825.6363/401: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)
656. Any solution which might possibly be arranged to assist the short stock position of petroleum products created in Chile as a result of heavy over consumption would have to be predicated on a firm realizable commitment on the part of the Chilean authorities to maintain consumption during the remainder of this year within the limits of existing allotments. This refers to your 960 of June 2, 1944.
Chile has persisted over the entire life of the petroleum pool arrangement in flagrantly disregarding the equitable consumption limits applied to her petroleum product imports along the same lines accepted by all other members of the Latin American pool.
In 1943 Chile over consumed her civilian allotment of gasoline by 38%, kerosene 99%, diesel oil 65%) and fuel oil 15%. In the first three months of 1944 her over consumption was respectively, 58%, 183%, 44% and 49%. It is evident that such extreme over consumption in the face of repeated warnings could not have other than a disastrous result as soon as it became necessary to discontinue the excess of products over formula quantities being delivered into Chile in an effort to provide her with emergency reserve of stocks. These stocks have been dissipated by unauthorized consumption and it is obvious that with the present and prospective tanker and product situation, Chile cannot continue to be supplied large additions to formula quantities. The rate of consumption in the civilian category in Chile in the first quarter of this year was equivalent to 63% of 1941 consumption whereas all other countries are limited to 40% of 1941 civilian consumption.
It is difficult to understand how a situation which is the exclusive responsibility of the Chilean authorities and results from their persistent disregard of numerous warnings can justifiably be a political responsibility of this country.
We are canvassing the possibility of relief measures but do not now see a solution. For obvious reasons we would not wish to resort to the chartering of an Argentine tanker and would have preferred the oil companies not to have suggested this possibility at least until it became evident that no other existed, especially since the problem is one of supply as well as transportation. There is no assurance at this time that products would be available to load such a tanker.
[Page 744]Is the Department correct in understanding that the prospective stock difficulty refers only to gasoline.
Please advise minimum gasoline requirements which in your estimation would avoid complete disruption of bus transportation.