740.0011 P.W./10–1344
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 7.]
Subject: The Growth of the New Fourth Army; An Example of the Popular Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch no. 3057, dated October 13, 1944, “Operations of the 8th Route Army”, and to enclose a copy of report no. 22, September 4, 1944, on the above subject,29 prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary on detail to General Stilwell’s staff who is now in Yenan as a member of the U.S. Army Observer Section.
Summary of Enclosure. The spectacular development of the Chinese Communist armies during the present war has proved them to be an extremely powerful political instrument since that development would not have been possible without the support of the people. This support must be considered a practical indication that the policies and methods of the Chinese Communists have a, democratic character. The success of the Communist forces in winning it is exemplified in the history of the New 4th Army, organized in 1938 with a strength of 12,000 men. Operating in partly Japanese and partly Kuomintang-controlled territory, it suffered losses in engagements with both, the largest being 7,000 casualties from the “Incident” in January, 1941. Recruits joining the New 4th were regarded by the Central Government as rebels; they were very poorly supplied with arms. Yet in the spring of 1942 the strength of the Army had risen to 100,000; in the spring of 1944, its regular strength had risen to 152,000 armed with 93,000 rifles and supported by a People’s Militia of 550,000. Stable base areas had been created with a total population, paying taxes only to the Chinese Communists, numbering 30,000,000. The Kuomintang forces with which the New 4th Army had originally shared areas, and which had had the benefit of supplies, reinforcements, and government support, had in the same period grown steadily weaker, most of them having by now disintegrated, turned puppet, or withdrawn. The Communists explain this as resulting from their [Page 647] tactics, some of which are: to gain the confidence of the people in a military sense by successful engagements; to explain the war to the people; to sponsor the establishment of democratically elected local governments; to reduce taxes, rents, and interest; to avoid forced conscription, and to take care of the families of soldiers. End of Summary.
In commenting on these statements, Mr. Service points out that General Chen Yi, the Vice Commander of the New 4th Army (who is evidently Mr. Service’s source for some of the information in the report) may be excused if he has painted an exaggeratedly favorable picture of the growth of that Army, of which he is in active command, but that the fact remains that the Communists have been successful in winning the support of the people in the areas in which they have operated, while the Kuomintang has not.
Respectfully yours,
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