281. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council0
Washington, June 2, 1948.
SUBJECT
- Establishment of a Special Services Unit in CIA
REFERENCE
The enclosed proposal on the above subject, which is suggested as a possible
alternative to the Conclusions in NSC 10,
represents the results of an informal discussion between the Secretary of
Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and Mr.Allen W. Dulles.1
At their request the enclosure is submitted herewith for consideration by the
National Security Council in connection with NSC 10, which is scheduled as Item 1 on the Agenda for the
NSC 12th Meeting on Thursday, June
3.2
Enclosure3
Proposal Submitted to the National Security
Council
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL SERVICES UNIT IN THECENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Further consideration of the problem of developing our activities in the
field of covert political warfare leads to the following points which,
it
[Page 693]
is suggested, should serve
as a basis for the further consideration of this problem by the National
Security Council.
CIA provides the legal structure within which covert political activities
can be conducted and it is already charged under NSC 4–A with the conduct of covert psychological operations
abroad. In addition, CIA is already charged by National Security Council
Directive No. 5 with conducting espionage and counter-espionage
operations abroad, which operations are by their nature very closely
related to covert political activities as contemplated in NSC 10. It, therefore, seems desirable for
legal, as well as operational reasons, not to create a new agency for
covert political activities, but to place the responsibility for this
work within the legal structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and
closely relate it to secret intelligence.
The principal objection to this proposal arises out of doubt as to
whether CIA is presently so constituted that it can effectively handle
this problem which is so different from CIA’s primary task of
coordinating intelligence activities and correlating and evaluating
intelligence relating to the national security. There is also fear lest
covert operations develop in a manner inconsistent with our foreign and
military policies.
These considerations lead to the following general conclusions and recommendations:
- (1)
- Responsibility for both secret intelligence and secret
operations, including covert psychological activities, should be
placed in a new Special Services unit to be created in
CIA.
- (2)
- This unit should have a considerable measure of autonomy
within CIA and its directors should be authorized to appeal
directly to the National Security Council in case of differences
arising between him and the Director of Central
Intelligence.
- (3)
- A highly qualified person recruited from outside the present
ranks of CIA and approved by the National Security Council
should be appointed to head the new unit in CIA.
- (4)
- Provision should be made so that the chief of the newly
created unit has access to and receives policy guidance from the
Department of State and the Military Establishment.
- (5)
- It is understood that this is a provisional arrangement
subject to review at a later date.
The following actions should be taken if the National Security Council
approves in principle the foregoing points:
- (a)
- The Department of State, the National Military Establishment,
and CIA should jointly request funds for the proposed
operation.
- (b)
- The Executive Secretary, National Security Council, should be
directed to prepare a detailed directive covering the above
points for approval by the Council.
