837.61351/12–2244: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Braden) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 23—1 a.m.]
1076. This afternoon I communicated the nonconfidential part of Department’s telegram No. 952 December 21, 5 p.m. to Seiglie. He proposes immediately to inform his Mission colleagues, telling them it is now incumbent on them to decide whether they will accept the 3-cent price and then to call upon and inform the President of their decision.
Seiglie reiterated his often expressed conviction that, in one way or another, we will obtain the sugar as needed and declared that in his last conversation with Grau the President expressed appreciation for our having raised price for political reason to 3 cents and said under no circumstances would he permit us to be “held up”. Nevertheless the Cuban Government does not wish to appear as putting pressure on industry nor to have United States Government appear to be pressing Cuba.
Seiglie explained that while at meeting, reported in my telegram No. 1068 December 14,58 consensus of Cubans was to insist on sale of two crops (Casanova and Santiesteban having declared they would refuse flatly to consider sale of only one crop) he nevertheless felt solution might be reached through sale of 1945 zafra alone. Wherefore as an entirely personal matter in order that he might better advise the President as to how best to maneuver in this situation he hoped I could ascertain and inform him, in strict confidence whether or not we would be content to contract for the 1945 zafra alone, the agreement in general to be the same as for 1944 excepting that price would be 3 cents and there would be included the security clause, with such relatively minor alterations as he feels confident could be agreed upon between two Governments; this agreement would also include the same stipulations as to price and otherwise in respect of molasses and alcohol as in the 1944 agreement and there would be included 250,000 long tons for local consumption and 150,000 long tons for free market.
I told him I did not like the idea myself and did not know whether the United States Government agencies would even be willing to express an opinion. I added that after all the next move was really up to the Cuban Mission; in this he agreed.
Please advise me whether or not you feel such an arrangement as Seiglie suggests would be feasible and what, if anything, I may advise him in connection herewith.
- Not printed.↩