893.00/10–2044
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Willys R. Peek of the Division of Cultural Cooperation
The Chinese Ambassador asked Mr. Peck to lunch with him in order to go over two or three subjects of mutual interest. Mr. Wei Tao-ming and Mr. Peck have been friends for many years, beginning when Mr. Peck was sent to Nanking as Counselor of Legation in 1931.
The first subject introduced by Mr. Wei for informal discussion was that of the 1200 technicians to be trained with Lend-Lease funds under the auspices of FEA.
The second subject was the program of cultural cooperation between the United States and China. Mr. Wei indicated a keen sense of the importance of this form of cooperation in determining the character of relations between China and the United States.
The third subject was the American popular impression of the Communist problem in China. Mr. Wei as much as said that this was the principal object for which he had sought a meeting with Mr. Peck and that he was discussing the matter privately with other friends of his in Washington who are qualified to understand it by their knowledge of conditions in China.
Mr. Wei believes that the Communist problem in China is by no means restricted to that country; he believes that it is part of a worldwide Communist problem and that it exists in any country in which there are Communists, even in the United States.
Mr. Peck naturally inquired in the course of the conversation whether the Communists in China are connected with the Communist Party or the Soviet Government in Moscow. Mr. Wei said that the Communists in China, and also those in other countries outside of Russia, are even more extreme than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. “They are more Communist than the Communists”, meaning [Page 653] that they are more fanatical in their belief in Communism as a world movement.
Mr. Wei said that the tactics used by the Communists in China are practically the same as the tactics used by the Soviet Government, that is, to resist the opponent, but never to break with him completely, and to make ostensible concessions, but never to yield anything in substance. Throughout their long negotiations with the Chinese Government the Chinese Communists have been careful never to break off completely the possibility of continuing discussions. Should they have done so at any time they would have lost a major element in their bargaining power and their national position in China. Under the second heading, Mr. Wei prophesied that the Communists in China would be willing to discuss modifications in the territory set aside for the occupation of their armies, but would never consent that those armies be subjected to the authority of the Supreme National Defense Council. The reason they give publicly for this attitude is their professed belief that the Chinese Government wishes to acquire authority over the Communist forces only that it may be able to send them to places in the front line in which they cannot avoid annihilation.
Mr. Wei prophesied that as long as there seemed to be a prospect of success the Chinese Communists would never surrender the command of their armies, but that if the discussion could be continued until after the war, the Chinese Government could nevertheless settle the whole question “by political means”. The use of this phrase seemed to Mr. Peck to be a concession to some recent announcements by General Chiang Kai-shek and to American opinion, since the implication from his other remarks was that after the war the Communist armies would be forcibly disbanded.
Mr. Wei felt greatly concerned lest the clever propaganda issued by the Chinese Communist Party should persuade the American public to give it moral support and even persuade the American Government to give it military supplies. If, through these two means, the Communist regime should receive an access of military strength, the threat to China’s efficiency in the war and to China’s unity would be serious.
As an instance of the subservience of the Chinese Communist Party to the Soviet Government, Mr. Wei recalled that when Matsuoka37 and Stalin on April 13, 1941 concluded a neutrality pact,38 the Chinese Communists uttered no word of criticism, even though they themselves professed to be fighting against the Japanese invasion. He mentioned that the Soviet Government is using now the same sort of idealistic tactics in regard to Poland and Germany as it used in taking a [Page 654] position of neutrality in respect to Japan’s activities. In the case of Germany he felt that the Soviet Government would probably want to preserve that country as a buffer state in Europe.
Mr. Wei said that one of the reasons why he strongly opposed the Communists in China was their ruthless cruelty. Whenever they found themselves in control of an area in China they did not hesitate to commit wanton slaughter, even for such trivial purposes as to make the available food suffice for the population. Mr. Wei recounted one or two instances of this ruthless disregard for human life shown by the Communists. Mr. Wei frankly admitted that the National Government of China and the Nationalist Party had been very faulty in their administration of affairs, having been guilty of inefficiency and corruption in many cases. Incidentally, he said that he himself was not a member of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and that he had not hesitated to criticize the Party. Nevertheless, he pleaded that the United States should not allow itself to be persuaded that the Communists had all the right on their side and the Chinese Government all the wrong. He asked for forbearance, patience and confidence on the part of the United States. He emphasized that if unfortunately it should turn out that the Communists obtained physical control of China, the international consequences might be far-reaching and grave.
Mr. Peck, for the most part, listened to Mr. Wei’s observations without comment. When Mr. Wei described the atrocities committed by the Communists in Mr. Wei’s own province of Kiangsi and other provinces in central China before they made their long journey to the Northwest, Mr. Peck admitted that he had heard similar accounts at the time.
In regard to the American attitude toward the Communist question in China, Mr. Peck observed that Americans were not surprised at or disturbed by violent differences of political opinion or by vehement expression of such opinion; the same things occurred in the United States, as evidenced in the present political campaign. In fact, the American people regarded such violent discussions as evidence of the existence of free speech. What they objected to was the use of force to suppress political opposition.
Mr. Wei observed that no reports ever came out of the Soviet Union indicating that the Russian people criticized their Government in any way and obviously no freedom of speech existed there. Reports of political differences did come out of China, however. (Note: The inference was plain that in Mr. Wei’s opinion if there were the same rigid suppression in China as in Russia, there would be the same appearance of unanimity. W. R. P.)
Mr. Wei said that whereas violent political disagreements existed both in the United States and in China, it was more serious in China, [Page 655] because the opposition to the Government was upheld by armed force. If the Chinese Communists used only the methods employed by the opposition party in the United States, the Chinese Government would not array military force against them. The Communists’ insistence on possession of an army showed that they intend to retain and expand an area under their armed domination as a base from which to extend their power. Speaking very confidentially, Mr. Wei said that if the view that the Chinese Government ought to condone armed resistance by the Communists were pressed on General Chiang Kai-shek to a point of extreme exasperation, he could not foresee what serious results might not follow.
- Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1940–41.↩
- See telegram No. 763, April 13, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 944.↩