893.00/11–444: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:20 p.m.]
1781. 1. We have been informed very privately and in strictest confidence by one of its members that PPC delegation (telegram 1571, September 16, 8 p.m.) will shortly proceed to Yenan, departing secretly out of fear of air interception by Japs.
2. Their hesitancy to go is explained by informant as due to their feeling that if they should proceed without some prior understanding with Generalissimo as to their position and the attitude they should adopt at Yenan, the mission would be disastrous for them: if on return they should recommend some compromise or form of agreement displeasing to Chiang or Kmt they would at once be accused of having been bribed by the Communists. They are therefore considering laying before Gmo prior to their departure appropriate proposals among these under discussion by members of the delegation being the following: reorganization of Supreme National Defense Council to bring in limited Communist representation (and perhaps representation of other minority parties) or setting up of new governing body to include heads of Yuan, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and War and certain Communist and independent party “Ministers without Portfolio”; on military side some arrangement under which Communists would have assurance of National Government support for certain number of divisions.
3. The essence of the Kmt–Communist impasse is that the Communists are naturally unwilling to accept any settlement which might entail liquidation or dissolution of their military forces and thus virtual elimination of their party; the Kmt for its part is looking determinedly to elimination of the Communists and is more than unwilling to give them any legitimate and secure place in the military and political scheme which would entail reduction of Kmt control or prestige or any sharing of government power. Almost all moves these days, political or military, of Chiang and his medievally minded cohorts revolve around the pressing problem of maintaining themselves in power, and under these circumstances there is little [Page 666] if any possibility of achieving a reasonable or realistic settlement of either the Communist or the other difficulties which are more and more besetting Chiang’s regime as the weeks go by.