operations; should the set-up be different in time of war than in time of peace; to what extent and in what manner should there be centralization of services common to several agencies; how should intelligence collection policies be coordinated; what coordinating authority should the central agency have over the departmental services and how should this authority be exercised?

(b) A descriptive analysis of the present responsibilities, organization and activities of CIA and the relations between CIA and other departments and agencies.

(c) An analysis of the opinions generally held regarding CIA, its personnel and its performance of its task as now conceived.

(d) Our conclusions and appraisal regarding CIA’s proper mission and its present organization and operations.

(e) Recommendations, which should be subject to review in light of our findings in the departmental intelligence agencies.

R.B.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80–M01009A, Box 1, Folder 12. Secret.