Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

176. Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board⁰

Washington, November 7, 1946, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
• Members Present
• Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
• Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
• Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
• Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
• Also Present
• Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
• Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
• Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
• Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
• Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
• Secretariat
• Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

1. National Intelligence Requirements—China (C.I.G. 19)¹

General Chamberlin said that he had difficulty understanding the purpose of this paper. If it was intended to cover over-all long-range intelligence requirements, he felt that it was incomplete. If, however, it covered only some intermediate objective, he did not have much to say except to suggest a few minor changes.

Mr. Edgar explained that this paper did not cover departmental requirements, which it was assumed would be drawn up by the various agencies. He pointed out, however, that uncoordinated and uncorrelated sets of instructions were going out to the field which did not completely fill national requirements. Therefore, the only requirements put in this paper were those which are most important from a national viewpoint. This paper covered only China as a trial area. It did not attempt, however, to define the ultimate requirements for national policy intelligence.

General Chamberlin noted that only three subjects were covered, whereas there are many others of interest to the War Department.

General Vandenberg said that the War Department was expected to send those out, except in those cases where C.I.G. might specifically ask for additional information.

Mr. Edgar explained that at the first interdepartmental meeting on coordination of the intelligence effort, it was agreed that the first step should be to develop a coordinated collection of intelligence requirements area by area throughout the world. Each agency representative was asked to turn in the requirements it considered most important. These were then synthesized by the Office of Reports and Estimates in C.I.G. Some of the information required was of interest to more than one department, and when the departments agreed, these requirements were put in the paper. If this paper is approved, the collection representatives from all agencies will look over Part II in order to decide which field representatives are best located to obtain the desired information and to attempt to allocate these requirements to the various field agencies.

General Chamberlin did not see how coordination could be accomplished in this way unless the whole problem was solved.

Mr. Eddy pointed out that this was merely a test case, and that this paper might look radically different a year from now.

Mr. Edgar noted that these requirements would be reviewed quarterly.

General Chamberlin asked why other items of importance, such as topographic data, were not included.

Mr. Edgar explained that no attempt had been made to include static or basic intelligence. Also, no scientific intelligence requirements were included because it was felt there was nothing of interest in this area.

Admiral Inglis noted that these requirements covered only those that are currently essential.

General Chamberlin expressed the belief that this was intended to be an attempt to coordinate the whole collection effort in China.

General Vandenberg said that it was impossible to do this until the agencies had agreed on more basic issues, such as assignment of primary responsibilities. Meanwhile, this was an attempt to move forward as far as possible.

Admiral Inglis said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands, but that he was also baffled by the wording “Essential Elements of National Intelligence”. He thought they were all right, however, as targets for the next three months and as a trial case.

Mr. Eddy said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands.

General Vandenberg said that the value of this paper would depend upon the effort which all agencies put behind it.

General Chamberlin said that if the three items mentioned were considered the most important, the War Department would fulfill its part of the effort as a matter of priority.

General Samford understood that this was an experiment in stating current emphasis. He considered the paper all right as it is.

General Chamberlin expressed the belief that the terminology was twisted.

Mr. Edgar explained that the first step had been to study national policy toward China, on the theory that intelligence should operate for the policy-makers, to show them whether the policy was a success or needed change. It was felt that the essential elements were stated too broadly and were therefore broken down into collection requirements which could be turned over to the collection representatives to draft a collection directive. He realized that the terms used were somewhat different from military usage, but that the four agency representatives had agreed upon the present terminology. C.I.G., however, did not feel strongly about making a change in the terminology. Mr. Edgar suggested, and it was agreed, that “Essential Elements of National Intelligence” should be changed to read “Current Essentials of National Intelligence.”

General Chamberlin said that he would prefer not to approve the paper until he had seen the collection directive based thereon. He did agree tentatively that the paper was all right as a basis for preparation of a further collection directive.

Admiral Inglis suggested that the meeting of collection representatives be held to break down the requirements into allocations to each agency. These could then be checked with the I.A.B., and when approved each agency would issue directives to accomplish its part of the mission.

General Vandenberg asked if a further I.A.B. meeting would be necessary if the representatives of the agencies agreed on the collection directive.

Admiral Inglis did not think it would be necessary to put the paper on the agenda for another meeting, but felt that it could be checked informally with the I.A.B. members and issued as another C.I.G. paper.

Mr. Eddy suggested approval of the paper with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until assignment of collection responsibilities was agreed upon.

In answer to Mr. Eddy, Mr. Edgar said that the directives would be distributed to ambassadors and theater commanders through the appropriate departments.

After further discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Agreed upon the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19:

(1) Change “Essential Elements of National Intelligence” to read “Current Essentials of National Intelligence” throughout the paper.

(2) In paragraph 1, line 4, change “requirements” to read “objectives”.

b. Approved the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19, as amended, tentatively as a basis for the preparation of a subsequent collection directive, with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until the collection directive had been agreed upon.

2. Establishment of a Channel Between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (C.I.G. 15)²

General Vandenberg explained that consideration of this problem had been deferred at a previous I.A.B. meeting, and requested any further comments.

Admiral Inglis said that the matter had been discussed in the J.I.C. It was a complicated problem, and it was hard to decide whether J.I.C. or I.A.B. should discuss it further. He said that the Navy Department feels that one solution is General Vandenberg’s original proposal, which goes much farther then Admiral Inglis’ proposal in C.I.G. 15. Admiral Inglis circulated a sketch showing how the Navy thought General Vandenberg’s proposal might be put into effect. This involved moving the J.I.C. and the J.I.S. into the structure of the C.I.G. It also formed a link between the J.C.S. and the Director of Central Intelligence and between J.C.S. subcommittees and the C.I.G. It proposed a change in the membership of J.I.C. to service members only, plus the addition of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member in the same manner as on the I.A.B. With the change in membership it was suggested that the name be changed to Joint Intelligence Board (J.I.B.). Admiral Inglis thought that in peacetime the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible to the N.I.A., but that this might be reversed in wartime to make him responsible to the J.C.S. He felt that this proposal provided a necessary security wall around the military activities of J.I.C. The J.I.S. membership would stay the same except for the elimination of the State Department member. Liaison with the State Department, however, would be continued, but through the I.A.B. rather than the J.I.C.

Admiral Inglis explained that for the preparation of intelligence estimates the proposed J.I.S. would go both to O.R.E. and, for departmental intelligence, to the other departments. J.I.S. would belong to the J.I.B., with lateral communications with C.I.G.

Mr. Eddy thought that might be an ultimate solution, but suggested as an interim stop that the J.I.S. serve as an intelligence advisory staff to the I.A.B.

General Chamberlin said that he had not figured out a solution to the problem yet, but that he did have some fundamental principles which he felt should be considered. First of all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must remain an essentially military agency. General Chamberlin felt, however, that General Eisenhower would be hesitant to change any existing arrangements for coordination with the State Department.

Admiral Inglis said that he would like to make it perfectly clear that the Navy Department wants a link with the State Department and considers it absolutely essential. There is no intent, in the proposal he just outlined, to stop such coordination. It was felt, however, that coordination with the State Department would be adequately assured through the I.A.B.

General Chamberlin noted that the mission of the Director of Central Intelligence goes far beyond the scope of the J.C.S. Therefore, nothing should be done to circumscribe C.I.G. into a lesser mission. This is a second fundamental which General Eisenhower feels should be observed. Third, it would be bad to circumscribe free and direct contact, especially in wartime, from the J.C.S. to the President. Fourth, there should be nothing in the arrangement, as far as the making of war plans is concerned, which interpolates a civilian agency between planning agencies of the J.C.S., but, as General Vandenberg noted, these J.C.S. agencies should not be denied any intelligence necessary to enable them to perform their mission. Fifth, no agencies other than strictly military should have access to military plans. This should be a matter of right on the part of military agencies, for security reasons. General Chamberlin said that he was unable to figure out an organization which observed all of those fundamental principles. He felt, however, that there was great advantage in Admiral Inglis’ original suggestion in C.I.G. 15, since it would at least provide a piecemeal approach to the problem.

General Vandenberg said that the principles enunciated by General Chamberlin were also the objectives for which the C.I.G. was striving. He pointed out that the C.I.G. proposal provided a watertight compartment for the military. He observed, however, that allied to that consideration is the fact that the war planners must have the best intelligence and that it must be constantly supplied to them. The intelligence agency, therefore, should work right along with the planners. Specifically, General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Inglis’ new proposal established a watertight military compartment, but placed it next to the C.I.G., where it could draw on all available intelligence.

General Chamberlin noted that there were some subjects covered by J.I.C. subcommittees which C.I.G. should not have.

Admiral Inglis said that some could be put under the J.I.B. and others, such as the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board and the Publications Review Subcommittee, could be integrated into C.I.G.

Mr. Eddy said that he was willing to accept Admiral Inglis’ new proposal as an ultimate objective. He thought, however, that it would be possible to proceed immediately to liquidate the J.I.C. subcommittees and then follow that with Admiral Inglis’ proposal.

General Vandenberg felt that it would be difficult to justify the initial step proposed in C.I.G. 15 until a broad plan had been presented for approval. He thought that the broad plan should first be approved in principle and then the initial step approved for immediate implementation. He noted that if the process stopped after the initial step had been taken, C.I.G. would be accountable but not responsible.

Admiral Inglis said that one difficulty which had been discovered in his proposal in C.I.G. 15 was that personnel assigned to J.C.S. subcommittees may not be assigned additional duties without the approval of the J.C.S. He agreed with General Vandenberg that the ultimate objective should be presented at the same time that the initial step is submitted for approval.

Mr. Eddy felt that the question of the ultimate objective involved very broad considerations. He pointed out that there were three policy-forming groups—namely, the State Department in the political field, the J.C.S. in the military field, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in politico-military matters. He thought that the relationship of those groups should be carefully considered and presented in any ultimate solution. He felt that it might be premature to attempt to outline the ultimate objective.

General Vandenberg thought that it might be possible to show the end objective in broad terms, how far it was now possible to go, and why the initial step was being taken.

Mr. Eddy felt that this would require considerable time-consuming staff work to prepare. Therefore, he would like to see the first step taken as soon as possible.

General Vandenberg suggested that if there was general agreement, Admiral Inglis’ new proposal could be used as the ultimate objective and the proposal in C.I.G. 15 as the initial step. He suggested that people from ICAPS and the agencies be designated to write up such a proposal for consideration by the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

General Chamberlin stated that he could not say at this time that he approved the end result suggested by Admiral Inglis. He thought a way should be found to get the intelligence from C.I.G. without interpolating C.I.G. into the J.C.S. He explained that he was not opposed to General Vandenberg personally, but was in general doubtful of the wisdom of mixing up in the J.C.S. the head of an agency who reported to civilian authority.

Admiral Inglis asked if, in case of war, it would not be desirable to have the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group under the command of the J.C.S.

General Chamberlin said that in case of war he thought that the C.I.G. should be brought into the J.C.S. organization and made responsible for the whole intelligence effort. He granted that this would involve abolishing the J.I.C.

Admiral Inglis expressed the belief that the J.C.S. would not agree to abolish the J.I.C. any more than they would to the abolition of the Joint War Plans Committee. He noted that at present the Director of Central Intelligence reported to the N.I.A. His proposal was that the Director of Central Intelligence be assigned additional duties to serve the J.C.S. If at any time the Director of Central Intelligence was not agreeable to the J.C.S., the J.C.S. could easily cancel the agreement.

Mr. Eddy said that he agreed with this proposal, but noted that it must be submitted to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

General Vandenberg agreed because he felt that they would want to know what lay behind the initial step.

Mr. Eddy thought that would be desirable, but felt that if they could not agree on the ultimate objective, the initial step should be recommended as improving liaison between C.I.G. and J.I.C.

General Vandenberg said that he would like to wait a week or so to see if staff members could not write something which would be agreeable to the I.A.B.

General Chamberlin said that he could not see what progress would be made, because he was fundamentally opposed to the principles involved in Admiral Inglis’ new proposal.

General Vandenberg said that he felt it was the responsibility of the I.A.B. to recommend approval of some plan. He suggested, therefore, that if there was disagreement within the I.A.B., both a majority and a minority report be submitted to the N.I.A. He noted that nothing was being done about this situation at the present time. He wanted to stop unnecessary duplication, and felt that the solution of this problem was one of the best ways to avoid it.

General Chamberlin believed that the Director of Central Intelligence should not be on the J.I.B.

Admiral Inglis felt that if the Director of Central Intelligence is made responsible for furnishing intelligence, he must know the purpose which the intelligence is to serve.

General Chamberlin felt there was some way to provide for a lateral communication with the Director of Central Intelligence in order to obtain intelligence which would then go up through the J.I.B. He thought that the initial stop proposed in C.I.G. 15 was worth trying.

General Vandenberg said that this would put either the Director of Central Intelligence or the J.I.C. in an untenable position if it lasted for long. He said that he would agree to that arrangement for a short period, but that there must be a limit placed on its duration.

Admiral Inglis felt that the proposal in C.I.G. 15 was all right as a first step, but that it would not solve the problem. It would not tie C.I.G. in close enough with the J.I.C., and it would not eliminate all of the duplication.

General Chamberlin said that he could understand General Vandenberg’s objections. He thought, therefore, that General Vandenberg’s suggestion for preparation of a staff paper was best. It would then be possible to see what points could be agreed on, and to put up a minority report on those points that are not agreed. He said that he thought it was a responsibility of the J.I.C. to get intelligence from the C.I.G. He hoped to see a solution. He thought that the J.I.S. should work with the C.I.G. to get intelligence, provided security of military information was not jeopardized.

General Vandenberg felt that this would lead to the same difficulty that the J.I.C. is now encountering with the Joint War Plans Committee, in not knowing what is wanted. He felt strongly that if C.I.G. was asked for intelligence without being familiar with what was involved, it would put out intelligence without giving it proper weight or considering the ramifications or including all of the intelligence that might be available.

General Chamberlin did not think that C.I.G. should be taken into military planning.

General Vandenberg pointed out that Admiral Inglis’ new proposal would provide a watertight military compartment within C.I.G.

Admiral Inglis said that there must be a watertight compartment somewhere. The question is just where it should be established.

After further discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Designated the following individuals as representatives to work with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of C.I.G. in drafting proposed recommendations to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S. on the relationship between C.I.G. and the J.C.S., including, if necessary, a majority and minority report:

For Mr. Eddy:	Mr. Merritt B. Booth
	Mr. A. Sidney Buford
For General Chamberlin:	Colonel E. J. Treacy, Jr.
	Colonel L. L. Williams
	Colonel J. K. Dickey
For Admiral Inglis:	Captain R. K. Davis
	Captain F. S. Habecker
For General McDonald:	Colonel E. P. Mussett
	Colonel L. C. Sherman
For Secretariat, J.I.C.:	Captain R. U. Hyde

3. Assignment of Functions in the Field of Static Intelligence to the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 13³ and C.I.G. 13/1⁴)

General Vandenberg said that ICAPS was now trying to solve the basic issues in the subject papers. Therefore, even if this specific study were cancelled as proposed in C.I.G. 13/1, this would not mean that further action on the subject would not be taken.

Admiral Inglis said that he was willing to concur in C.I.G. 13/1, but that he wanted the record to show that the Navy will go just as far as other participating departments in collaborative efforts in this field.

General Chamberlin said that he would like to state some principles which he felt should govern the solution of this problem. First of all, he felt that each department should be supreme in its field of primary responsibility. For example, in its field of primary responsibility he did not think that the War Department could assign its functions to another agency because the War Department is charged by law with performing them. General Chamberlin thought, therefore, that the first thing to do was to assign areas of primary responsibility to each department. Then matters which are not in the field of these primary responsibilities should be assigned to C.I.G. He thought that those assignments should carry into the field of collection, but that they should not draw a narrow corridor which would prevent any field representative from getting useful information.

General Vandenberg said that he thought everyone agreed to these principles, but he questioned whether they had been transmitted to the agency representatives who were working with ICAPS.

General Chamberlin said that the implementation of those principles should be carefully timed to cause a minimum of interruption in the performance of necessary functions. He expressed the belief that the War Department now had the best balanced intelligence agency, and was fully engaged in the preparation of Strategic Intelligence Digests (S.I.D.). He hoped to obtain permission to complete these S.I.D.’s as a basis for assignment of responsibilities. Even after responsibilities had been assigned, he felt that each department must have a unit which is capable of presenting the whole picture to the officials of that department. He therefore would like to see the War Department preserve a strong Military Intelligence Service to fulfill the requirements of the Chief of Staff. For example, the War Department was working on war potential, which covers a very wide field. On this matter, the War Department was getting advice from other departments, but nevertheless was ultimately responsible for that field. He hoped that this statement of fundamentals would indicate the reason why he was voting as he had.

Admiral Inglis agreed that the principles were fine, but required definition. For example, what is military intelligence? He felt that while it was granted that the War Department was responsible for military intelligence, it should also be granted that the War Department must get intelligence elsewhere in order to complete the picture. This meant looking to other departments over which the War Department had no authority.

General Chamberlin said that he was perfectly willing to trust the State Department, Navy Department, and Air Forces for the intelligence in their fields of primary responsibility.

Admiral Inglis thought, then, that if it was granted that the War Department must obtain intelligence from agencies other than those under its command, it then became a question of which agency or agencies were best qualified and most efficient to produce the intelligence required. That was the principle Admiral Inglis had in mind in C.I.G. 13. He thought it would be possible to pool items of common interest in C.I.G. Then each agency would make available all that it received in those fields, and would draw off from C.I.G. what it needed. Admiral Inglis noted that General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz had directed General Craig and Admiral Inglis to join M.I.D. and O.N.I. in all possible fields. He said that an effort had been made to accomplish this, but that nothing had happened. Now with C.I.G. formed, he thought it might be possible to turn over some of these functions of common interest to C.I.G.

General Chamberlin did not recall having seen the directive to which Admiral Inglis referred, but said that he was nevertheless willing to follow the principles which he had enunciated.

Mr. Eddy said that he was in sympathy with the committee report, C.I.G. 13/1. He would like, however, to see the responsibility and functions of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board transferred to C.I.G. He said that if that recommendation were made, he would vote for it.

General Vandenberg expressed appreciation for Mr. Eddy’s suggestion, but felt that it was first necessary to settle the broader questions involved. If action was blocked after such piecemeal steps had been taken, it would not help the over-all intelligence picture.

General Samford thought that the guiding principle was that the functions required by each agency staff must be performed in that staff. Everything else he was willing to centralize.

General Chamberlin said that an example was the question of war potential in Russia. He noted that the War Department was now engaged in a comprehensive study of that subject, and he wondered whether it was intended that this project should be stopped.

Admiral Inglis thought that was an excellent example, since it involved intelligence of interest to all three departments. While G–2 was responsible for furnishing that data to the Chief of Staff, Military Attaches and other War Department sources were not adequate to get what was needed. The same thing is true in the Navy and State Departments. No one agency is competent to get all that information; each must rely on the other. Each now has a collecting agency feeding in that type of material. Admiral Inglis said that his idea was that when this information was received, instead of each agency having about a hundred people picking the brains of other agencies, fifty from each department could be transferred into C.I.G., where, with half the people, they would receive all departmental source material and do a better job.

General Chamberlin agreed that this was all right in theory, but that it would cause delay. For example, the War Department has already written hundreds of pages on all countries, and he did not think that work should be interrupted.

Admiral Inglis said that his example was something that could be worked up to. He did not think that any project should be interrupted until it could be taken over efficiently by C.I.G.

General Chamberlin agreed, and said that he thought that 30 June 1947 would be a date on which his projects could be turned over to some other agency.

Admiral Inglis recommended that the procedure be worked out step by step and extend over a period of time.

General Vandenberg felt that each agency, when it transferred a function to C.I.G., should still have a feeling of responsibility and an interest in seeing that the people who were working on the project were also transferred, in order to ensure the best possible product.

Admiral Inglis said that 30 June 1947 was an agreeable date for turning over to C.I.G.

General Chamberlin said that he would be willing to furnish surplus personnel available on that date. He pointed out, however, that G–2 had already let out some 700 individuals and was about down to its minimum requirements for military intelligence. In fact, there were fields of military intelligence which G–2 is not now covering. Therefore, when the S.I.D.’s are completed, G–2 would have to turn those people to the performance of some other G–2 function.

Admiral Inglis felt that there were two additional principles that should be recognized: First, each agency, in fulfilling its responsibilities, must collaborate with other agencies to complete the picture. Second, each agency has a responsibility for the successful performance of C.I.G.

General Chamberlin said that he felt a responsibility, as a member of the I.A.B., for the manner in which C.I.G. grows. On the other hand, he felt that one responsibility of C.I.G. was to build strong organizations in the departments to fulfill their primary functions.

General Vandenberg agreed, but noted that C.I.G. has no control over that matter at the present time.

After further discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved the recommendation in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 13/1, with the understanding that the basic issues involved are under continuing study by ICAPS and agency representatives.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.
1. CIG 19 as amended became NIA Directive No. 8, February 12, 1947. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) See the Supplement.
2. Dated September 18. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement. For a summary of this long-running issue during Vandenberg’s tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, see Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950, pp. 154–160.
3. Dated September 17. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
4. See footnote 7, Document 170.