136. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Publicity on Bogota Intelligence Reports
PARTICIPANTS
- CIA—Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter
- S/S—Mr. Humelsine
- SA-A—Mr. Armstrong
Upon entering Admiral Hillenkoetter’s office, he said to Mr. Armstrong, “Well, I kept you off the spot, didn’t I?” To this Mr. Armstrong [Page 313] replied, “Perhaps, but you certainly put the State Department on it.” Admiral Hillenkoetter admitted this.
Admiral Hillenkoetter then described the circumstances of the hearing before the Committee headed by Congressman Clarence Brown on the preceding day. He said that the statement which he had made before the Committee had been shown to Admiral Leahy (and indicated that the President had been consulted in the matter) and that he had then shown it to Secretary Forrestal. He stated that Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal had told him to go ahead with the statement even if it involved a public hearing. Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that the hearing before the Committee had been first in executive session, but that upon its completion, the Chairman had called in the press and required him to read his statement again to the reporters.
Mr. Humelsine requested Admiral Hillenkoetter to explain his references in his testimony to the CIA report allegedly “censored” by a Mr. O.J. Libert at Bogota. Admiral Hillenkoetter picked up a memorandum, a copy of which is attachéd, and read it.1
The memorandum had been prepared, he said, by the CIA Agent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Bogota and was an explanation of the Agent’s instructions to CIA in Washington that the message he sent on March 23rd should not be forwarded to the State Department. Mr. Humelsine and Mr. Armstrong noted that the statement did not indicate that Ambassador Beaulac had interposed any objection to the message being transmitted to the State Department and that the CIA Agent had accepted unquestioningly the authority of an administrative officer of the International Conference Division as sufficient to block the transmission of the message. Mr. Armstrong asked why the Agent had not gone back to the Ambassador and urged the sending of the information, if he thought it was important. Admiral Hillenkoetter responded that the Agent had to “live” with the Embassy and therefore could not afford to antagonize the personnel there.
Mr. Humelsine then said to Admiral Hillenkoetter, “It is inconceivable to me that you personally could have had the information to which your man Attachéd such importance and not have sent it to the Department regardless of your subordinate’s instructions from Bogota.” Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that in hindsight he felt he should have done so and that, in fact, when the information was received, on or about March 23, he had suggested doing so. However, in a discussion of the matter with his Deputy, General E.K. Wright, his Executive Officer, Captain Ford, and Colonel Galloway, the Deputy Director for Special Operations, he had been advised against doing so on the grounds that their man in [Page 314] Bogota would be placed in serious trouble vis-à-vis the Ambassador and the staff.
Admiral Hillenkoetter went on to indicate the general character of the difficulties which his overseas covert operations have encountered at various [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] posts. He particularly referred to a situation at [1 line of source text not declassified] and pointed out that the man had gone to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in September 1947 and had not as yet been able to make any official report or even send official word of his arrival on duty. Mr. Humelsine said that this was news to him and, it being a serious matter, would be investigated at once.
Admiral Hillenkoetter then recited the history of the efforts CIA has made to obtain departmental agreement to the enlargement of its overseas staff and said that since July 1947 he had been trying to get [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] additional number of agents without success. He stated that he had talked to Mr. Peurifoy about it last fall and had at first found him sympathetic to his request and to the CIA’s staffing problem. After a further delay, Mr. Peurifoy had written him to the effect that the additional assignments not only would not be granted, but that by January 1st the overseas force would have to be reduced to no more than 200 agents. He recalled that Mr. Peurifoy had subsequently told him that he had signed this letter only with “great reluctance”. Admiral Hillenkoetter recounted conversations which he had had with Mr. Armour, Mr. Neal, Mr. Ravndal, and others on the subject in which the divergence of views on the function of CIA in the field became apparent. He stated that he had also talked to Secretary Forrestal and that the latter had talked to Mr. Lovett. It had been agreed between them that the Committee surveying CIA operations headed by Mr. Allen Dulles would attempt to resolve the impasse. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Admiral Hillenkoetter said that the CIA had been unjustifiably, in his opinion, put on the spot by the State Department’s failure to release publicly the information which had been given by Lincoln White at a Thursday evening, April 15th, press conference and that he thought the Department deserved whatever heat might now be on it. Mr. Humelsine pointed out that the State Department looked upon this situation as being the responsibility of the Executive Branch of the Government, not of one department which could disclaim responsibility by shifting the burden to another. He asked the Director why he had not informed the Department that CIA was under pressure and requested its cooperation. Mr. Humelsine recalled to the Director that he had telephoned him, at Mr. Lovett’s request, when he first heard that there would be a congressional investigation and had asked him if there was anything the State Department could do to help. Mr. Armstrong said that he too had telephoned the Director in the same vein and noted that in neither case had [Page 315] the Director indicated that the CIA was under disturbing pressure or that the State Department could, or should, do anything in the circumstances. Admiral Hillenkoetter referred to the fact that the newspapers and radio had continuously indicated that CIA was being held accountable for the alleged intelligence failure at Bogota and said that the Department should have known that the only corrective would be to issue a statement on the quantity and quality of information that had been available.
Admiral Hillenkoetter then reverted to the difficulties he has encountered in getting his program implemented through the State Department and the Foreign Service and said that he would much prefer to have relations with the Department centralized in one office and that if he could do all of his business with Mr. Armstrong’s office, he thought that better results would ensue. He emphasized that his relations with Mr. Armstrong and the substantive side of intelligence were satisfactory, and that he hoped that the Department would take steps to make his relations center in one place. Mr. Humelsine said that he thought this was essential and should be carried into effect and he would so report to Mr. Lovett.
In closing, Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that if relations with the Department did not improve in the near future, [2 lines of source text not declassified] he intended to inform the President and, if necessary, the Congress, that they could not hold him responsible for obtaining the intelligence information that he is charged with at present. He stated that he would have to bring the blocking of his plans by the Department to public notice, since not, in some cases, he is able to get only 60% or less of the information that he should and would get if his program were fully put into effect.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration—Subject Files, 1944–47: Lot 53 D 28, Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Box 19. Secret. Drafted by Humelsine and Armstrong.↩
- Not printed; see the Supplement.↩