Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

170. Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board⁰

Washington, October 1, 1946, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
• Members Present
• Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
• Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
• Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
• Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
• Also Present
• Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
• Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
• Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
• Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
• Mr. George B. McManus, Central Intelligence Group (for Item 1 only)
• Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
• Secretariat
• Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
• Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

1. [3 lines of source text not declassified]¹

General Vandenberg stated that subsequent to the last I.A.B. meeting he had conferred with Mr. Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After discussing C.I.G. 12/2, Mr. Hoover agreed with the paper provided some changes were made. It appeared that Mr. Hoover’s chief objection to C.I.G. 12/2 was exploitation by C.I.G. of subversive groups which the F.B.I might be contacting or investigating.

Admiral Inglis asked specifically what changes had been made in C.I.G. 12/2.

General Vandenberg explained the changes and stated that he was willing to go along with the paper, as amended, since he was fully in accord with Mr. Hoover’s viewpoint.

Admiral Inglis questioned the phrasing of paragraph 2 of C.I.G. 12/2,² and particularly that part thereof which reads “and American residents travelling abroad”. He suggested that consideration be given to clarifying that phrase.

Admiral Inglis then brought up the question of whether or not the changes in this paper would preclude O.N.I. from contacting “hyphenated” groups and individuals.

General Vandenberg replied that it would not, since such individuals and groups were not mentioned in the paper at all and there was no effect whatsoever.

Admiral Inglis suggested, and it was agreed, that an understanding to that effect appear in the minutes.

Mr. Lay read an interpretation of the intent of paragraph 3–b, which was accepted.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Concurred in the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 (subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 15).³

b. Noted that the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 eliminated provisions for coordination of the exploitation of other non-governmental groups and individuals not specifically mentioned therein.

[6 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties With Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. Directive No. 8)⁴

General Vandenberg stated that C.I.G. Directive No. 8 was based upon the arrangement existing at that time under which departments assigned personnel to C.I.G. The departments, therefore, assumed the responsibility for conducting necessary security investigations. He further stated that two developments had made this Directive out of date. First, it is clear that in the future the majority of C.I.G. personnel must be recruited from sources other than the departments. Second, the War Department finds it impossible to carry out the necessary investigations because of reduced personnel ceiling. As a result of these facts it will be necessary for C.I.G. to assume responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel. In conducting these security investigations, C.I.G. will adhere to the same security standards as established in this Directive and will, of course, check with the departments in each case. General Vandenberg assumed that when the departments nominate individuals in the future for C.I.G., the nominating department has at least made a preliminary check on its own files to determine that the individual meets C.I.G.’s security standards. General Vandenberg also assumed that the departments will complete all investigations initiated up to this time.

General Chamberlin stated that the War Department could check records on any new personnel nominations to C.I.G. and also that those checks they have started can be completed. However, that was about as far as he could go, in view of the greatly restricted personnel ceiling and tremendous backlog of requested checks now on hand.

Admiral Inglis stated that the Navy Department could also give a quick check on any personnel nominations they might make to C.I.G., but that the Navy Department too was suffering from reduced personnel and also had a large number of requested checks on hand. Admiral Inglis further stated that he believed that C.I.G. should in some way be covered to take care of the type of individual who did not pass a full security check but whose services would be of value to the Central Intelligence Group.

General Chamberlin suggested that exemption in these cases should be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.

General Vandenberg agreed that provision for such exemptions would be made.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Concurred in the proposal by General Vandenberg that C.I.G. undertake responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence. (Recision of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 subsequently circulated.)

3. Assignment of Functions in the Field of Static Intelligence to the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 13)⁵

General Vandenberg noted that the C.I.G. has already given consideration to this problem and its broad implications. Inter-departmental discussions on coordination, allocation, and centralization are being held under C.I.G. auspices. However, these discussions have indicated the need for an early I.A.B. or N.I.A. decision regarding the broad basis on which the assignment of primary responsibilities should be considered, and how each agency of secondary interest will have its needs for finished intelligence met.

Mr. Eddy asked what was meant by the term “statis intelligence”.

Admiral Inglis explained that it involved roughly the field covered by JANIS studies.⁶

General Vandenberg considered that it involved gathering a large mass of data and then preparing a basic study which would be of use to many agencies. He explained that political matters of a more or less permanent nature were included, such as the constitution of the country and the form of government if this was fairly stable.

Mr. Eddy felt that political and economic matters were at the present time in a state of change throughout a large part of the world. He said that the State Department did not object to coordination of these fields, but was not willing to turn over to C.I.G. the responsibility for getting this intelligence. That responsibility must remain in the State Department.

Admiral Inglis explained that O.N.I. must retain an interest in political and economic matters as they affect naval affairs. He did not think that naval and military attachés should be blind to political and economic developments. The subject paper, however, was not concerned with the problem of collection. Admiral Inglis explained that the War and Navy Departments had been studying what functions and activities could be performed jointly. It was useless, however, for these departments to make any joint arrangement if C.I.G. proposed to take over various functions and activities. The purpose of the subject paper was to initiate a study to find out what C.I.G. planned to do. He explained that the JANIS studies were used only as an example of the fields involved, but not as an example of the procedures to be used. The subject paper contemplated the possibility of turning over to C.I.G. people in the various agencies working on geographical desks who prepared material which is edited by the JANIS Board. Admiral Inglis stated that the paper was not confined to the subject of JANIS studies.

Mr. Edgar stated that the question raised by C.I.G. could be explained as follows: If political intelligence, in which O.N.I has an interest, is allocated to the agency of primary interest, would O.N.I. expect to receive this intelligence directly from the primary agency in proper form, or would O.N.I. have a group to put it into form, or would O.N.I. expect C.I.G. to do that?

General Vandenberg said that C.I.G. desired an expression of opinion from the I.A.B. as to whether they would like C.I.G. to operate as a middleman between departments, or if they would like direct contact between departments with C.I.G. in a coordinating role. He explained that if C.I.G. was to take over the preparation of static or strategic intelligence studies, C.I.G. would either have to receive the intelligence from the departments as JANIS now does, or would have to take over the people in the agencies who are now preparing this intelligence.

General Chamberlin felt that it was clear that certain departments were responsible for certain elements of intelligence, although this had never been put in the form of a written statement, to his knowledge. He wondered if it wasn’t possible for C.I.G. and the departments to parcel out functions on the basis of primary responsibility. Then each department would furnish finished intelligence to other departments who could rework it to meet their particular needs.

General Vandenberg said that the question involved in such a plan was whether C.I.G. should operate in the middle between departments or on the side.

General Samford stated that he voted for C.I.G. in the middle position.

Mr. Edgar said that a further question was whether the required intelligence should be written in proper form by the agency of primary responsibility, or by C.I.G.

General Chamberlin felt that another solution was preferable. This was that the proper function of C.I.G. should be to obtain intelligence from all departments and put it in the best form for the use of all departments.

General Vandenberg said that it was hard to have the intelligence put in the form required by any single department. For example, it would be difficult to get people in State to put intelligence in final form for use by the War Department.

Captain Davis said that the subject paper suggested a study of the possibility of placing C.I.G. in the middle role.

Mr. Eddy said that the problems facing the various departments were different. He thought that most of the intelligence now produced in the War and Navy Departments was for potential use in case of active operations. Political operations, however, are going on day by day, and the State Department has to produce intelligence for those current operations. He said that he would be glad to have State’s product sent to C.I.G. and integrated with similar intelligence from the War and Navy Departments.

General Vandenberg pointed out that the economic intelligence produced by State did not cover all of the needs in that field of the War and Navy Departments.

General Samford said that what each intelligence agency does stems from what its chief wants done. He felt that with C.I.G. in the middle role, the agencies would find that C.I.G. could do completely many of the things they required, and would eventually find that it was best to rely on C.I.G.

Mr. Eddy said that he would like to feel that C.I.G. would send to State the military and naval intelligence required by the diplomats.

General Chamberlin stated that if G–2 had an insight into State’s needs, G–2 could incorporate those needs into its documents. If all agencies sat down with C.I.G. to find each other’s needs, each agency could produce documents containing all the essential elements in its field of primary responsibility that any other agency needed to extract and pass to its operating officials.

Mr. Edgar felt that would mean that C.I.G. would devise a format of a national intelligence handbook to meet the individual requirements of each of the agencies.

General Chamberlin said that was not quite what he intended. Rather, if C.I.G. would find out what military intelligence State needs, then C.I.G. could arrange that G–2 include these needs in its documents.

General Vandenberg felt that a further step was involved. He thought that General Chamberlin was talking about weekly and daily reports, whereas the subject paper was concerned with the preparation of basic handbooks for use by all agencies. The question was whether C.I.G. should produce these handbooks, or ask each agency to produce appropriate sections of them.

General Chamberlin said that he preferred the latter arrangement. He noted, however, that the present JANIS covers only a part of the basic intelligence required.

Admiral Inglis enumerated the following fields which he felt should be studied by the committee proposed in the basic paper:

1. Establishment of elements which are susceptible of operation by C.I.G.

2. Proposed organization for the operation of such elements by C.I.G.

3. Space requirements.

4. A time schedule for the steps involved in taking over by C.I.G.

5. Standard filing system and central library, standard report form, and form for intelligence directives.

6. Method for responding to urgent requests.

General Samford felt that each agency should retain its own group to prepare reports, but that the basic material would be easier to work on if it were integrated by C.I.G.

Admiral Inglis thought that each agency should retain responsibility for operational intelligence and for collection and dissemination. He felt the place that C.I.G. could be of most help would be in the processing required between collection and dissemination. He felt that each agency must retain a staff to disseminate and to put material into the final form desired by its customers. He thought that each agency should assist in obtaining the basic intelligence information for C.I.G.

Mr. Eddy and General Samford said that they were in favor of the proposal as described by Admiral Inglis.

General Chamberlin felt that one other element must be retained in the departments, namely, that the intelligence officers must always be able to give their commanders an independent judgment.

General Vandenberg said that this was possible if the intelligence produced by departments was based on the same source but differently oriented.

General Chamberlin stated that each agency should not be excluded from getting information through their field representatives on subjects outside of the field of its primary interest.

General Samford agreed that each agency should be able to exploit all sources available to it.

General Chamberlin reiterated that it was necessary for each agency to retain independence of judgment.

Admiral Inglis said that this should be satisfied by each agency having its own people in C.I.G. He felt strongly that when naval officers were assigned to C.I.G. they were still naval officers and responsible for seeing that C.I.G. gets all necessary naval information and that the Navy gets all C.I.G. intelligence of interest to it.

General Vandenberg added that naval officers in C.I.G. should also ensure that C.I.G. estimates have the proper naval slant.

Admiral Inglis felt that if this was understood, the concern of each intelligence head regarding responsibility to his chief, was largely obviated.

Mr. Eddy said that State would be willing to cooperate if C.I.G. produced documents the use of which was permissible but not mandatory. If the subject proposal, however, lead to referring State Department requests to C.I.G. for preparation, he felt this would be a dangerous practice.

Admiral Inglis said that one of the problems is that, if personnel are turned over to C.I.G. and the departmental agencies accept this reduction of their force, they must be assured of the quick service required by their departments.

Mr. Edgar noted a further step in that, if the primary responsibility is allocated to another agency, C.I.G. will have to arrange that the latter agency meets requirements on time.

Mr. Eddy reiterated that each agency must retain responsibility for intelligence of primary interest. What is passed to C.I.G. will involve material of secondary interest to the various agencies.

General Samford agreed that all agencies must still concentrate on intelligence of primary interest.

General Chamberlin said that G–2 does not handle operational intelligence, but is concerned solely with strategic intelligence.

Admiral Inglis agreed that this was also true of O.N.I., except that it must retain a skeleton force for mobilization in case of active operations.

General Chamberlin felt that the solution lies along both lines suggested. Certain activities must be performed in the departments and other activities should be done centrally when they are of common interest and can be more efficiently handled centrally. He did not think that the I.A.B. could give definite guidance one way or the other. He felt that each case must be studied separately.

Admiral Inglis agreed that the problem could not be solved at this time, but that a committee must be formed to break the problem down into its various elements.

General Vandenberg said that he would ask for nominations for such a committee in the next few days. He explained that the purpose of this discussion was to have Mr. Edgar hear the viewpoints of the I.A.B. members so that he could guide the committee’s discussions.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would ask for nominations for a committee to conduct the study proposed in C.I.G. 13.⁷

4. War Plans for Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 14)⁸

General Vandenberg noted the recommendations in C.I.G. 14 and stated that as a general principle he firmly believed that the personnel requirements of the C.I.G. should be as fully mobilized in peace as in war. On that basis he stated that he would furnish the War and Navy Departments with an estimate of C.I.G. personnel requirements based on present planning, taking into account the probable number of Reserve officers assigned to C.I.G. He stated, however, that at C.I.G.’s present stage of organization any such estimates should be considered tentative and subject to substantial revision as the organization develops.

Admiral Inglis agreed that all C.I.G. personnel figures to be submitted at the present time could only be estimates. However, he wanted to be sure that all Regular Line officers assigned to C.I.G. would not be frozen in case of an emergency. He stated that he felt that the Navy Department should have some assurance that the Regular and Reserve Line officers assigned to C.I.G. would either be retained in toto or that a certain number of them would be released to the Navy for sea duty.

General Vandenberg agreed to give the Navy this information, and that such information would be based on the best possible estimation.

General Chamberlin stated that the War Department would like to have the same estimate on both Regular and Reserve Army officers assigned to C.I.G.

Mr. Lay stated that C.I.G. had already received such a request and that a reply was being prepared.

Mr. Eddy asked if C.I.G. would try to protect civilians assigned to C.I.G. in case of an emergency, in order that their services would not be lost.

General Vandenberg stated that these civilians would be protected unless they would be of more service to the Government elsewhere.

Mr. Eddy brought out the point that he believed that the civilians in C.I.G. would generally feel that they should be in uniform. He suggested that provision be made for retaining C.I.G. civilian personnel in time of war.

General Vandenberg stated that this involved a much longer range problem and should, in his opinion, be considered at a later date.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would furnish to the War and Navy Departments estimates of C.I.G. military and naval personnel requirements in case of mobilization.

5. Establishment of a Channel Between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (C.I.G. 15)⁹

General Vandenberg stated that Admiral Inglis had raised the question of the relationship between C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of this, C.I.G. has prepared a proposed directive on the subject, which he believed had been seen by all I.A.B. members. General Vandenberg further stated that it was his understanding, as a result of informal discussions in the departments by members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, that this proposed directive was generally acceptable to the I.A.B., and he therefore recommended concurrence in its submittal to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin stated that this paper as written was not entirely acceptable.

Mr. Lay stated that it was his understanding that members of ICAPS had coordinated this paper with representatives of the intelligence agencies of the State, War, and Navy Departments.

Admiral Inglis said that he was afraid the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be embarrassed if N.I.A. approved this proposal prior to the J.C.S. having a chance to comment.

Mr. Lay said that this was merely an attempt to find an appropriate recommendation for a solution to the problem. He also said that this paper, if acceptable to the J.I.C., could be submitted by them to the J.C.S. prior to N.I.A.’s consideration.

Admiral Inglis explained that this problem had been brought up by a J.I.S. request for information on nuclear energy, which had been prepared without knowledge of the fact that C.I.G. was also working on this problem. His original proposal, that J.I.S. serve as a staff for the I.A.B., was intended to offer an immediate interim means for coordinating C.I.G. and J.I.C. activities.

General Vandenberg felt that we should go the whole way if an acceptable final solution could be found. He felt that it might even be desirable for him as an intelligence representative to sit in on J.C.S. meetings as a non-voting member in order to learn what areas of the world were being worked on.

Admiral Inglis stated that he had the following changes to suggest in the C.I.G. paper: He had no objection to having the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the J.I.C., but he did not think that any one individual should be designated as chief intelligence adviser to the J.C.S.

General Vandenberg stated that for his protection he wanted some assurance that, if he served both the N.I.A. and the J.C.S., it was clear that only one of them was his master.

General Chamberlin pointed out that the difficulty was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be assured that their priorities are met. He thought that they would therefore wish to retain an intelligence organization under their control.

Mr. Eddy suggested a modification of Admiral Inglis’ proposal whereby the J.I.S. would formulate J.C.S. requirements for intelligence and would transmit them to C.I.G. for compilation. In this way the J.I.S. would serve more as a secretariat, and the intelligence would be produced by C.I.G.

General Samford noted that this would retain the J.I.S., who could then fulfill J.C.S. requirements if C.I.G. was unable to give them the necessary priority.

General Chamberlin questioned whether this would be acceptable to the planners, since he wondered whether they would be willing to let an outside agency in on their plans. He stated that the J.I.C. even now was still working on the problem of persuading the planners to let the intelligence people in on their plans.

General Vandenberg suggested that this problem be deferred pending further study.

General Chamberlin agreed, and said that he would like to discuss it with General Eisenhower.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Deferred action on C.I.G. 15.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Secret: Limited Distribution. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the New War Department.
1. [text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency Histroical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
2. Inglis apparently was referring to the changes in CIG 12/2 that Vandenberg had mentioned (no written version of which has been found) [text not declassified].
3. [text not declassified] (Central Intellegence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
4. Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–275)
5. Dated September 17. (Ibid., HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
6. The Joint Army–Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were basic country handbooks intended to provide essential information for military planners.
7. The committee appointed to make the study reported on November 4, 1946. The report, CIG 13/1, concluded that fundamental differences precluded a study. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
8. Dated September 19. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
9. Dated September 18. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.