715.1715/11–1844

The Ambassador in Honduras (Erwin) to the Secretary of State

No. 1485

Sir: I have the honor to refer to your confidential telegram No. 231 of September 27, 1944, 5 p.m.25 and to state that an appropriate occasion has not presented itself for further conversations with President Carías respecting the Honduras–Nicaragua boundary. Since the receipt of the telegram under reference I have also received a copy of the airgram which Ambassador Stewart sent to the Department under date of October 12, 1944, 4 p.m., A–428.

[Page 225]

It is true that the relations between Carías and Somoza appear to be friendly at the present time. However, Mr. Bonsal’s approach to this matter on the two occasions when he talked with President Carías last May and June was a proposal to execute the laudo of the King of Spain, whereas the conversation which President Somoza had with Ambassador Stewart appears to contemplate a definite ceding by Honduras of a part of the area given the latter under the award.

Nevertheless, the subject would have been taken up again with President Carías before now except for the unsettled political conditions which have been reflected in the various telegrams and despatches from this Embassy to the Department, as well as those received from neighboring countries. In addition, I was informed confidentially about three weeks ago that President Carías had had a severe heart attack the previous night. This information came through Dr. Juan M. Fiallos, the President’s personal physician. So far as I am informed, he has had no recurrence of this ailment.

These circumstances seemed to suggest that the “appropriate occasion” mentioned in the Department’s telegram under reference has not arisen.

As the Department knows, these unsettled political conditions still exist. I will take the earliest possible occasion after there has been a lull to again broach the boundary settlement. To do so at this moment, especially if there should be a leak to the public about the matter, would possibly intensify local political agitation. While the question does not appear to have been such a delicate one on the Nicaraguan side of the line, where (according to the Minister of Nicaragua to Honduras and other authorities) it has only excited public interest when whipped up by artificial means, it is a peculiarly touchy subject among all classes of Hondurans. This is the one question on which the Reds and Blues26 are united. The school children have had it drilled into them that this effort to take away from Honduras the fruits of its victory in the arbitral award of the King of Spain is one of the great injustices which have been attempted against the country. Public thought has been so inflamed on this subject over a period of years that any hint that a sitting president was considering agreeing to a modification of Honduras’ territorial claims would bring an instant political upheaval.

While it has no direct connection with the Honduras–Nicaragua settlement, only recently an attaché of the Foreign Office brought to my attention a newspaper clipping, under a Quito date line, stating that ex-President Carlos Arroyo del Rio, of Ecuador, and others concerned, had been subjected to sanctions by the Ecuadoran Assembly [Page 226] because of the Ecuador–Peru boundary settlement.27 The Foreign Office was obviously impressed that penalties in the form of confiscation of 80 percent of the property of those Ecuadorans who made this settlement had been meted out. This is no valid argument against a dispute involving two other countries being pressed for early consideration, but it indicates the extreme caution with which the matter should be approached because of its widespread political implications.

This latter phase is one of the considerations that makes me feel as a matter of sound judgment and expediency that I should ask the Department’s indulgence in making immediate representation to President Carías. The matter will again be presented at the earliest feasible moment. If the Department believes that the urgency of the matter outweighs the other considerations stated, I will present the matter without further delay, although I feel the prospects for a successful negotiation will be enhanced by waiting until the present internal and external conditions have improved.

Respectfully yours,

John D. Erwin
  1. See footnote 22, p. 222.
  2. Liberals and Conservatives.
  3. See bracketed note, p. 213.