287. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)0

Dear Jimmy: The attached represents our general thinking about the new draft.1 I should like to suggest that, since State evidently will not go along with CIA operating this political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner, we go back to the original concept that State proposed. Let State run it and let it have no connection at all with us. It seems to me [Page 704] that this is the only thing that will satisfy State in any way and rather than try to keep a makeshift in running order, subject to countless restrictions which can only lead to continued bickering and argument, I think maybe the best idea is to go back and make the OSP work for State alone.

I am sending this letter for your own information and, of course, for Admiral Souers and have made it separate in order that it need not be forwarded with our comments on the last draft.

Sincerely,

R. H. Hillenkoetter 2

Rear Admiral, USN

Attachment3

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)

SUBJECT

  • Proposed NSC Directive
1.
The draft directive of 8 June 1948 is considered much weaker and less satisfactory than that of last Friday, 4 June.4 Further, the latest draft is much more inconsistent and much less organizationally sound than the 4 June paper.
2.
For example, in para. 2 of the draft of 8 June, reasons are stated why the new office should be placed under the Central Intelligence Agency—then along in para. 3c are stated a number of restrictions on what can and cannot be done, all of such restrictions leading to confusion and chaos. Suppose the Director of Central Intelligence is out of town, then does the work of the Special Projects stop, does it “free wheel”, or does it work with the Acting Director of Central Intelligence? All of this [Page 705] remains in doubt by the statement “the head of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence.”In the present set-up of the Central Intelligence Agency, the head of any branch can see the Director of Central Intelligence any time desired—the door is always open. It would seem that a new branch should come in, in a similar manner. The need for special measures, security or otherwise, exists as much for our present Office of Special Operations as it would for the new Office of Special Projects, and the present set-up does not seem to hamper the Office of Special Operations, nor can I see why a similar set-up should hamper the Office of Special Projects.
3.
Also, what is meant by “to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency”? Does this mean that the Office of Special Projects will have its own administrative staff, its own budget staff, its own communications net, its own services, etc. and etc? And, who is to decide what is the “maximum degree consistent with efficiency”—the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chief of Office of Special Projects, the National Security Council, or who? This paragraph cannot be accepted as is. I should much prefer the working of the corresponding paragraph (3b) in the draft of 4 June.
4.
It would seem that either the National Security Council has confidence in the operation of the Office of Special Projects by the Central Intelligence Agency or it has not. If such confidence exists, then the Central Intelligence Agency should be directed to operate the new office subject to a general declaration of policy by the National Security Council. If such confidence does not exist, then the Central Intelligence Agency should not be expected or directed to operate the Office of Special Operations in any manner.
R. H. Hillenkoetter 5

Rear Admiral, USN
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 25. Top Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on March 26, 1953. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 203–205.
  2. Reference is to a draft NSC directive of June 8 not found but referred to in the enclosure.
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
  4. Top Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on March 26, 1953.
  5. See Document 285.
  6. Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.